Re: CVE-2023-52596: sysctl: Fix out of bounds access for empty sysctl registers

[Lee Jones]

On Tue, 12 Mar 2024, Kees Cook wrote:

> On Tue, Mar 12, 2024 at 11:04:09AM -0700, Luis Chamberlain wrote:
> > + Kees,
> > 
> > On Tue, Mar 12, 2024 at 03:49:10PM +0000, Lee Jones wrote:
> > > On Tue, 12 Mar 2024, Luis Chamberlain wrote:
> > > 
> > > > On Tue, Mar 12, 2024 at 10:45:28AM +0100, Michal Hocko wrote:
> > > > > On Tue 12-03-24 09:17:30, Lee Jones wrote:
> > > > > [...]
> > > > > > > Backporting this is fine, but wouldn't fix an issue unless an external
> > > > > > > module had empty sysctls. And exploiting this is not possible unless
> > > > > > > you purposely build an external module which could end up with empty
> > > > > > > sysctls.
> > > > > 
> > > > > Thanks for the clarification Luis!
> > > > > 
> > > > > > Thanks for the amazing explanation Luis.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > If I'm reading this correctly, an issue does exist, but an attacker
> > > > > > would have to lay some foundations before it could be triggered.  Sounds
> > > > > > like loading of a malicious or naive module would be enough.
> > > > > 
> > > > > If the bar is set as high as a kernel module to create and empty sysctl
> > > > > directory then I think it is safe to say that the security aspect is
> > > > > mostly moot. There are much simpler ways to attack the system if you are
> > > > > able to load a kernel module.
> > > > 
> > > > Indeed, a simple BUG_ON(1) on external modules cannot possible be a
> > > > source of a CVE. And so this becomes BUG_ON(when_sysctl_empty()) where
> > > 
> > > Issues that are capable of crashing the kernel in any way, including
> > > with WARN() or BUG() are being considered weaknesses and presently get
> > > CVEs.
> > 
> > Its not possible to crash any released kernel with the out of bounds issue
> > today, the commit is just a fix for a future world with empty sysctls
> > which just don't exist today.
> > 
> > Yes you can crash an external module with an empty sysctl on kernels
> > without that commit, but an empty sysctl is not common practice for
> > external modules, they'd have to have custom #ifdefs embedded as noted
> > earlier with the example crash. So your average external module should
> > not be able to crash existing kernels. The scope of a crash then would
> > be external modules that used older kernels without the fix starting after
> > v6.6. Since the fix is already meged on v6.6+ the scope of possible
> > kernels is small, and you'd need a specially crafted sysctl empty array
> > to do so.
> > 
> > > > when_sysctl_empty() is hypotethical and I think the source of this
> > > > question for CVE. Today's that not at boot time or dynamically with
> > > > any linux kernel sources released, and so its only possible if:
> > > > 
> > > >   a) As Joel indicated if you backported an empty sysctl array (which
> > > >   would be unless you carried all the infrastructure to support it).
> > > > 
> > > >   b) an external module has an empty sysctl
> > > 
> > > So what we're discussing here is weather this situation is
> > > _possible_, however unlikely.
> > 
> > I tried my best to summarize that world as we see it above.
> > 
> > > You are the maintainer here, so the final decision is yours.  If you say
> > > this situation is impossible and the CVE should be revoked, I'll go
> > > ahead and do just that.
> > 
> > To the best of our ability, from our perspective, upon our review, the
> > only way to trigger a crash would be with sysctls on external modules
> > loaded on these kernels:
> > 
> >  * v6.6 up to v6.6.15 (v6.6.16 has the fix backported) so 16 releases
> >  * v6.7 up to v6.7.3  (v6.7.4 has the fix backported) so 4 releases
> > 
> > External modules having empty sysctls should be rare, however possible.
> > So these 20 release would be affected by a crash with specially crafted
> > external modules. I suppose one way to exploit this, might be for a
> > vendor providing an external safe-looking module with #ifdefs which make
> > a sysctl seem non-empty but in reality it would be. That issue would
> > exist for 20 kernel releases. Could someone craft something with the out
> > of bounds access given the context to do something evil? Your domain of
> > expertise, your call, not ours.
> 
> I'm not a member of the CNA, but I would lean "yes, the absolute weakest
> of CVE" after spending some time reading the code, reading this thread,
> to dig in and look at this. If it's a malicious module, it doesn't matter:
> the module can do anything. If it's a published module that an attacker
> could use due to the resulting logic of processing the 0th sysctl table
> entry, okay, yes, CVE. Likely insanely rare, but not impossible. But,
> if, as Luis says, there are no upstream modules like this, then it's
> not a CVE.
> 
> So for real-world impact, we'd have to either say "there might be an
> out-of-tree module that could be used as a stepping stone here, and we
> want to protect our users, so let's assign a CVE" or we take a hard line
> and say that's up to downstreams to assign CVEs for their modules.
> 
> I have tried to argue before that it's up to the core kernel code to Do
> The Right Thing, even in the face of crappy out-of-tree code, so to me,
> since this is a (very very very limited) weakness in the core kernel
> code, give it a CVE.
> 
> My attempt at a CVSS for it yields a 3.4 overall:
> AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L/E:U/RL:O/RC:X
> https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss/v3-calculator?vector=AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L/E:U/RL:O/RC:X&version=3.1

Thank you Luis and Kees for your input.  Your efforts are very much
appreciated.  I have read and digested everyone's points.

Since no one (including myself) is willing to conclude that this
represents _zero_ risk, the allocation will not be rescinded.  In our
view a CVE, however weak, is still a CVE.  Thus, inline with our
documented cautious posture I'm going to err on the side of it.

Thanks again everyone.

-- 
Lee Jones [李琼斯]