Re: [PATCH v7 0/9] x86: Confine early 1:1 mapped startup code

[Ard Biesheuvel]

On Mon, 4 Mar 2024 at 18:07, Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On 2/27/24 09:19, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> > From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
> >
> > This is resend #2 of v5 [0] with some touchups applied.
> >
> > Changes since v6:
> > - Drop flawed patch to move some SME/SEV related calls out of the early
> >    boot path to avoid the potential need for backporting patches #6/#7
> >    to kernels where SEV support may not be crucial. This problem will be
> >    dealt with if/when it arises while doing those backports.
> >
> > Changes since v5:
> > - drop patches that have been merged
> > - rebase onto latest tip/x86/boot
> > - fix comment regarding CR4.PGE wrt flushing of global TLB entries
> > - avoid adding startup code to .noinstr.text as it triggers objtool
> >    warnings
> >
> > [0] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240221113506.2565718-18-ardb+git@xxxxxxxxxx/
> >
> > Cc: Kevin Loughlin <kevinloughlin@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
> > Cc: Dionna Glaze <dionnaglaze@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
> > Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@xxxxxxxxx>
>
> For the series, tested bare metal boots with mem_encrypt=on /
> mem_encrypt=off and boots of SVM, SEV, SEV-ES and SEV-SNP guests.
>
> Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
>

Thanks a lot! I take it this was a kernel built with GCC?