Re: Security patch for /proc
Alan Cox (alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk)
Tue, 31 Mar 1998 13:10:44 +0100 (BST)
> I'm not sure I agree with this approach -- perhaps root processes should
> not be allowed to use the mount() syscall if root_dir != real_root. The
> other main source of nastiness is ptrace() -- this needs to be banned in a
> similar manner. There are other ways root could escape a chroot()
> jail, we need to think about them and eliminate them one by one.
mkdir("x");
chroot("x");
chdir("../../../../../../../..");
chroot(".");
Let alone all the stuff like iopl() and loading modules that sysctl or
capabilities would need to cover first
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