Re: [PATCH 5/9] KVM: SVM: Save shadow stack host state on VMRUN

From: Maxim Levitsky
Date: Thu Nov 02 2023 - 14:12:17 EST


On Tue, 2023-10-10 at 20:02 +0000, John Allen wrote:
> When running as an SEV-ES guest, the PL0_SSP, PL1_SSP, PL2_SSP, PL3_SSP,
> and U_CET fields in the VMCB save area are type B, meaning the host
> state is automatically loaded on a VMEXIT, but is not saved on a VMRUN.
> The other shadow stack MSRs, S_CET, SSP, and ISST_ADDR are type A,
> meaning they are loaded on VMEXIT and saved on VMRUN. PL0_SSP, PL1_SSP,
> and PL2_SSP are currently unused. Manually save the other type B host
> MSR values before VMRUN.
>
> Signed-off-by: John Allen <john.allen@xxxxxxx>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 9 +++++++++
> 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> index b9a0a939d59f..bb4b18baa6f7 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> @@ -3098,6 +3098,15 @@ void sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct sev_es_save_area *hostsa)
> hostsa->dr2_addr_mask = amd_get_dr_addr_mask(2);
> hostsa->dr3_addr_mask = amd_get_dr_addr_mask(3);
> }
> +
> + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
> + /*
> + * MSR_IA32_U_CET and MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP are restored on VMEXIT,
> + * save the current host values.
> + */
> + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, hostsa->u_cet);
> + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, hostsa->pl3_ssp);
> + }
> }


Do we actually need this patch?

Host FPU state is not encrypted, and as far as I understood from the common CET patch series,
that on return to userspace these msrs will be restored.

Best regards,
Maxim Levitsky


PS: AMD's APM is silent on how 'S_CET, SSP, and ISST_ADDR' are saved/restored for non encrypted guests.
Are they also type A?

Can the VMSA table be trusted in general to provide the same swap type as for the non encrypted guests?


>
> void sev_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector)