ACLs (was: Ext3 filesystem info?)

Benjamin Scott (dragonhawk@iname.com)
Mon, 20 Sep 1999 21:39:11 -0400 (EDT)


On Mon, 20 Sep 1999, Oliver Xymoron wrote:
> Not to mention that auditing a system using ACLs for security is much*
> more difficult. And that such a system would break all mature UNIX
> tools' notions of what is secure. ACLs tend to be an answer for people who
> are asking the wrong question anyway.

I strongly disagree with that last sentence. There are a number of things
that ACLs let you do, that standard UNIX security does not. I would even
argue that ACLs can lead to better security, as it allows you to specify
combinations which would be difficult or impossible with traditional UNIX
mechanisms. Like most anything, it depends on the application.

I agree that, like any powerful tool, ACLs can be easily misused. But that
theory applies to UNIX in general. :-) I have implemented Linux in
situations as small as a six person company, and even then, ACLs were
something I missed. I would be happy to provide examples if you like.

As far as existing tools and auditing techniques go, yes, ACLs are outside
their domain. However, I believe categorically dismissing all possible
improvements is an error. Otherwise, this mailing list would not exist. :)

--
Benjamin Scott
dragonhawk@iname.com

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