Re: [PATCH 1/2] x86/random: Retry on RDSEED failure

[Jason A. Donenfeld]

On Tue, Jan 30, 2024 at 02:43:19PM +0000, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 30, 2024 at 03:06:14PM +0100, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> > Is that an accurate summary? If it is, then the actual problem is that
> > the hardware provided to solve this problem doesn't actually solve it
> > that well, so we're caught deciding between guest-guest DoS (some
> > other guest on the system uses all RDRAND resources) and cryptographic
> > failure because of a malicious host creating a deterministic
> > environment.
> 
> In a CoCo VM environment, a guest DoS is not a unique threat
> scenario, as it is unrelated to confidentiality. Ensuring
> fair subdivision of resources between competeing guests is
> just a general VM threat. There are many easy ways a host
> admin can stop a guest making computational progress. Simply
> not scheduling the guest vCPU threads is one. CoCo doesn't
> try to solve this problem.
> 
> Preserving confidentiality is the primary aim of CoCo.
> 
> IOW, if the guest boot is stalled because the kernel is spinning
> waiting on RDRAND to return data, that's fine. If the kernel
> panics after "n" RDRAND failures in a row that's fine too. They
> are both just yet another DoS scenario. 
> 
> If the kernel ignores the RDRAND failure and lets it boot with
> degraded RNG state there were susceptible to attacks, that would
> not be OK for CoCo. 

Yea, that's why I said "we're caught deciding..." One case is a DoS that
would affect all VMs, so while one guest preventing new guests from
booting seems like not a CoCo problem, yes, it is still a problem.

At least in theory. And in practice this is easy with RDSEED too. In
practice, could you actually indefinably starve RDRAND between guests?
Is this pretty easy to do with a little tinkering, or is this a
practically impossible DoS vector? I don't actually know.