Re: [RFC net-next v3 2/2] bnxt: Use generic HBH removal helper in tx path

[Michael Chan]

On Tue, Nov 29, 2022 at 12:07 PM Coco Li <lixiaoyan@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c
> index 0fe164b42c5d..f144a5ef2e04 100644
> --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c
> +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c
> @@ -389,6 +389,9 @@ static netdev_tx_t bnxt_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
>                         return NETDEV_TX_BUSY;
>         }
>
> +       if (unlikely(ipv6_hopopt_jumbo_remove(skb)))
> +               goto tx_free;
> +
>         length = skb->len;
>         len = skb_headlen(skb);
>         last_frag = skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags;
> @@ -11342,9 +11345,15 @@ static bool bnxt_exthdr_check(struct bnxt *bp, struct sk_buff *skb, int nw_off,
>
>                 if (hdrlen > 64)
>                         return false;
> +
> +               /* The ext header may be a hop-by-hop header inserted for
> +                * big TCP purposes. This will be removed before sending
> +                * from NIC, so do not count it.
> +                */
> +               if (!(*nexthdr == NEXTHDR_HOP && ipv6_has_hopopt_jumbo(skb)))

To be more efficient, why not just check the header's tlv_type here
instead of calling ipv6_has_hopopt_jumbo()?

> +                       hdr_count++;
>                 nexthdr = &hp->nexthdr;
>                 start += hdrlen;
> -               hdr_count++;
>         }
>         if (nextp) {
>                 /* Caller will check inner protocol */
> @@ -13657,6 +13666,8 @@ static int bnxt_init_one(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent)
>                 dev->features &= ~NETIF_F_LRO;
>         dev->priv_flags |= IFF_UNICAST_FLT;
>
> +       netif_set_tso_max_size(dev, GSO_MAX_SIZE);
> +
>  #ifdef CONFIG_BNXT_SRIOV
>         init_waitqueue_head(&bp->sriov_cfg_wait);
>  #endif
> --
> 2.38.1.584.g0f3c55d4c2-goog
>

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