> Is there any reason for setting current->dumpable to 0 in sys_setuid()?
> It seems to me it doesn't close any security problem (since you need to
> be root to change UID and if it the program was setuid, core dumps
> should have been already disabled at this point) and it makes debugging
> of daemons switching their UID a lot harder.
Consider the case where login (or some other such program - maybe ftpd)
switches uid but still has a lump of the shadow password file somewhere,
or of some unreadable config file.
Perhaps we should add a SIGCORE which just causes the kernel to drop the
process image as a core file (without necessarily killing the process).
Matthew.
-
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@vger.rutgers.edu
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/