Re: [PATCH] mm/secretmem: make it on by default

[David Hildenbrand]

On 15.05.23 10:34, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> From: "Mike Rapoport (IBM)" <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
>
> Following the discussion about direct map fragmentaion at LSF/MM [1], it
> appears that direct map fragmentation has a negligible effect on kernel
> data accesses. Since the only reason that warranted secretmem to be
> disabled by default was concern about performance regression caused by
> the direct map fragmentation, it makes perfect sense to lift this
> restriction and make secretmem enabled.
>
> secretmem obeys RLIMIT_MEMBLOCK and as such it is not expected to cause
> large fragmentation of the direct map or meaningfull increase in page
> tables allocated during split of the large mappings in the direct map.
>
> The secretmem.enable parameter is retained to allow system
> administrators to disable secretmem at boot.
>
> Switch the default setting of secretem.enable parameter to 1.
>
> Link: https://lwn.net/Articles/931406/ [1]
> Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
>   mm/secretmem.c | 2 +-
>   1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/mm/secretmem.c b/mm/secretmem.c
> index 0b502625cd30..974b32ba8b9d 100644
> --- a/mm/secretmem.c
> +++ b/mm/secretmem.c
> @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
>   #define SECRETMEM_MODE_MASK	(0x0)
>   #define SECRETMEM_FLAGS_MASK	SECRETMEM_MODE_MASK
>   
> -static bool secretmem_enable __ro_after_init;
> +static bool secretmem_enable __ro_after_init = 1;
>   module_param_named(enable, secretmem_enable, bool, 0400);
>   MODULE_PARM_DESC(secretmem_enable,
>   		 "Enable secretmem and memfd_secret(2) system call");

Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>

--
Thanks,

David / dhildenb