Re: [syzbot] KASAN: use-after-free Read in put_pmu_ctx

From: Peter Zijlstra
Date: Thu Dec 22 2022 - 15:59:57 EST


On Wed, Dec 21, 2022 at 10:42:39AM +0800, Chengming Zhou wrote:

> > Does this help?
> >
> > diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
> > index e47914ac8732..bbff551783e1 100644
> > --- a/kernel/events/core.c
> > +++ b/kernel/events/core.c
> > @@ -12689,7 +12689,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
> > return event_fd;
> >
> > err_context:
> > - /* event->pmu_ctx freed by free_event() */
> > + put_pmu_ctx(event->pmu_ctx);
> > + event->pmu_ctx = NULL; /* _free_event() */
> > err_locked:
> > mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex);
> > perf_unpin_context(ctx);
>
> Tested-by: Chengming Zhou <zhouchengming@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>
> While reviewing the code, I found perf_event_create_kernel_counter()
> has the similar problem in the "err_pmu_ctx" error handling path:

Right you are, updated the patch, thanks!

> CPU0 CPU1
> perf_event_create_kernel_counter()
> // inc ctx refcnt
> find_get_context(task, event) (1)
>
> // inc pmu_ctx refcnt
> pmu_ctx = find_get_pmu_context()
>
> event->pmu_ctx = pmu_ctx
> ...
> goto err_pmu_ctx:
> // dec pmu_ctx refcnt
> put_pmu_ctx(pmu_ctx) (2)
>
> mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex)
> // dec ctx refcnt
> put_ctx(ctx)
> perf_event_exit_task_context()
> mutex_lock()
> mutex_unlock()
> // last refcnt put
> put_ctx()
> free_event(event)
> if (event->pmu_ctx) // True
> put_pmu_ctx() (3)
> // will access freed pmu_ctx or ctx
>
> if (event->ctx) // False
> put_ctx()

This doesn't look right; iirc you can hit this without concurrency,
something like so:


// note that when getting here, we've not passed
// perf_install_in_context() and event->ctx == NULL.
err_pmu_ctx:
put_pmu_ctx();
put_ctx(); // last, actually frees ctx
..
err_alloc:
free_event()
_free_event()
if (event->pmu_ctx) // true, because we forgot to clear
put_pmu_ctx() // hits 0 because double put
// goes and touch epc->ctx and UaF