[PATCH RFC 11/20] kasan: introduce poison_kmalloc_large_redzone

From: andrey . konovalov
Date: Mon Nov 06 2023 - 15:11:59 EST


From: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@xxxxxxxxxx>

Split out a poison_kmalloc_large_redzone helper from
__kasan_kmalloc_large and use it in the caller's code.

This is a preparatory change for the following patches in this series.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
mm/kasan/common.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
index ceb06d5f169f..b50e4fbaf238 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/common.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
@@ -353,23 +353,12 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kasan_kmalloc);

-void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,
+static inline void poison_kmalloc_large_redzone(const void *ptr, size_t size,
gfp_t flags)
{
unsigned long redzone_start;
unsigned long redzone_end;

- if (gfpflags_allow_blocking(flags))
- kasan_quarantine_reduce();
-
- if (unlikely(ptr == NULL))
- return NULL;
-
- /*
- * The object has already been unpoisoned by kasan_unpoison_pages() for
- * alloc_pages() or by kasan_krealloc() for krealloc().
- */
-
/*
* The redzone has byte-level precision for the generic mode.
* Partially poison the last object granule to cover the unaligned
@@ -379,12 +368,25 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,
kasan_poison_last_granule(ptr, size);

/* Poison the aligned part of the redzone. */
- redzone_start = round_up((unsigned long)(ptr + size),
- KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
+ redzone_start = round_up((unsigned long)(ptr + size), KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
redzone_end = (unsigned long)ptr + page_size(virt_to_page(ptr));
kasan_poison((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE, false);
+}

+void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,
+ gfp_t flags)
+{
+ if (gfpflags_allow_blocking(flags))
+ kasan_quarantine_reduce();
+
+ if (unlikely(ptr == NULL))
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* The object has already been unpoisoned by kasan_unpoison_pages(). */
+ poison_kmalloc_large_redzone(ptr, size, flags);
+
+ /* Keep the tag that was set by alloc_pages(). */
return (void *)ptr;
}

@@ -392,6 +394,9 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t size, gfp_t flag
{
struct slab *slab;

+ if (gfpflags_allow_blocking(flags))
+ kasan_quarantine_reduce();
+
if (unlikely(object == ZERO_SIZE_PTR))
return (void *)object;

@@ -409,11 +414,11 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t size, gfp_t flag

/* Piggy-back on kmalloc() instrumentation to poison the redzone. */
if (unlikely(!slab))
- return __kasan_kmalloc_large(object, size, flags);
- else {
+ poison_kmalloc_large_redzone(object, size, flags);
+ else
poison_kmalloc_redzone(slab->slab_cache, object, size, flags);
- return (void *)object;
- }
+
+ return (void *)object;
}

bool __kasan_mempool_poison_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order,
--
2.25.1