Re: [syzbot] [usb?] KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Read in read_descriptors (3)

From: Khazhy Kumykov
Date: Fri Jul 21 2023 - 18:40:20 EST


On Fri, Jul 21, 2023 at 11:56 AM Alan Stern <stern@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Jul 21, 2023 at 11:23:10AM -0700, Khazhy Kumykov wrote:
> > On Fri, Jul 21, 2023 at 11:10 AM Khazhy Kumykov <khazhy@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Mon, Jun 19, 2023 at 7:56 PM syzbot
> > > <syzbot+18996170f8096c6174d0@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > Hello,
> > > >
> > > > syzbot found the following issue on:
> > > >
> > > > HEAD commit: 40f71e7cd3c6 Merge tag 'net-6.4-rc7' of git://git.kernel.o..
> > > > git tree: upstream
> > > > console+strace: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=1581445b280000
> > > > kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=ac246111fb601aec
> > > > dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=18996170f8096c6174d0
> > > > compiler: gcc (Debian 10.2.1-6) 10.2.1 20210110, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.35.2
> > > > syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=15d23487280000
> > > > C reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=16613ed3280000
> > > >
> > > > Downloadable assets:
> > > > disk image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/30922ad38c58/disk-40f71e7c.raw.xz
> > > > vmlinux: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/3bd12e7503b8/vmlinux-40f71e7c.xz
> > > > kernel image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/1dcd340b18d4/bzImage-40f71e7c.xz
> > > >
> > > > IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
> > > > Reported-by: syzbot+18996170f8096c6174d0@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > > >
> > > > ==================================================================
> > > > BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in read_descriptors+0x263/0x280 drivers/usb/core/sysfs.c:883
> > > > Read of size 8 at addr ffff88801e78b8c8 by task udevd/5011
> > > >
> > > > CPU: 0 PID: 5011 Comm: udevd Not tainted 6.4.0-rc6-syzkaller-00195-g40f71e7cd3c6 #0
> > > > Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/27/2023
> > > > Call Trace:
> > > > <TASK>
> > > > __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
> > > > dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:106
> > > > print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x3c0 mm/kasan/report.c:351
> > > > print_report mm/kasan/report.c:462 [inline]
> > > > kasan_report+0x11c/0x130 mm/kasan/report.c:572
> > >
> > > "src = udev->rawdescriptors[cfgno]" (so, just reading rawdescriptors)
> > >
> > > > read_descriptors+0x263/0x280 drivers/usb/core/sysfs.c:883
> > > > sysfs_kf_bin_read+0x19a/0x270 fs/sysfs/file.c:97
> > > > kernfs_file_read_iter fs/kernfs/file.c:251 [inline]
> > > > kernfs_fop_read_iter+0x387/0x690 fs/kernfs/file.c:280
> > > > call_read_iter include/linux/fs.h:1862 [inline]
> > > > new_sync_read fs/read_write.c:389 [inline]
> > > > vfs_read+0x4b1/0x8a0 fs/read_write.c:470
> > > > ksys_read+0x12b/0x250 fs/read_write.c:613
> > > > do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
> > > > do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
> > > > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
> > > > RIP: 0033:0x7f07c7916b6a
> > > > Code: 00 3d 00 00 41 00 75 0d 50 48 8d 3d 2d 08 0a 00 e8 ea 7d 01 00 31 c0 e9 07 ff ff ff 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 1b 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 76 6c 48 8b 15 8f a2 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 83
> > > > RSP: 002b:00007ffdf34973d8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
> > > > RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f07c7916b6a
> > > > RDX: 0000000000010011 RSI: 00007ffdf3497407 RDI: 0000000000000008
> > > > RBP: 0000000000000008 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: f4f13e10193fbafe
> > > > R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055be37470e10
> > > > R13: 00007ffdf34a7ae8 R14: 00007ffdf34a8138 R15: 00007ffdf3497407
> > > > </TASK>
> > > >
> > > > Allocated by task 758:
> > > > kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:45
> > > > kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52
> > > > ____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:374 [inline]
> > > > ____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:333 [inline]
> > > > __kasan_kmalloc+0xa2/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:383
> > > > kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:196 [inline]
> > > > __do_kmalloc_node mm/slab_common.c:966 [inline]
> > > > __kmalloc+0x5e/0x190 mm/slab_common.c:979
> > > > kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:563 [inline]
> > > > kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:680 [inline]
> > >
> > > kzmalloc(length) -> this length derived from dev->descriptor.bNumConfigurations
> > >
> > > The corresponding kfree is in usb_destroy_configuration (makes sense)
> > > - we also set rawdescriptors to NULL here. If this race was happening,
> > > I'd also expect some sort of null deref report...
> > >
> > > Stumbled upon https://lore.kernel.org/all/1599201467-11000-1-git-send-email-prime.zeng@xxxxxxxxxxxxx/T/,
> > > which suggests that we can, instead, race with a descriptor change,
> > > which sounds plausible - descriptor changes, bNumConfigurations no
> > > longer lines up with our kmalloc... so we may run past the end of it.
> > Ah yeah, the syzbot C repro does something like this, it has a virtual
> > usb and keeps changing the descs -> which may end up calling
> > hub_port_connect_change()
>
> Yes, that sounds right.
>
> The problem-causing commit is 45bf39f8df7f ("USB: core: Don't hold
> device lock while reading the "descriptors" sysfs file"). When writing
> the commit message I only considered changes to the rawdescriptors; it
> didn't occur to me that the device descriptor might also change, which
> would be just as dangerous.
>
> > > Looking at hub_port_connect_change(), we seem to read directly into
> > > udev->descriptor, check if it changed, and if it did, set
> > > udev->descriptor back to the old one...? If we have an ongoing sysfs
> > > read, which directly touches udev->descriptor, there might be
> > > trouble...
> > >
> > > I see this is called in both hub_port_connect_change() and
> > > usb_reset_and_verify_device()... which both seem to lock the port_dev?
> > > ("port_dev->status_lock"). This looks like a different lock than
> > > usb_lock_device_interruptible would grab, maybe the code has changed
> > > since that was reported in 2020. But it seems to suggest we want to
> > > grab this lock in sysfs to safely read from udev->descriptor.
> > >
> > > (I'm not clear on when the sysfs gets added/removed, since it happens
> > > in usb_bus_notify()..., the above two functions that touch
> > > udev->descriptor don't look like they send the
> > > BUS_NOTIFY_ADD/DEL_DEVICE to me, so the race seems plausible)
> >
> > Ah yeah - in hub_port_connect_change() we call hub_port_connect() if
> > the descriptor changed, which notifies us of device remove *after* we
> > already directly messed with udev->descriptor for a potentially live
> > device.
> >
> > I do see there's several sysfs files that directly read
> > udev->descriptor with no locking - should these all need to grab the
> > port_dev->status_lock?
>
> I suppose some of them should. (For others, the caller will already
> hold the device lock.)
>
> On the other hand, it would almost certainly be simpler if
> hub_port_connect_change() and the other places calling
> usb_get_device_descriptor() would read into a temporary buffer instead
> of directly into udev->descriptor. Do you think the problem could be
> solved this way? It would be cleaner in the end.

Simpler... It'll probably be cleaner in the end, but we're
snapshotting and resetting udev->descriptor several call frames above
where we're calling usb_get_device_descriptor in the case of
usb_reset_and_verify_device().. For hub_port_connect_change() it
should be straightforward - use the on-stack descriptor as the buf for
usb_get_descriptor(), and bail out like we do already.

For usb_reset_and_verify_device... we're calling hub_port_init, which
is directly modifying a bunch of the usb struct, fetches the
descriptor, validates it, and we rely on the return here to decide
whether or not to simulate a disconnect...

I'd personally lean to reverting 45bf39f8df7f, but I'm not that
familiar with the code here. :)

>
> Alan Stern

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