Re: [PATCH] DES LOOP Support

Matti E Aarnio (mea@mea.cc.utu.fi)
Wed, 19 Jun 1996 14:38:14 +0300 (EET DST)


Kevin M Bealer <kmb203@psu.edu> presented new info:
[ about DES in file encryption via Loop-Back device ]
> DES is a fairly recent US government standard correct? The US government
> has proposed that all encryption methods have back doors so that the
> government can get into them, correct? Would they have designed DES in such
> a way that it is unbreakable, or in such a way that a person who knew how to
> get into it, can do so at will.
>
> Ergo DES is compromised, and it is only until whoever wants to bad enough
> can buy from the right person(1) or figure out what the method is.

No, no. DES is OLD FIPS standard, so old in fact, that just its
AGE is reason to avoid it in serious data secrecy tasks.
There are no trap-doors that the data-encryption community knows
about - at least those who can talk, and it is well researched.

The reason why no sane US people publish cryptography stuff in
SOURCE FORM is US ITAR rules, which classify data encryption
software into munitions category, which you can't export without
license, and on which the penalties are rather severe...
That is also, why the contemporary free strong cryptography software
development happens outside USA.

> It looks to me like anything powerful enough to be really secure will be
> very slow for full system encryption.. (I am thinking mostly of RSA/MD5
> based things which I admittedly don't know enough about.)

"Slow method" does not imply "Secure method", nor has the
reverse hold true -- thinking of couple of proprietary methods
at which the hardware processing goes at 10+ MB/s ...
(You can get DES at that speed too, in single cheap chip!
Not without paperwork, but without full ITAR mess -- from Europe.)

> __kmb203@psu.edu_________________________Debian__1.1___Linux__2.0.0___
> Error: this signature should not appear. If you see this signature, ...

/Matti Aarnio <mea@utu.fi>