Re: [PATCH] selinux: fix memory leak in sel_make_bools

From: Paul Moore
Date: Thu Aug 13 2009 - 14:55:28 EST


On Thursday 13 August 2009 04:26:16 am Xiaotian Feng wrote:
> In sel_make_bools, kernel allocates memory for bool_pending_names[i]
> with security_get_bools. So if we just free bool_pending_names, those
> memories for bool_pending_names[i] will be leaked.
>
> This patch resolves dozens of following kmemleak report after resuming
> from suspend:
> unreferenced object 0xffff88022e4c7380 (size 32):
> comm "init", pid 1, jiffies 4294677173
> backtrace:
> [<ffffffff810f76b5>] create_object+0x1a2/0x2a9
> [<ffffffff810f78bb>] kmemleak_alloc+0x26/0x4b
> [<ffffffff810ef3eb>] __kmalloc+0x18f/0x1b8
> [<ffffffff811cd511>] security_get_bools+0xd7/0x16f
> [<ffffffff811c48c0>] sel_write_load+0x12e/0x62b
> [<ffffffff810f9a39>] vfs_write+0xae/0x10b
> [<ffffffff810f9b56>] sys_write+0x4a/0x6e
> [<ffffffff81011b82>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
> [<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff
>
> Signed-off-by: Xiaotian Feng <dfeng@xxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 6 +++++-
> 1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
> index b4fc506..ab93472 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
> @@ -979,7 +979,11 @@ static int sel_make_bools(void)
> u32 sid;
>
> /* remove any existing files */
> - kfree(bool_pending_names);
> + if (bool_pending_names) {
> + for (i = 0; i < bool_num; i++)
> + kfree(bool_pending_names[i]);
> + kfree(bool_pending_names);
> + }
> kfree(bool_pending_values);
> bool_pending_names = NULL;
> bool_pending_values = NULL;

Since the code seems to rely on 'bool_num' in other places to ensure we don't
walk off the end of the array it is probably safe to omit the 'if
(bool_pending_names) ...' conditional and just rely on the for loop to do the
right thing.

--
paul moore
linux @ hp

--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/