[PATCH 15/23] x86/srso: Remove 'pred_cmd' label

From: Josh Poimboeuf
Date: Fri Aug 25 2023 - 03:03:17 EST


SBPB is only enabled in two distinct cases:

1) when SRSO has been disabled with srso=off

2) when SRSO has been fixed (in future HW)

Simplify the control flow by getting rid of the 'pred_cmd' label and
moving the SBPB enablement check to the two corresponding code sites.
This makes it more clear when exactly SBPB gets enabled.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 21 +++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index d883d1c38f7f..3c7f634b6148 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -2410,13 +2410,21 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
{
bool has_microcode = boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE);

- if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRSO) || cpu_mitigations_off())
- goto pred_cmd;
+ if (cpu_mitigations_off())
+ return;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRSO)) {
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SBPB))
+ x86_pred_cmd = PRED_CMD_SBPB;
+ return;
+ }

if (has_microcode) {
/*
* Zen1/2 with SMT off aren't vulnerable after the right
* IBPB microcode has been applied.
+ *
+ * Zen1/2 don't have SBPB, no need to try to enable it here.
*/
if (boot_cpu_data.x86 < 0x19 && !cpu_smt_possible()) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO);
@@ -2439,7 +2447,9 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)

switch (srso_cmd) {
case SRSO_CMD_OFF:
- goto pred_cmd;
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SBPB))
+ x86_pred_cmd = PRED_CMD_SBPB;
+ return;

case SRSO_CMD_MICROCODE:
if (has_microcode) {
@@ -2501,11 +2511,6 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)

out:
pr_info("%s%s\n", srso_strings[srso_mitigation], has_microcode ? "" : ", no microcode");
-
-pred_cmd:
- if ((!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRSO) || srso_cmd == SRSO_CMD_OFF) &&
- boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SBPB))
- x86_pred_cmd = PRED_CMD_SBPB;
}

#undef pr_fmt
--
2.41.0