Re: [PATCH v2 14/14] arm64/mm: Add ptep_get_and_clear_full() to optimize process teardown

From: Alistair Popple
Date: Thu Nov 23 2023 - 20:37:17 EST



Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@xxxxxxx> writes:

> On 23/11/2023 05:13, Alistair Popple wrote:
>>
>> Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@xxxxxxx> writes:
>>
>>> ptep_get_and_clear_full() adds a 'full' parameter which is not present
>>> for the fallback ptep_get_and_clear() function. 'full' is set to 1 when
>>> a full address space teardown is in progress. We use this information to
>>> optimize arm64_sys_exit_group() by avoiding unfolding (and therefore
>>> tlbi) contiguous ranges. Instead we just clear the PTE but allow all the
>>> contiguous neighbours to keep their contig bit set, because we know we
>>> are about to clear the rest too.
>>>
>>> Before this optimization, the cost of arm64_sys_exit_group() exploded to
>>> 32x what it was before PTE_CONT support was wired up, when compiling the
>>> kernel. With this optimization in place, we are back down to the
>>> original cost.
>>>
>>> This approach is not perfect though, as for the duration between
>>> returning from the first call to ptep_get_and_clear_full() and making
>>> the final call, the contpte block in an intermediate state, where some
>>> ptes are cleared and others are still set with the PTE_CONT bit. If any
>>> other APIs are called for the ptes in the contpte block during that
>>> time, we have to be very careful. The core code currently interleaves
>>> calls to ptep_get_and_clear_full() with ptep_get() and so ptep_get()
>>> must be careful to ignore the cleared entries when accumulating the
>>> access and dirty bits - the same goes for ptep_get_lockless(). The only
>>> other calls we might resonably expect are to set markers in the
>>> previously cleared ptes. (We shouldn't see valid entries being set until
>>> after the tlbi, at which point we are no longer in the intermediate
>>> state). Since markers are not valid, this is safe; set_ptes() will see
>>> the old, invalid entry and will not attempt to unfold. And the new pte
>>> is also invalid so it won't attempt to fold. We shouldn't see this for
>>> the 'full' case anyway.
>>>
>>> The last remaining issue is returning the access/dirty bits. That info
>>> could be present in any of the ptes in the contpte block. ptep_get()
>>> will gather those bits from across the contpte block. We don't bother
>>> doing that here, because we know that the information is used by the
>>> core-mm to mark the underlying folio as accessed/dirty. And since the
>>> same folio must be underpinning the whole block (that was a requirement
>>> for folding in the first place), that information will make it to the
>>> folio eventually once all the ptes have been cleared. This approach
>>> means we don't have to play games with accumulating and storing the
>>> bits. It does mean that any interleaved calls to ptep_get() may lack
>>> correct access/dirty information if we have already cleared the pte that
>>> happened to store it. The core code does not rely on this though.
>>
>> Does not *currently* rely on this. I can't help but think it is
>> potentially something that could change in the future though which would
>> lead to some subtle bugs.
>
> Yes, there is a risk, although IMHO, its very small.
>
>>
>> Would there be any may of avoiding this? Half baked thought but could
>> you for example copy the access/dirty information to the last (or
>> perhaps first, most likely invalid) PTE?
>
> I spent a long time thinking about this and came up with a number of
> possibilities, none of them ideal. In the end, I went for the simplest one
> (which works but suffers from the problem that it depends on the way it is
> called not changing).

Ok, that answers my underlying question of "has someone thought about
this and are there any easy solutions". I suspected that was the case
given the excellent write up though!

> 1) copy the access/dirty flags into all the remaining uncleared ptes within the
> contpte block. This is how I did it in v1; although it was racy. I think this
> could be implemented correctly but its extremely complex.
>
> 2) batch calls from the core-mm (like I did for pte_set_wrprotects()) so that we
> can clear 1 or more full contpte blocks in a single call - the ptes are never in
> an intermediate state. This is difficult because ptep_get_and_clear_full()
> returns the pte that was cleared so its difficult to scale that up to multiple ptes.
>
> 3) add ptep_get_no_access_dirty() and redefine the interface to only allow that
> to be called while ptep_get_and_clear_full() calls are on-going. Then assert in
> the other functions that ptep_get_and_clear_full() is not on-going when they are
> called. So we would get a clear sign that usage patterns have changed. But there
> is no easy place to store that state (other than scanning a contpte block
> looking for pte_none() amongst pte_valid_cont() entries) and it all felt ugly.
>
> 4) The simple approach I ended up taking; I thought it would be best to keep it
> simple and see if anyone was concerned before doing something more drastic.
>
> What do you think? If we really need to solve this, then option 1 is my
> preferred route, but it would take some time to figure out and reason about a
> race-free scheme.

Well I like simple, and I agree the risk is small. But I can't help feel
the current situation is too subtle, mainly because it is architecture
specific and the assumptions are not communicated in core-mm code
anywhere. But also none of the aternatives seem much better.

However there are only three callers of ptep_get_and_clear_full(), and
all of these hold the PTL. So if I'm not mistaken that should exclude
just about all users of ptep_get*() which will take the ptl before hand.

So really that only leaves ptep_get_lockless() that could/should
interleave right? From a quick glance of those users none look at the
young/dirty information anyway, so I wonder if we can just assert in the
core-mm that ptep_get_lockless() does not return young/dirty information
and clear it in the helpers? That would make things explicit and
consistent which would address my concern (although I haven't looked too
closely at the details there).

> Thanks,
> Ryan