[tip: x86/urgent] x86/fineibt: Poison ENDBR at +0

From: tip-bot2 for Peter Zijlstra
Date: Mon Jul 10 2023 - 04:15:10 EST


The following commit has been merged into the x86/urgent branch of tip:

Commit-ID: 04505bbbbb15da950ea0239e328a76a3ad2376e0
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/04505bbbbb15da950ea0239e328a76a3ad2376e0
Author: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Thu, 15 Jun 2023 21:35:48 +02:00
Committer: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
CommitterDate: Mon, 10 Jul 2023 09:52:25 +02:00

x86/fineibt: Poison ENDBR at +0

Alyssa noticed that when building the kernel with CFI_CLANG+IBT and
booting on IBT enabled hardware to obtain FineIBT, the indirect
functions look like:

__cfi_foo:
endbr64
subl $hash, %r10d
jz 1f
ud2
nop
1:
foo:
endbr64

This is because the compiler generates code for kCFI+IBT. In that case
the caller does the hash check and will jump to +0, so there must be
an ENDBR there. The compiler doesn't know about FineIBT at all; also
it is possible to actually use kCFI+IBT when booting with 'cfi=kcfi'
on IBT enabled hardware.

Having this second ENDBR however makes it possible to elide the CFI
check. Therefore, we should poison this second ENDBR when switching to
FineIBT mode.

Fixes: 931ab63664f0 ("x86/ibt: Implement FineIBT")
Reported-by: "Milburn, Alyssa" <alyssa.milburn@xxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@xxxxxxxxxx>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230615193722.194131053@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
---
arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
index 04b25a2..d77aaab 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
@@ -1068,6 +1068,17 @@ static int cfi_rewrite_preamble(s32 *start, s32 *end)
return 0;
}

+static void cfi_rewrite_endbr(s32 *start, s32 *end)
+{
+ s32 *s;
+
+ for (s = start; s < end; s++) {
+ void *addr = (void *)s + *s;
+
+ poison_endbr(addr+16, false);
+ }
+}
+
/* .retpoline_sites */
static int cfi_rand_callers(s32 *start, s32 *end)
{
@@ -1162,14 +1173,19 @@ static void __apply_fineibt(s32 *start_retpoline, s32 *end_retpoline,
return;

case CFI_FINEIBT:
+ /* place the FineIBT preamble at func()-16 */
ret = cfi_rewrite_preamble(start_cfi, end_cfi);
if (ret)
goto err;

+ /* rewrite the callers to target func()-16 */
ret = cfi_rewrite_callers(start_retpoline, end_retpoline);
if (ret)
goto err;

+ /* now that nobody targets func()+0, remove ENDBR there */
+ cfi_rewrite_endbr(start_cfi, end_cfi);
+
if (builtin)
pr_info("Using FineIBT CFI\n");
return;