Re: [syzbot] [crypto?] general protection fault in scatterwalk_copychunks (5)

From: Chengming Zhou
Date: Wed Jan 03 2024 - 03:42:16 EST


On 2024/1/3 14:53, Barry Song wrote:
> On Wed, Dec 27, 2023 at 7:38 PM Chengming Zhou
> <zhouchengming@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>
>> On 2023/12/27 14:25, Barry Song wrote:
>>> On Wed, Dec 27, 2023 at 4:51 PM Chengming Zhou
>>> <zhouchengming@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On 2023/12/27 08:23, Nhat Pham wrote:
>>>>> On Tue, Dec 26, 2023 at 3:30 PM Chris Li <chrisl@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Again, sorry I was looking at the decompression side rather than the
>>>>>> compression side. The compression side does not even offer a safe
>>>>>> version of the compression function.
>>>>>> That seems to be dangerous. It seems for now we should make the zswap
>>>>>> roll back to 2 page buffer until we have a safe way to do compression
>>>>>> without overwriting the output buffers.
>>>>>
>>>>> Unfortunately, I think this is the way - at least until we rework the
>>>>> crypto/compression API (if that's even possible?).
>>>>> I still think the 2 page buffer is dumb, but it is what it is :(
>>>>
>>>> Hi,
>>>>
>>>> I think it's a bug in `scomp_acomp_comp_decomp()`, which doesn't use
>>>> the caller passed "src" and "dst" scatterlist. Instead, it uses its own
>>>> per-cpu "scomp_scratch", which have 128KB src and dst.
>>>>
>>>> When compression done, it uses the output req->dlen to copy scomp_scratch->dst
>>>> to our dstmem, which has only one page now, so this problem happened.
>>>>
>>>> I still don't know why the alg->compress(src, slen, dst, &dlen) doesn't
>>>> check the dlen? It seems an obvious bug, right?
>>>>
>>>> As for this problem in `scomp_acomp_comp_decomp()`, this patch below
>>>> should fix it. I will set up a few tests to check later.
>>>>
>>>> Thanks!
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/crypto/scompress.c b/crypto/scompress.c
>>>> index 442a82c9de7d..e654a120ae5a 100644
>>>> --- a/crypto/scompress.c
>>>> +++ b/crypto/scompress.c
>>>> @@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ static int scomp_acomp_comp_decomp(struct acomp_req *req, int dir)
>>>> struct crypto_scomp *scomp = *tfm_ctx;
>>>> void **ctx = acomp_request_ctx(req);
>>>> struct scomp_scratch *scratch;
>>>> + unsigned int dlen;
>>>> int ret;
>>>>
>>>> if (!req->src || !req->slen || req->slen > SCOMP_SCRATCH_SIZE)
>>>> @@ -128,6 +129,8 @@ static int scomp_acomp_comp_decomp(struct acomp_req *req, int dir)
>>>> if (!req->dlen || req->dlen > SCOMP_SCRATCH_SIZE)
>>>> req->dlen = SCOMP_SCRATCH_SIZE;
>>>>
>>>> + dlen = req->dlen;
>>>> +
>>>> scratch = raw_cpu_ptr(&scomp_scratch);
>>>> spin_lock(&scratch->lock);
>>>>
>>>> @@ -145,6 +148,9 @@ static int scomp_acomp_comp_decomp(struct acomp_req *req, int dir)
>>>> ret = -ENOMEM;
>>>> goto out;
>>>> }
>>>> + } else if (req->dlen > dlen) {
>>>> + ret = -ENOMEM;
>>>> + goto out;
>>>> }
>>>
>>> This can't fix the problem as crypto_scomp_compress() has written overflow data.
>>
>> No, crypto_scomp_compress() writes to its own scomp_scratch->dst memory, then copy
>> to our dstmem.
>
> Hi Chengming,
> I still feel these two memcpys are too big and unnecessary, so i sent
> a RFC[1] to remove
> them as well as another one removing memcpy in zswap[2].
> but unfortunately I don't have real hardware to run and collect data,
> I wonder if you are
> interested in testing and collecting data as you are actively
> contributing to zswap.

Ok, I just tested these three patches on my server, found improvement in the
kernel build testcase on a tmpfs with zswap (lz4 + zsmalloc) enabled.

mm-stable 501a06fe8e4c patched
real 1m38.028s 1m32.317s
user 19m11.482s 18m39.439s
sys 19m26.445s 17m5.646s

The improvement looks good! So feel free to add:

Tested-by: Chengming Zhou <zhouchengming@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>

Thanks.

>
> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20240103053134.564457-1-21cnbao@xxxxxxxxx/
> [2]
> https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20240103025759.523120-1-21cnbao@xxxxxxxxx/
> https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20240103025759.523120-2-21cnbao@xxxxxxxxx/
>
> Thanks
> Barry