Re: [PATCH] Capabilities, this time in elf section

Jonathan Walther (krooger@debian.org)
Fri, 9 Apr 1999 21:36:54 -0700 (PDT)


You obviously don't understand the implications of the "effective" and the
"allowed" capabilities masks. Your worries about being restricted to
"subsets or supersets" of capabilities if suid isn't changed are unfounded,
and worse, are sending people off on blind tangents. None of the suid stuff
needs behavior modification.

SirDibos

On Fri, 9 Apr 1999, Albert D. Cahalan wrote:

>
> Jonathan Walther writes:
> > On Fri, 9 Apr 1999, Daniel Taylor wrote:
>
> >> Exactly.
> >> Non-SUID binary, & capabilities with user,
> >> SUID binary, own capabilities.
> >
> > I disagree. if you suid to some other user, then they become the
> > effective user, so the effective capabilities should become
> > and & of THAT users capabilities and the binaries capabilities,
> > and not those of the invoker.
>
> Any UID change caused by the exec must be independent of any
> capability change caused by the exec.
>
> The old way: capabilities are associated with a user (UID 0)
> The new way: capabilities are orthogonal to identity
>
> I may want a setuid-lpr program to operate with capabilities that
> are different from the printing daemon. I don't want to be forced
> to make the daemon have a superset or subset of the setuid program.
> The daemon might get CAP_A and CAP_B, while the other program
> gets CAP_B and CAP_C.
>
> Anyway, the kernel does not look up user database entries to determine
> what capabilities a user might have.
>
>
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