Re: [PATCH v1 2/2] riscv: envcfg save and restore on trap entry/exit

[Deepak Gupta]

On Wed, Dec 13, 2023 at 4:24 AM Andrew Jones <ajones@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Dec 12, 2023 at 05:02:43PM -0800, Deepak Gupta wrote:
> > On Tue, Dec 12, 2023 at 04:53:48PM -0800, Palmer Dabbelt wrote:
> > > On Tue, 12 Dec 2023 15:49:25 PST (-0800), debug@xxxxxxxxxxxx wrote:
> > > > envcfg CSR defines enabling bits for cache management instructions and soon
> > > > will control enabling for control flow integrity and pointer masking features.
> > > >
> > > > Control flow integrity and pointer masking features need to be enabled on per
> > > > thread basis. Additionally, I believe cache management instructions need to be
> > > > enabled on per thread basis. As an example a seccomped task on riscv may be
> > > > restricted to not use cache management instructions
> > >
> > > Do we have anything in the kernel that actually does that?  Generally we
> > > need some use, I couldn't find any user-mode writable envcfg bits in any
> > > extesions I looked at (admittidly just CFI and pointer masking), and
> > > unless I'm missing something there's no per-thread state in the kernel.
> > >
> >
> > Cache management operations?
> > As of now kernel blindly enables that for all the user mode. It will be good if
> > that is enabled on per-thread basis. Sure, all threads can have it enabled by
> > default. But if strict seccomp is enabled, I would argue that cache management
> > operations for that thread to be disabled as is done on other arches. As an
> > example x86 disable rdtsc on strict seccomp. RISCV allows this CMO extension
> > and I expect CMO to leverage this (currently it
> > doesn't).
> >
> > I was being opportunistic here so that I can reduce number of patches on CFI
> > enabling patchset.
> >
> > Will it be okay if I revise this patch to include with a usecase to restrict CMO
> > (say for case of strict seccomp on risc-v)?
>
> I opted to only expose cache block zero since giving userspace the
> ability to invalidate cache blocks seems risky from a side-channel attack
> perspective.

I didn't pay attention. You're right, it's only cbo.zero that's exposed.
I will roll up my patch with cfi set then.

>
> I'm no security expert, so feedback welcome, but I don't see a risk with
> userspace being granted cbo.zero, even for strict seccomp processes.

Yeah I don't see a risk with cbo.zero to strict seccomp thread either.

>
> Thanks,
> drew