I see absolutely NO reason why we should stop with that.
This does rather make my suggestions extensions to what
is "required" by spec. I believe them to be reasonable
suggestions that should be carefully considered for inclusion.
Note that what I propose in no way breaks what I saw in the
referenced document, they just do not go far enough IMNSHO.
Plan big or be small. --me
Daniel Taylor
On Sat, 10 Apr 1999, David L. Parsley (lkml account) wrote:
> On Sat, 10 Apr 1999, Daniel Taylor wrote:
>
> > You need capabilities directly tied to the UID or you cannot
> > securely eliminate root from the system.
>
> Please follow the link I posted earlier (and repeated below) to the
> linux-privs (capabilities) info. To quote:
>
> "At the heart of the changes to the Linux kernel from the historical model
> is the separation of identity and privilege."
>
> Pretty much the opposite of what you're saying.
>
> Note: the capabilities stuff is a little complex, esp. wrt file cap sets,
> process cap sets, and the way caps are passed on during an exec. Even the
> available documentation isn't completely clear to me, and now it's time to
> read the code, too. You may misunderstand, too, that capabilities and
> their behavior are _already_ coded in the kernel; we're just trying to
> make use of a kernel feature that's already present, but not currently in
> use due to lack of support in the fs.
>
> For your elucidation:
> http://www1.us.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/doc/linux-privs.html/linux-privs.html
>
> - --
> David L. Parsley
> Network Specialist
> City of Salem Schools
>
>
> -
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