Re: [PATCH RFC v9 07/51] x86/sev: Add the host SEV-SNP initialization support

[Borislav Petkov]

On Sun, Jun 11, 2023 at 11:25:15PM -0500, Michael Roth wrote:
> From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
> 
> The memory integrity guarantees of SEV-SNP are enforced through a new
> structure called the Reverse Map Table (RMP). The RMP is a single data
> structure shared across the system that contains one entry for every 4K
> page of DRAM that may be used by SEV-SNP VMs. APM2 section 15.36 details

Rather say 'APM v2, section "Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP)"' because
the numbering is more likely to change than the name in the future. With
the name, people can find it faster.

> a number of steps needed to detect/enable SEV-SNP and RMP table support
> on the host:
> 
>  - Detect SEV-SNP support based on CPUID bit
>  - Initialize the RMP table memory reported by the RMP base/end MSR
>    registers and configure IOMMU to be compatible with RMP access
>    restrictions
>  - Set the MtrrFixDramModEn bit in SYSCFG MSR
>  - Set the SecureNestedPagingEn and VMPLEn bits in the SYSCFG MSR
>  - Configure IOMMU
> 
> RMP table entry format is non-architectural and it can vary by
> processor. It is defined by the PPR. Restrict SNP support to CPU
> models/families which are compatible with the current RMP table entry
> format to guard against any undefined behavior when running on other
> system types. Future models/support will handle this through an
> architectural mechanism to allow for broader compatibility.

I'm guessing this is all for live migration between SNP hosts. If so,
then there will have to be a guest API to handle the differences.

> SNP host code depends on CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV config flag, which may be
> enabled even when CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT isn't set, so update the
> SNP-specific IOMMU helpers used here to rely on CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
> instead of CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT.

Does that mean that even on CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT=n kernels, host SNP
can function?

Do we even want that?

I'd expect that a host SNP kernel should have SME enabled too even
though it is not absolutely necessary.

> Co-developed-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@xxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@xxxxxxx>
> Co-developed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
> [mdr: rework commit message to be clearer about what patch does, squash
>       in early_rmptable_check() handling from Tom]
> Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@xxxxxxx>
> ---
>  arch/x86/coco/Makefile                   |   1 +
>  arch/x86/coco/sev/Makefile               |   3 +
>  arch/x86/coco/sev/host.c                 | 212 +++++++++++++++++++++++
>  arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h |   8 +-
>  arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h         |  11 +-
>  arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h               |   2 +
>  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c                |  19 ++
>  drivers/iommu/amd/init.c                 |   2 +-
>  include/linux/amd-iommu.h                |   2 +-
>  9 files changed, 256 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>  create mode 100644 arch/x86/coco/sev/Makefile
>  create mode 100644 arch/x86/coco/sev/host.c

Ignored review comments here:

https://lore.kernel.org/r/Y9ubi0i4Z750gdMm@xxxxxxx

Ignoring this one for now too.

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette