[PATCH v3] Bluetooth: Add more enc key size check

From: Alex Lu
Date: Mon Dec 11 2023 - 21:38:56 EST


From: Alex Lu <alex_lu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

When we are slave role and receives l2cap conn req when encryption has
started, we should check the enc key size to avoid KNOB attack or BLUFFS
attack.
>From SIG recommendation, implementations are advised to reject
service-level connections on an encrypted baseband link with key
strengths below 7 octets.
A simple and clear way to achieve this is to place the enc key size
check in hci_cc_read_enc_key_size()

The btmon log below shows the case that lacks enc key size check.

> HCI Event: Connect Request (0x04) plen 10
Address: BB:22:33:44:55:99 (OUI BB-22-33)
Class: 0x480104
Major class: Computer (desktop, notebook, PDA, organizers)
Minor class: Desktop workstation
Capturing (Scanner, Microphone)
Telephony (Cordless telephony, Modem, Headset)
Link type: ACL (0x01)
< HCI Command: Accept Connection Request (0x01|0x0009) plen 7
Address: BB:22:33:44:55:99 (OUI BB-22-33)
Role: Peripheral (0x01)
> HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4
Accept Connection Request (0x01|0x0009) ncmd 2
Status: Success (0x00)
> HCI Event: Connect Complete (0x03) plen 11
Status: Success (0x00)
Handle: 1
Address: BB:22:33:44:55:99 (OUI BB-22-33)
Link type: ACL (0x01)
Encryption: Disabled (0x00)
...

> HCI Event: Encryption Change (0x08) plen 4
Status: Success (0x00)
Handle: 1 Address: BB:22:33:44:55:99 (OUI BB-22-33)
Encryption: Enabled with E0 (0x01)
< HCI Command: Read Encryption Key Size (0x05|0x0008) plen 2
Handle: 1 Address: BB:22:33:44:55:99 (OUI BB-22-33)
> HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 7
Read Encryption Key Size (0x05|0x0008) ncmd 2
Status: Success (0x00)
Handle: 1 Address: BB:22:33:44:55:99 (OUI BB-22-33)
Key size: 6
// We should check the enc key size
...

> ACL Data RX: Handle 1 flags 0x02 dlen 12
L2CAP: Connection Request (0x02) ident 3 len 4
PSM: 25 (0x0019)
Source CID: 64
< ACL Data TX: Handle 1 flags 0x00 dlen 16
L2CAP: Connection Response (0x03) ident 3 len 8
Destination CID: 64
Source CID: 64
Result: Connection pending (0x0001)
Status: Authorization pending (0x0002)
> HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5
Num handles: 1
Handle: 1 Address: BB:22:33:44:55:99 (OUI BB-22-33)
Count: 1
#35: len 16 (25 Kb/s)
Latency: 5 msec (2-7 msec ~4 msec)
< ACL Data TX: Handle 1 flags 0x00 dlen 16
L2CAP: Connection Response (0x03) ident 3 len 8
Destination CID: 64
Source CID: 64
Result: Connection successful (0x0000)
Status: No further information available (0x0000)

Signed-off-by: Alex Lu <alex_lu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Max Chou <max.chou@xxxxxxxxxxx>
---
Changes in v3:
- Use a simple and clear approach according to maintainer's suggestion
Changes in v2:
- Fix compiling issue reported by sparse

net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 16 +++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
index 2ad7b9f86f74..ef8c3bed7361 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
@@ -750,9 +750,23 @@ static u8 hci_cc_read_enc_key_size(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data,
} else {
conn->enc_key_size = rp->key_size;
status = 0;
+
+ if (conn->enc_key_size < hdev->min_enc_key_size) {
+ /* As slave role, the conn->state has been set to
+ * BT_CONNECTED and l2cap conn req might not be received
+ * yet, at this moment the l2cap layer almost does
+ * nothing with the non-zero status.
+ * So we also clear encrypt related bits, and then the
+ * handler of l2cap conn req will get the right secure
+ * state at a later time.
+ */
+ status = HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE;
+ clear_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &conn->flags);
+ clear_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &conn->flags);
+ }
}

- hci_encrypt_cfm(conn, 0);
+ hci_encrypt_cfm(conn, status);

done:
hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
--
2.39.2