Re: [PATCH] riscv: Support RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET

From: Palmer Dabbelt
Date: Wed Nov 08 2023 - 22:48:00 EST


On Wed, 08 Nov 2023 15:52:34 PST (-0800), keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx wrote:
On Wed, Nov 01, 2023 at 02:44:23PM +0800, Song Shuai wrote:
Inspired from arm64's implement -- commit 70918779aec9
("arm64: entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support")

Add support of kernel stack offset randomization while handling syscall,
the offset is defaultly limited by KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX() (i.e. 10 bits).

In order to avoid trigger stack canaries (due to __builtin_alloca) and
slowing down the entry path, use __no_stack_protector attribute to
disable stack protector for do_trap_ecall_u() at the function level.

Signed-off-by: Song Shuai <songshuaishuai@xxxxxxxxxxx>

I can't speak to the correctness of the entropy level, but the usage of
the helpers looks correct to me.

As far as I can tell the comment matches how the system behaves. I'm not sure if that much entropy is useful. I was poking around for a bit to try and figure that out, but after reading that comment at the top of include/linux/randomize_kstack.h I decided to stop ;)

So aside from those whitespace errors Damien pointed out,

Reviewed-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@xxxxxxxxxxxx>

It's too late for the merge window for me, but

Acked-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@xxxxxxxxxxxx>

in case someone else wants to take it still. Otherwise I'll try and remember to pick it up right after the merge window, but with Plumbers things might be a bit clunky.

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>

-Kees

---
Testing with randomize_kstack_offset=y cmdline, lkdtm/stack-entropy.sh
showed appropriate stack offset instead of zero.
---
arch/riscv/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/riscv/Kconfig b/arch/riscv/Kconfig
index d607ab0f7c6d..0e843de33f0c 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/riscv/Kconfig
@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ config RISCV
select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB_QXFER_PKT
select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS if MMU
select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS if COMPAT
+ select HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
select HAVE_ARCH_THREAD_STRUCT_WHITELIST
select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK
diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c
index 19807c4d3805..3f869b2d47c3 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
#include <linux/cpu.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/randomize_kstack.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/sched/debug.h>
#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
@@ -296,9 +297,11 @@ asmlinkage __visible __trap_section void do_trap_break(struct pt_regs *regs)
}
}

-asmlinkage __visible __trap_section void do_trap_ecall_u(struct pt_regs *regs)
+asmlinkage __visible __trap_section __no_stack_protector
+void do_trap_ecall_u(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
if (user_mode(regs)) {
+
long syscall = regs->a7;

regs->epc += 4;
@@ -308,10 +311,23 @@ asmlinkage __visible __trap_section void do_trap_ecall_u(struct pt_regs *regs)

syscall = syscall_enter_from_user_mode(regs, syscall);

+ add_random_kstack_offset();
+
if (syscall >= 0 && syscall < NR_syscalls)
syscall_handler(regs, syscall);
else if (syscall != -1)
regs->a0 = -ENOSYS;
+ /*
+ * Ultimately, this value will get limited by KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(),
+ * so the maximum stack offset is 1k bytes (10 bits).
+ *
+ * The actual entropy will be further reduced by the compiler when
+ * applying stack alignment constraints: 16-byte (i.e. 4-bit) aligned
+ * for RV32I or RV64I.
+ *
+ * The resulting 6 bits of entropy is seen in SP[9:4].
+ */
+ choose_random_kstack_offset(get_random_u16());

syscall_exit_to_user_mode(regs);
} else {
--
2.20.1