Re: [PATCH 1/2] x86/random: Retry on RDSEED failure

[Dan Williams]

Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 12, 2024 at 08:25:33AM +0000, Reshetova, Elena wrote:
> > What if we instead of doing some special treatment on rdrand/seed, we
> > try to fix the underneath problem of Linux RNG not supporting CoCo threat
> > model. Linux RNG has almost set in stone definition of what sources contribute
> > entropy and what don’t (with some additional flexibility with flags like trust_cpu).
> > This works well for the current fixed threat model, but doesn’t work for
> > CoCo because some sources are suddenly not trusted anymore to contribute
> > entropy. However, some are still trusted and that is not just rdrand/rdseed,
> > but we would also trust add_hwgenerator_randomness (given that we use
> > TEE IO device here or have a way to get this input securely). So, even in
> > theoretical scenario that both rdrand/rdseed is broken (let's say HW failure),
> > a Linux RNG can actually boot securely in the guest if we have enough
> > entropy from add_hwgenerator_randomness.
> 
> So the problem with this is that there is now way we can authenticate
> the hardware RNG.

Sure there is, that is what, for example, PCI TDISP (TEE Device
Interface Security Protocol) is about. Set aside the difficulty of doing
the PCI TDISP flow early in boot, and validating the device certficate
and measurements based on golden values without talking to a remote
verifier etc..., but if such a device has been accepted and its driver
calls hwrng_register() it should be added as an entropy source.

Now maybe there is something fatal in that "etc", and RDRAND needs to
work for early entropy, but if a PCI device passes guest acceptance
there should be no additional concerns for it to be considered a CC
approved RNG.