[PATCH v17 000/116] KVM TDX basic feature support

From: isaku . yamahata
Date: Tue Nov 07 2023 - 09:57:42 EST

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From: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@xxxxxxxxx>

KVM TDX basic feature support

Hello. This is v16 the patch series vof KVM TDX support. This is based on
v6.7-rc + the following patch series + minor fixes.
The most changes are trivial and contained in VMX specific. The arguable changes
are to KVM TDP-MMU that requires more reviews.

Related patch series This patch is based on:
- v13 KVM: guest_memfd() and per-page attributes
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230914015531.1419405-1-seanjc@xxxxxxxxxx/

- TDX host kernel support v14
https://lore.kernel.org/all/cover.1697532085.git.kai.huang@xxxxxxxxx/

The tree can be found at https://github.com/intel/tdx/tree/kvm-upstream
The corresponding qemu branch is found at
https://github.com/yamahata/qemu/tree/tdx/qemu-upm
How to run/test: It's describe at https://github.com/intel/tdx/wiki/TDX-KVM

More features tree is found at
https://github.com/intel/tdx/tree/kvm-upstream-next

Isaku Yamahata

Changes from v16:
- rebased v6.7-rc
- Switched to TDX module 1.5. Unsupport TDX module 1.0

Changes from v15:
- Added KVM_TDX_RELEASE_VM to reduce the destruction time
- Catch up the TDX module interface to use struct tdx_module_args
instead of struct tdx_module_output
- Add tdh_mem_sept_rd() for SEPT_VE_DISABLE=1 and handle Secure-EPT violation
with SEPT_VE_DISABLE case.
- Simplified tdx_reclaim_page()
- Reorganize the locking of tdx_release_hkid(), and use smp_call_mask()
instead of smp_call_on_cpu() to hold spinlock to race with invalidation
on releasing guest memfd
- Removed AMX check as the KVM upstream supports AMX.
- Added CET flag to guest supported xss
- add check if nr_pages isn't large with
(nr_page << PAGE_SHIFT) >> PAGE_SHIFT
- use __seamcall_saved_ret()
- As struct tdx_module_args doesn't match with vcpu.arch.regs, copy regs
before/after calling __seamcall_saved_ret().

Changes from v14:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/cover.1685333727.git.isaku.yamahata@xxxxxxxxx/
- rebased to v6.5-rc2, v11 KVM guest_memfd(), v11 TDX host kernel support
- ABI change to add reserved member for future compatibility, dropped unused
member.
- handle EXIT_REASON_OTHER_SMI
- handle FEAT_CTL MSR access

Changes from v13:
- rbased to v6.4-rc3
- Make use of KVM gmem.
- Added check_cpuid callback for KVM_SET_CPUID2 as RFC patch.
- ABI change of KVM_TDX_VM_INIT as VM scoped KVM ioctl.
- Make TDX initialization non-depend on kvm hardware_enable.
Use vmx_hardware_enable directly.
- Drop a patch to prohibit dirty logging as new KVM gmem code base
- Drop parameter only checking for some TDG.VP.VMCALL. Just default part

Changes from v12:
- ABI change of KVM_TDX_VM_INIT
- Rename kvm_gfn_{private, shared} to kvm_gfn_to_{private, shared}
- Move APIC BASE MSI initialization to KVM_TDX_VCPU_INIT
- Fix MTRR patch
- Make MapGpa hypercall always pass it to user space VMM
- Split hooks to TDP MMU into two part. populating and zapping.

Changes from v11:
- ABI change of KVM_TDX_VM_INIT
- Split the hook of TDP MMU to not modify handle_changed_spte()
- Enhanced commit message on mtrr patch
- Made KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPUS to x86 specific

Changes from v10:
- rebased to v6.2-rc3
- support mtrr with its own patches
- Integrated fd-based private page v10
- Integrated TDX host kernel support v8
- Integrated kvm_init rework v2
- removed struct tdx_td_page and its initialization logic
- cleaned up mmio spte and require enable_mmio_caching=true for TDX
- removed dubious WARN_ON_ONCE()
- split a patch adding methods as nop into several patches

Changes from v9:
- rebased to v6.1-rc2
- Integrated fd-based private page v9 as prerequisite.
- Integrated TDX host kernel support v6
- TDP MMU: Make handle_change_spte() return value.
- TDX: removed seamcall_lock and return -EAGAIN so that TDP MMU can retry

Changes from v8:
- rebased to v6.0-rc7
- Integrated with kvm hardware initialization. Check all packages has at least
one online CPU when creating guest TD and refuse cpu offline during guest TDs
are running.
- Integrated fd-based private page v8 as prerequisite.
- TDP MMU: Introduced more callbacks instead of single callback.

Changes from v7:
- Use xarray to track whether GFN is private or shared. Drop SPTE_SHARED_MASK.
The complex state machine with SPTE_SHARED_MASK was ditched.
- Large page support is implemented. But will be posted as independent RFC patch.
- fd-based private page v7 is integrated. This is mostly same to Chao's patches.
It's in github.

Changes from v6:
- rebased to v5.19

Changes from v5:
- export __seamcall and use it
- move mutex lock from callee function of smp_call_on_cpu to the caller.
- rename mmu_prezap => flush_shadow_all_private() and tdx_mmu_release_hkid
- updated comment
- drop the use of tdh_mng_key.reclaimid(): as the function is for backward
compatibility to only return success
- struct kvm_tdx_cmd: metadata => flags, added __u64 error.
- make this ioctl systemwide ioctl
- ABI change to struct kvm_init_vm
- guest_tsc_khz: use kvm->arch.default_tsc_khz
- rename BUILD_BUG_ON_MEMCPY to MEMCPY_SAME_SIZE
- drop exporting kvm_set_tsc_khz().
- fix kvm_tdp_page_fault() for mtrr emulation
- rename it to kvm_gfn_shared_mask(), dropped kvm_gpa_shared_mask()
- drop kvm_is_private_gfn(), kept kvm_is_private_gpa()
keep kvm_{gfn, gpa}_private(), kvm_gpa_private()
- update commit message
- rename shadow_init_value => shadow_nonprsent_value
- added ept_violation_ve_test mode
- shadow_nonpresent_value => SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE in tdp_mmu.c
- legacy MMU case
=> - mmu_topup_shadow_page_cache(), kvm_mmu_create()
- FNAME(sync_page)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
- #VE warning:
- rename: REMOVED_SPTE => __REMOVED_SPTE, SHADOW_REMOVED_SPTE => REMOVED_SPTE
- merge into Like we discussed, this patch should be merged with patch
"KVM: x86/mmu: Allow non-zero init value for shadow PTE".
- fix pointed by Sagi. check !is_private check => (kvm_gfn_shared_mask && !is_private)
- introduce kvm_gfn_for_root(kvm, root, gfn)
- add only_shared argument to kvm_tdp_mmu_handle_gfn()
- use kvm_arch_dirty_log_supported()
- rename SPTE_PRIVATE_PROHIBIT to SPTE_SHARED_MASK.
- rename: is_private_prohibit_spte() => spte_shared_mask()
- fix: shadow_nonpresent_value => SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE in comment
- dropped this patch as the change was merged into kvm/queue
- update vt_apicv_post_state_restore()
- use is_64_bit_hypercall()
- comment: expand MSMI -> Machine Check System Management Interrupt
- fixed TDX_SEPT_PFERR
- tdvmcall_p[1234]_{write, read}() => tdvmcall_a[0123]_{read,write}()
- rename tdmvcall_exit_readon() => tdvmcall_leaf()
- remove optional zero check of argument.
- do a check for static_call(kvm_x86_has_emulated_msr)(kvm, MSR_IA32_SMBASE)
in kvm_vcpu_ioctl_smi and __apic_accept_irq.
- WARN_ON_ONCE in tdx_smi_allowed and tdx_enable_smi_window.
- introduce vcpu_deliver_init to x86_ops
- sprinkeled KVM_BUG_ON()

Changes from v4:
- rebased to TDX host kernel patch series.
- include all the patches to make this patch series working.
- add [MARKER] patches to mark the patch layer clear.

---
* What's TDX?
TDX stands for Trust Domain Extensions, which extends Intel Virtual Machines
Extensions (VMX) to introduce a kind of virtual machine guest called a Trust
Domain (TD) for confidential computing.

A TD runs in a CPU mode that is designed to protect the confidentiality of its
memory contents and its CPU state from any other software, including the hosting
Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM), unless explicitly shared by the TD itself.

We have more detailed explanations below (***).
We have the high-level design of TDX KVM below (****).

In this patch series, we use "TD" or "guest TD" to differentiate it from the
current "VM" (Virtual Machine), which is supported by KVM today.

* The organization of this patch series
This patch series is on top of the patches series "TDX host kernel support":
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/cover.1646007267.git.kai.huang@xxxxxxxxx/

This patch series is available at
https://github.com/intel/tdx/tree/kvm-upstream

The related repositories (TDX qemu, TDX OVMF(tdvf) etc) are described at
https://github.com/intel/tdx/wiki/TDX-KVM

The relations of the layers are depicted as follows.
The arrows below show the order of patch reviews we would like to have.

The below layers are chosen so that the device model, for example, qemu can
exercise each layering step by step. Check if TDX is supported, create TD VM,
create TD vcpu, allow vcpu running, populate TD guest private memory, and handle
vcpu exits/hypercalls/interrupts to run TD fully.

TDX vcpu
interrupt/exits/hypercall<------------\
^ |
| |
TD finalization |
^ |
| |
TDX EPT violation<------------\ |
^ | |
| | |
TD vcpu enter/exit | |
^ | |
| | |
TD vcpu creation/destruction | \-------KVM TDP MMU MapGPA
^ | ^
| | |
TD VM creation/destruction \---------------KVM TDP MMU hooks
^ ^
| |
TDX architectural definitions KVM TDP refactoring for TDX
^ ^
| |
TDX, VMX <--------TDX host kernel KVM MMU GPA stolen bits
coexistence support

The followings are explanations of each layer. Each layer has a dummy commit
that starts with [MARKER] in subject. It is intended to help to identify where
each layer starts.

TDX host kernel support:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/cover.1646007267.git.kai.huang@xxxxxxxxx/
The guts of system-wide initialization of TDX module. There is an
independent patch series for host x86. TDX KVM patches call functions
this patch series provides to initialize the TDX module.

TDX, VMX coexistence:
Infrastructure to allow TDX to coexist with VMX and trigger the
initialization of the TDX module.
This layer starts with
"KVM: VMX: Move out vmx_x86_ops to 'main.c' to wrap VMX and TDX"
TDX architectural definitions:
Add TDX architectural definitions and helper functions
This layer starts with
"[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TDX architectural definitions".
TD VM creation/destruction:
Guest TD creation/destroy allocation and releasing of TDX specific vm
and vcpu structure. Create an initial guest memory image with TDX
measurement.
This layer starts with
"[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD VM creation/destruction".
TD vcpu creation/destruction:
guest TD creation/destroy Allocation and releasing of TDX specific vm
and vcpu structure. Create an initial guest memory image with TDX
measurement.
This layer starts with
"[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu creation/destruction"
TDX EPT violation:
Create an initial guest memory image with TDX measurement. Handle
secure EPT violations to populate guest pages with TDX SEAMCALLs.
This layer starts with
"[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TDX EPT violation"
TD vcpu enter/exit:
Allow TDX vcpu to enter into TD and exit from TD. Save CPU state before
entering into TD. Restore CPU state after exiting from TD.
This layer starts with
"[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu enter/exit"
TD vcpu interrupts/exit/hypercall:
Handle various exits/hypercalls and allow interrupts to be injected so
that TD vcpu can continue running.
This layer starts with
"[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu exits/interrupts/hypercalls"

KVM MMU GPA shared bit:
Introduce framework to handle shared bit repurposed bit of GPA TDX
repurposed a bit of GPA to indicate shared or private. If it's shared,
it's the same as the conventional VMX EPT case. VMM can access shared
guest pages. If it's private, it's handled by Secure-EPT and the guest
page is encrypted.
This layer starts with
"[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM MMU GPA stolen bits"
KVM TDP refactoring for TDX:
TDX Secure EPT requires different constants. e.g. initial value EPT
entry value etc. Various refactoring for those differences.
This layer starts with
"[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP refactoring for TDX"
KVM TDP MMU hooks:
Introduce framework to TDP MMU to add hooks in addition to direct EPT
access TDX added Secure EPT which is an enhancement to VMX EPT. Unlike
conventional VMX EPT, CPU can't directly read/write Secure EPT. Instead,
use TDX SEAMCALLs to operate on Secure EPT.
This layer starts with
"[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP MMU hooks"
KVM TDP MMU MapGPA:
Introduce framework to handle switching guest pages from private/shared
to shared/private. For a given GPA, a guest page can be assigned to a
private GPA or a shared GPA exclusively. With TDX MapGPA hypercall,
guest TD converts GPA assignments from private (or shared) to shared (or
private).
This layer starts with
"[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP MMU MapGPA "

KVM guest private memory: (not shown in the above diagram)
[PATCH v4 00/12] KVM: mm: fd-based approach for supporting KVM guest private
memory: https://lkml.org/lkml/2022/1/18/395
Guest private memory requires different memory management in KVM. The
patch proposes a way for it. Integration with TDX KVM.

(***)
* TDX module
A CPU-attested software module called the "TDX module" is designed to implement
the TDX architecture, and it is loaded by the UEFI firmware today. It can be
loaded by the kernel or driver at runtime, but in this patch series we assume
that the TDX module is already loaded and initialized.

The TDX module provides two main new logical modes of operation built upon the
new SEAM (Secure Arbitration Mode) root and non-root CPU modes added to the VMX
architecture. TDX root mode is mostly identical to the VMX root operation mode,
and the TDX functions (described later) are triggered by the new SEAMCALL
instruction with the desired interface function selected by an input operand
(leaf number, in RAX). TDX non-root mode is used for TD guest operation. TDX
non-root operation (i.e. "guest TD" mode) is similar to the VMX non-root
operation (i.e. guest VM), with changes and restrictions to better assure that
no other software or hardware has direct visibility of the TD memory and state.

TDX transitions between TDX root operation and TDX non-root operation include TD
Entries, from TDX root to TDX non-root mode, and TD Exits from TDX non-root to
TDX root mode. A TD Exit might be asynchronous, triggered by some external
event (e.g., external interrupt or SMI) or an exception, or it might be
synchronous, triggered by a TDCALL (TDG.VP.VMCALL) function.

TD VCPUs can be entered using SEAMCALL(TDH.VP.ENTER) by KVM. TDH.VP.ENTER is one
of the TDX interface functions as mentioned above, and "TDH" stands for Trust
Domain Host. Those host-side TDX interface functions are categorized into
various areas just for better organization, such as SYS (TDX module management),
MNG (TD management), VP (VCPU), PHYSMEM (physical memory), MEM (private memory),
etc. For example, SEAMCALL(TDH.SYS.INFO) returns the TDX module information.

TDCS (Trust Domain Control Structure) is the main control structure of a guest
TD, and encrypted (using the guest TD's ephemeral private key). At a high
level, TDCS holds information for controlling TD operation as a whole,
execution, EPTP, MSR bitmaps, etc that KVM needs to set it up. Note that MSR
bitmaps are held as part of TDCS (unlike VMX) because they are meant to have the
same value for all VCPUs of the same TD.

Trust Domain Virtual Processor State (TDVPS) is the root control structure of a
TD VCPU. It helps the TDX module control the operation of the VCPU, and holds
the VCPU state while the VCPU is not running. TDVPS is opaque to software and
DMA access, accessible only by using the TDX module interface functions (such as
TDH.VP.RD, TDH.VP.WR). TDVPS includes TD VMCS, and TD VMCS auxiliary structures,
such as virtual APIC page, virtualization exception information, etc.

Several VMX control structures (such as Shared EPT and Posted interrupt
descriptor) are directly managed and accessed by the host VMM. These control
structures are pointed to by fields in the TD VMCS.

The above means that 1) KVM needs to allocate different data structures for TDs,
2) KVM can reuse the existing code for TDs for some operations, 3) it needs to
define TD-specific handling for others. 3) Redirect operations to . 3)
Redirect operations to the TDX specific callbacks, like "if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
tdx_callback() else vmx_callback();".

*TD Private Memory
TD private memory is designed to hold TD private content, encrypted by the CPU
using the TD ephemeral key. An encryption engine holds a table of encryption
keys, and an encryption key is selected for each memory transaction based on a
Host Key Identifier (HKID). By design, the host VMM does not have access to the
encryption keys.

In the first generation of MKTME, HKID is "stolen" from the physical address by
allocating a configurable number of bits from the top of the physical
address. The HKID space is partitioned into shared HKIDs for legacy MKTME
accesses and private HKIDs for SEAM-mode-only accesses. We use 0 for the shared
HKID on the host so that MKTME can be opaque or bypassed on the host.

During TDX non-root operation (i.e. guest TD), memory accesses can be qualified
as either shared or private, based on the value of a new SHARED bit in the Guest
Physical Address (GPA). The CPU translates shared GPAs using the usual VMX EPT
(Extended Page Table) or "Shared EPT" (in this document), which resides in host
VMM memory. The Shared EPT is directly managed by the host VMM - the same as
with the current VMX. Since guest TDs usually require I/O, and the data exchange
needs to be done via shared memory, thus KVM needs to use the current EPT
functionality even for TDs.

* Secure EPT and Minoring using the TDP code
The CPU translates private GPAs using a separate Secure EPT. The Secure EPT
pages are encrypted and integrity-protected with the TD's ephemeral private
key. Secure EPT can be managed _indirectly_ by the host VMM, using the TDX
interface functions, and thus conceptually Secure EPT is a subset of EPT (why
"subset"). Since execution of such interface functions takes much longer time
than accessing memory directly, in KVM we use the existing TDP code to minor the
Secure EPT for the TD.

This way, we can effectively walk Secure EPT without using the TDX interface
functions.

* VM life cycle and TDX specific operations
The userspace VMM, such as QEMU, needs to build and treat TDs differently. For
example, a TD needs to boot in private memory, and the host software cannot copy
the initial image to private memory.

* TSC Virtualization
The TDX module helps TDs maintain reliable TSC (Time Stamp Counter) values
(e.g. consistent among the TD VCPUs) and the virtual TSC frequency is determined
by TD configuration, i.e. when the TD is created, not per VCPU. The current KVM
owns TSC virtualization for VMs, but the TDX module does for TDs.

* MCE support for TDs
The TDX module doesn't allow VMM to inject MCE. Instead PV way is needed for TD
to communicate with VMM. For now, KVM silently ignores MCE request by VMM. MSRs
related to MCE (e.g, MCE bank registers) can be naturally emulated by
paravirtualizing MSR access.

[1] For details, the specifications, [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], are
available.

* Restrictions or future work
Some features are not included to reduce patch size. Those features are
addressed as future independent patch series.
- large page (2M, 1G)
- qemu gdb stub
- guest PMU
- and more

* Prerequisites
It's required to load the TDX module and initialize it. It's out of the scope
of this patch series. Another independent patch for the common x86 code is
planned. It defines CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST and this patch series uses
CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST. It's assumed that With CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST=y, the TDX
module is initialized and ready for KVM to use the TDX module APIs for TDX guest
life cycle like tdh.mng.init are ready to use.

Concretely Global initialization, LP (Logical Processor) initialization, global
configuration, the key configuration, and TDMR and PAMT initialization are done.
The state of the TDX module is SYS_READY. Please refer to the TDX module
specification, the chapter Intel TDX Module Lifecycle State Machine

** Detecting the TDX module readiness.
TDX host patch series implements the detection of the TDX module availability
and its initialization so that KVM can use it. Also it manages Host KeyID
(HKID) assigned to guest TD.
The assumed APIs the TDX host patch series provides are
- const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdx_get_sysinfo(void);
Return the system wide information about the TDX module. NULL if the TDX
isn't initialized.
- int tdx_enable(void);
Initialization of TDX module so that the TDX module is ready for KVM to use.
- extern u32 tdx_global_keyid __read_mostly;
global host key id that is used for the TDX module itself.
- u32 tdx_get_num_keyid(void);
return the number of available TDX private host key id.
- int tdx_keyid_alloc(void);
Allocate HKID for guest TD.
- void tdx_keyid_free(int keyid);
Free HKID for guest TD.

(****)
* TDX KVM high-level design
- Host key ID management
Host Key ID (HKID) needs to be assigned to each TDX guest for memory encryption.
It is assumed The TDX host patch series implements necessary functions,
u32 tdx_get_global_keyid(void), int tdx_keyid_alloc(void) and,
void tdx_keyid_free(int keyid).

- Data structures and VM type
Because TDX is different from VMX, define its own VM/VCPU structures, struct
kvm_tdx and struct vcpu_tdx instead of struct kvm_vmx and struct vcpu_vmx. To
identify the VM, introduce VM-type to specify which VM type, VMX (default) or
TDX, is used.

- VM life cycle and TDX specific operations
Re-purpose the existing KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP to add TDX specific operations.
New commands are used to get the TDX system parameters, set TDX specific VM/VCPU
parameters, set initial guest memory and measurement.

The creation of TDX VM requires five additional operations in addition to the
conventional VM creation.
- Get KVM system capability to check if TDX VM type is supported
- VM creation (KVM_CREATE_VM)
- New: Get the TDX specific system parameters. KVM_TDX_GET_CAPABILITY.
- New: Set TDX specific VM parameters. KVM_TDX_INIT_VM.
- VCPU creation (KVM_CREATE_VCPU)
- New: Set TDX specific VCPU parameters. KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU.
- New: Initialize guest memory as boot state and extend the measurement with
the memory. KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION.
- New: Finalize VM. KVM_TDX_FINALIZE. Complete measurement of the initial
TDX VM contents.
- VCPU RUN (KVM_VCPU_RUN)

- Protected guest state
Because the guest state (CPU state and guest memory) is protected, the KVM VMM
can't operate on them. For example, accessing CPU registers, injecting
exceptions, and accessing guest memory. Those operations are handled as
silently ignored, returning zero or initial reset value when it's requested via
KVM API ioctls.

VM/VCPU state and callbacks for TDX specific operations.
Define tdx specific VM state and VCPU state instead of VMX ones. Redirect
operations to TDX specific callbacks. "if (tdx) tdx_op() else vmx_op()".

Operations on the CPU state
silently ignore operations on the guest state. For example, the write to
CPU registers is ignored and the read from CPU registers returns 0.

. ignore access to CPU registers except for allowed ones.
. TSC: add a check if tsc is immutable and return an error. Because the KVM
implementation updates the internal tsc state and it's difficult to back
out those changes. Instead, skip the logic.
. dirty logging: add check if dirty logging is supported.
. exceptions/SMI/MCE/SIPI/INIT: silently ignore

Note: virtual external interrupt and NMI can be injected into TDX guests.

- KVM MMU integration
One bit of the guest physical address (bit 51 or 47) is repurposed to indicate if
the guest physical address is private (the bit is cleared) or shared (the bit is
set). The bits are called stolen bits.

- Stolen bits framework
systematically tracks which guest physical address, shared or private, is
used.

- Shared EPT and secure EPT
There are two EPTs. Shared EPT (the conventional one) and Secure
EPT(the new one). Shared EPT is handled the same for the stolen
bit set. Secure EPT points to private guest pages. To resolve
EPT violation, KVM walks one of two EPTs based on faulted GPA.
Because it's costly to access secure EPT during walking EPTs with
SEAMCALLs for the private guest physical address, another private
EPT is used as a shadow of Secure-EPT with the existing logic at
the cost of extra memory.

The following depicts the relationship.

KVM | TDX module
| | |
-------------+---------- | |
| | | |
V V | |
shared GPA private GPA | |
CPU shared EPT pointer KVM private EPT pointer | CPU secure EPT pointer
| | | |
| | | |
V V | V
shared EPT private EPT--------mirror----->Secure EPT
| | | |
| \--------------------+------\ |
| | | |
V | V V
shared guest page | private guest page
|
|
non-encrypted memory | encrypted memory
|

- Operating on Secure EPT
Use the TDX module APIs to operate on Secure EPT. To call the TDX API
during resolving EPT violation, add hooks to additional operation and wiring
it to TDX backend.

* References

[1] TDX specification
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/intel-trust-domain-extensions.html
[2] Intel Trust Domain Extensions (Intel TDX)
https://cdrdv2.intel.com/v1/dl/getContent/726790
[3] Intel CPU Architectural Extensions Specification
https://www.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents-tps/intel-tdx-cpu-architectural-specification.pdf
[4] Intel TDX Module 1.0 Specification
https://www.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/tdx-module-1.0-public-spec-v0.931.pdf
[5] Intel TDX Loader Interface Specification
https://www.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents-tps/intel-tdx-seamldr-interface-specification.pdf
[6] Intel TDX Guest-Hypervisor Communication Interface
https://cdrdv2.intel.com/v1/dl/getContent/726790
[7] Intel TDX Virtual Firmware Design Guide
https://www.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/tdx-virtual-firmware-design-guide-rev-1.01.pdf
[8] intel public github
kvm TDX branch: https://github.com/intel/tdx/tree/kvm
TDX guest branch: https://github.com/intel/tdx/tree/guest
qemu TDX https://github.com/intel/qemu-tdx
[9] TDVF
https://github.com/tianocore/edk2-staging/tree/TDVF
This was merged into EDK2 main branch. https://github.com/tianocore/edk2

Chao Gao (2):
KVM: x86/mmu: Assume guest MMIOs are shared
KVM: x86: Allow to update cached values in kvm_user_return_msrs w/o
wrmsr

Isaku Yamahata (93):
KVM: x86/vmx: initialize loaded_vmcss_on_cpu in vmx_hardware_setup()
KVM: x86/vmx: Refactor KVM VMX module init/exit functions
KVM: VMX: Reorder vmx initialization with kvm vendor initialization
KVM: TDX: Initialize the TDX module when loading the KVM intel kernel
module
KVM: TDX: Add placeholders for TDX VM/vcpu structure
KVM: TDX: Make TDX VM type supported
[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TDX architectural
definitions
KVM: TDX: Define TDX architectural definitions
KVM: TDX: Add C wrapper functions for SEAMCALLs to the TDX module
KVM: TDX: Retry SEAMCALL on the lack of entropy error
KVM: TDX: Add helper functions to print TDX SEAMCALL error
[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD VM creation/destruction
x86/cpu: Add helper functions to allocate/free TDX private host key id
x86/virt/tdx: Add a helper function to return system wide info about
TDX module
KVM: TDX: Add place holder for TDX VM specific mem_enc_op ioctl
KVM: x86, tdx: Make KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPUS backend specific
KVM: TDX: create/destroy VM structure
KVM: TDX: initialize VM with TDX specific parameters
KVM: TDX: Make pmu_intel.c ignore guest TD case
KVM: TDX: Refuse to unplug the last cpu on the package
[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu
creation/destruction
KVM: TDX: allocate/free TDX vcpu structure
KVM: TDX: Do TDX specific vcpu initialization
[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM MMU GPA shared bits
KVM: x86/mmu: introduce config for PRIVATE KVM MMU
KVM: x86/mmu: Add address conversion functions for TDX shared bit of
GPA
[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP refactoring for
TDX
KVM: x86/mmu: Replace hardcoded value 0 for the initial value for SPTE
KVM: x86/mmu: Add Suppress VE bit to
shadow_mmio_mask/shadow_present_mask
KVM: x86/mmu: Track shadow MMIO value on a per-VM basis
KVM: x86/mmu: Disallow fast page fault on private GPA
KVM: VMX: Introduce test mode related to EPT violation VE
[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP MMU hooks
KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Init role member of struct kvm_mmu_page at
allocation
KVM: x86/mmu: Add a new is_private member for union kvm_mmu_page_role
KVM: x86/mmu: Add a private pointer to struct kvm_mmu_page
KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Sprinkle __must_check
KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Support TDX private mapping for TDP MMU
[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TDX EPT violation
KVM: TDX: Add accessors VMX VMCS helpers
KVM: TDX: Require TDP MMU and mmio caching for TDX
KVM: TDX: TDP MMU TDX support
KVM: TDX: MTRR: implement get_mt_mask() for TDX
[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD finalization
KVM: TDX: Create initial guest memory
KVM: TDX: Finalize VM initialization
[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu enter/exit
KVM: TDX: Implement TDX vcpu enter/exit path
KVM: TDX: vcpu_run: save/restore host state(host kernel gs)
KVM: TDX: restore host xsave state when exit from the guest TD
KVM: TDX: restore user ret MSRs
[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu
exits/interrupts/hypercalls
KVM: TDX: complete interrupts after tdexit
KVM: TDX: restore debug store when TD exit
KVM: TDX: handle vcpu migration over logical processor
KVM: x86: Add a switch_db_regs flag to handle TDX's auto-switched
behavior
KVM: TDX: remove use of struct vcpu_vmx from posted_interrupt.c
KVM: TDX: Implement interrupt injection
KVM: TDX: Implements vcpu request_immediate_exit
KVM: TDX: Implement methods to inject NMI
KVM: TDX: Add a place holder to handle TDX VM exit
KVM: TDX: handle EXIT_REASON_OTHER_SMI
KVM: TDX: handle ept violation/misconfig exit
KVM: TDX: handle EXCEPTION_NMI and EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT
KVM: TDX: Handle EXIT_REASON_OTHER_SMI with MSMI
KVM: TDX: Add a place holder for handler of TDX hypercalls
(TDG.VP.VMCALL)
KVM: TDX: handle KVM hypercall with TDG.VP.VMCALL
KVM: TDX: Add KVM Exit for TDX TDG.VP.VMCALL
KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV CPUID hypercall
KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV HLT hypercall
KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV port io hypercall
KVM: TDX: Implement callbacks for MSR operations for TDX
KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV rdmsr/wrmsr hypercall
KVM: TDX: Handle MSR MTRRCap and MTRRDefType access
KVM: TDX: Handle MSR IA32_FEAT_CTL MSR and IA32_MCG_EXT_CTL
KVM: TDX: Handle TDG.VP.VMCALL<GetTdVmCallInfo> hypercall
KVM: TDX: Silently discard SMI request
KVM: TDX: Silently ignore INIT/SIPI
KVM: TDX: Add methods to ignore accesses to CPU state
KVM: TDX: Add methods to ignore guest instruction emulation
KVM: TDX: Add a method to ignore dirty logging
KVM: TDX: Add methods to ignore VMX preemption timer
KVM: TDX: Add methods to ignore accesses to TSC
KVM: TDX: Ignore setting up mce
KVM: TDX: Add a method to ignore for TDX to ignore hypercall patch
KVM: TDX: Add methods to ignore virtual apic related operation
KVM: TDX: Inhibit APICv for TDX guest
Documentation/virt/kvm: Document on Trust Domain Extensions(TDX)
KVM: x86: design documentation on TDX support of x86 KVM TDP MMU
KVM: TDX: Add hint TDX ioctl to release Secure-EPT
RFC: KVM: x86: Add x86 callback to check cpuid
RFC: KVM: x86, TDX: Add check for KVM_SET_CPUID2
[MARKER] the end of (the first phase of) TDX KVM patch series

Sean Christopherson (17):
KVM: VMX: Move out vmx_x86_ops to 'main.c' to wrap VMX and TDX
KVM: TDX: Add TDX "architectural" error codes
KVM: TDX: x86: Add ioctl to get TDX systemwide parameters
KVM: Allow page-sized MMU caches to be initialized with custom 64-bit
values
KVM: x86/mmu: Allow non-zero value for non-present SPTE and removed
SPTE
KVM: x86/mmu: Allow per-VM override of the TDP max page level
KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Don't zap private pages for unsupported cases
KVM: VMX: Split out guts of EPT violation to common/exposed function
KVM: VMX: Move setting of EPT MMU masks to common VT-x code
KVM: TDX: Add load_mmu_pgd method for TDX
KVM: x86/mmu: Introduce kvm_mmu_map_tdp_page() for use by TDX
KVM: TDX: Add support for find pending IRQ in a protected local APIC
KVM: x86: Assume timer IRQ was injected if APIC state is proteced
KVM: VMX: Modify NMI and INTR handlers to take intr_info as function
argument
KVM: VMX: Move NMI/exception handler to common helper
KVM: x86: Split core of hypercall emulation to helper function
KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV MMIO hypercall

Yan Zhao (1):
KVM: x86/mmu: TDX: Do not enable page track for TD guest

Yang Weijiang (1):
KVM: TDX: Add TSX_CTRL msr into uret_msrs list

Yao Yuan (1):
KVM: TDX: Handle vmentry failure for INTEL TD guest

Yuan Yao (1):
KVM: TDX: Retry seamcall when TDX_OPERAND_BUSY with operand SEPT

Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 9 +-
Documentation/virt/kvm/index.rst | 1 +
Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/index.rst | 2 +
Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/intel-tdx.rst | 362 +++
Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/tdx-tdp-mmu.rst | 443 +++
arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 17 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 84 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h | 85 +
arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 14 +
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 89 +
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h | 5 +-
arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig | 6 +
arch/x86/kvm/Makefile | 3 +-
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 27 +-
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h | 2 +
arch/x86/kvm/irq.c | 3 +
arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c | 33 +-
arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h | 2 +
arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h | 31 +
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 200 +-
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h | 109 +-
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/page_track.c | 3 +
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c | 17 +-
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h | 27 +-
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.h | 14 +-
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 421 ++-
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.h | 7 +-
arch/x86/kvm/smm.h | 7 +-
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h | 166 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 1239 ++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c | 46 +-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.h | 28 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.c | 43 +-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.h | 13 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 3214 ++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 272 ++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_arch.h | 221 ++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.h | 44 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_error.c | 20 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h | 267 ++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs.h | 5 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 674 ++--
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 52 +-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 257 ++
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 117 +-
arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 2 +
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S | 4 +
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c | 48 +-
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h | 51 -
include/linux/kvm_host.h | 1 +
include/linux/kvm_types.h | 1 +
include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 89 +
tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 96 +
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 31 +-
58 files changed, 8271 insertions(+), 758 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/intel-tdx.rst
create mode 100644 Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/tdx-tdp-mmu.rst
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.h
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_arch.h
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.h
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_error.c
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h

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--
2.25.1

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