Re: [PATCH 1/2] x86/random: Retry on RDSEED failure

[Dan Williams]

Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 13, 2024 at 04:53:06PM -0800, Dan Williams wrote:
> > 
> > Indeed it is. Typically when you have x86, riscv, arm, and s390 folks
> > all show up at a Linux Plumbers session [1] to talk about their approach
> > to handling a new platform paradigm, that is a decent indication that
> > the technology is more real than not. Point taken that it is not here
> > today, but it is also not multiple hardware generations away as the
> > Plumbers participation indicated.
> 
> My big concerns with TDISP which make me believe it may not be a
> silver bullet is that (a) it's hyper-complex (although to be fair
> Confidential Compute isn't exactly simple, and (b) it's one thing to
> digitally sign software so you know that it comes from a trusted
> source; but it's a **lot** harder to prove that hardware hasn't been
> tampered with --- a digital siganture can't tell you much about
> whether or not the hardware is in an as-built state coming from the
> factory --- this requires things like wrapping the device with
> resistive wire in multiple directions with a whetstone bridge to
> detect if the wire has gotten cut or shorted, then dunking the whole
> thing in epoxy, so that any attempt to tamper with the hardware will
> result it self-destructing (via a thermite charge or equivalent :-)
> 
> Remember, the whole conceit of Confidential Compute is that you don't
> trust the cloud provider --- but if that entity controls the PCI cards
> installed in their servers, and and that entity has the ability to
> *modify* the PCI cards in the server, all of the digital signatures
> and fancy-schmancy TDISP complexity isn't necessarily going to save
> you.
>
> The final concern is that it may take quite a while before these
> devices become real, and then for cloud providers like Amazon, Azure,
> to actually deploy them.  And in the meantime, Confidential Compute
> VM's are already something which are available for customers to
> purchase *today*.  So we need some kind of solution right now, and
> preferably, something which is simple enough that it is likely to be
> back-portable to RHEL.
> 
> (And I fear that even if TDISP hardware existed today, it is so
> complicated that it may be a heavy lift to get it backported into
> enterprise distro kernels.)

No lies detected.

Something is broken if you need to rely on TDISP to get a reliable
random number in a guest. All it can enforce is that the VMM is not
emulating a HWRNG. Also, VMM denial of service is outside of the TDISP
threat model, so if VMM can steal all the entropy, or DoS RDSEED, you
are back at square one. The only reason for jumping in on this tangent
was to counterpoint the implication that the RNG core must always hard
code a dependency on CPU HWRNG for confidential computing.

However, yes, given the timelines for TDISP Linux could hard code that
choice in the near term for expediency and leave it to the TDISP folks
to unwind it later.

> Ultimately, if CPU's can actually have an architectgural RNG ala
> RDRAND/RDSEED that actually can do the right thing in the face of
> entropy draining attacks, that seems to be a **much** simpler
> solution.  And even if it requires waiting for the next generation of
> CPU's, this might be faster than waiting for the TDISP ecosystem
> mature.

Yes, please. I am happy if TDISP flies below the hype cycle so that its
implications can be considered carefullly. At the same time I will keep
an eye out for discussions like this where guest attestation of hardware
provenance is raised.