Re: [PATCH] selinux: fix memory leak in sel_make_bools

From: Danny Feng
Date: Thu Aug 13 2009 - 22:01:43 EST


On 08/14/2009 02:55 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
On Thursday 13 August 2009 04:26:16 am Xiaotian Feng wrote:
In sel_make_bools, kernel allocates memory for bool_pending_names[i]
with security_get_bools. So if we just free bool_pending_names, those
memories for bool_pending_names[i] will be leaked.

This patch resolves dozens of following kmemleak report after resuming
from suspend:
unreferenced object 0xffff88022e4c7380 (size 32):
comm "init", pid 1, jiffies 4294677173
backtrace:
[<ffffffff810f76b5>] create_object+0x1a2/0x2a9
[<ffffffff810f78bb>] kmemleak_alloc+0x26/0x4b
[<ffffffff810ef3eb>] __kmalloc+0x18f/0x1b8
[<ffffffff811cd511>] security_get_bools+0xd7/0x16f
[<ffffffff811c48c0>] sel_write_load+0x12e/0x62b
[<ffffffff810f9a39>] vfs_write+0xae/0x10b
[<ffffffff810f9b56>] sys_write+0x4a/0x6e
[<ffffffff81011b82>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff

Signed-off-by: Xiaotian Feng<dfeng@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 6 +++++-
1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index b4fc506..ab93472 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -979,7 +979,11 @@ static int sel_make_bools(void)
u32 sid;

/* remove any existing files */
- kfree(bool_pending_names);
+ if (bool_pending_names) {
+ for (i = 0; i< bool_num; i++)
+ kfree(bool_pending_names[i]);
+ kfree(bool_pending_names);
+ }
kfree(bool_pending_values);
bool_pending_names = NULL;
bool_pending_values = NULL;

Since the code seems to rely on 'bool_num' in other places to ensure we don't
walk off the end of the array it is probably safe to omit the 'if
(bool_pending_names) ...' conditional and just rely on the for loop to do the
right thing.
Thanks for point out, I'll resend V2 patch :-)

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