Re: [PATCH 5/5] x86/traps: avoid KMSAN bugs originating from handle_bug()

[Alexander Potapenko]

On Wed, Nov 2, 2022 at 1:51 PM Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Nov 02, 2022 at 12:06:11PM +0100, Alexander Potapenko wrote:
> > There is a case in exc_invalid_op handler that is executed outside the
> > irqentry_enter()/irqentry_exit() region when an UD2 instruction is used
> > to encode a call to __warn().
> >
> > In that case the `struct pt_regs` passed to the interrupt handler is
> > never unpoisoned by KMSAN (this is normally done in irqentry_enter()),
> > which leads to false positives inside handle_bug().
> >
> > Use kmsan_unpoison_entry_regs() to explicitly unpoison those registers
> > before using them.
>
> As does poke_int3_handler(); does that need fixing up too? OTOH look
> *very very* carefully at the contraints there.

Fortunately poke_int3_handler() is a noinstr function, so KMSAN
doesn't add any checks to it.
It also does not pass regs to other instrumented functions, at least
for now, so we're good.


-- 
Alexander Potapenko
Software Engineer

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