There was, at one point, something circulating about security patches to
give more fine grained allocation of things like the lower ports which
solves both problems, but I haven't heard anything recently...
-Rob H.
On Tue, 31 Mar 1998, Gerhard Mack wrote:
> On Tue, 31 Mar 1998, Andreas Kostyrka wrote:
>
> > On Tue, 31 Mar 1998, Chris Evans wrote:
> >
> > >
> > > On Tue, 31 Mar 1998, Jeremy Fitzhardinge wrote:
> > >
> > > > Hi all,
> > > >
> > > > Here's a patch which prevents chrooted processes from escaping from
> > > > their chrooted area via /proc.
> > >
> > > Hi,
> > >
> > > I'm not sure I agree with this approach -- perhaps root processes should
> > > not be allowed to use the mount() syscall if root_dir != real_root. The
> > > other main source of nastiness is ptrace() -- this needs to be banned in a
> > > similar manner. There are other ways root could escape a chroot()
> > > jail, we need to think about them and eliminate them one by one.
> > - mknod()
> >
> > Other are not that nasty, but still nasty:
> > - bind(): the lower ports are reserved to root, so another box may trust
> > that a connection is coming from a system program, and not a
> > user process.
>
> It would be really nice if the stuff atatched to the lower ports didn't
> need to be root. That is the only place I've ever had my system
> broken into from. Wasn't even that old of a system. (redhat 4.2)
>
> Gerhard
>
> --
> Gerhard Mack
> gmack@imag.net
> innerfire@starchat.net
>
> As a computer I find your faith in technology amusing.
>
>
>
> -
> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
> the body of a message to majordomo@vger.rutgers.edu
>
-
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@vger.rutgers.edu