[PATCH v2] x86/Kconfig: Enable kernel IBT by default

From: Kees Cook
Date: Tue Nov 01 2022 - 13:25:16 EST


The kernel IBT defense strongly mitigates the common "first step" of ROP
attacks, by eliminating arbitrary stack pivots (that appear either at
the end of a function or in immediate values), which cannot be reached
if indirect calls must be to marked function entry addresses. IBT is
also required to be enabled to gain the FineIBT feature when built with
Kernel Control Flow Integrity.

Additionally, given that this feature is runtime enabled via CPU ID,
it clearly should be built in by default; it will only be enabled if the
CPU supports it. The build takes 2 seconds longer, which seems a small
price to pay for gaining this coverage by default.

Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: x86@xxxxxxxxxx
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@xxxxxxxxx>
Suggested-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
v2: update commit log with more details
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220902234213.3034396-1-keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx/
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 67745ceab0db..35d251ba0709 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1854,7 +1854,7 @@ config CC_HAS_IBT

config X86_KERNEL_IBT
prompt "Indirect Branch Tracking"
- bool
+ def_bool y
depends on X86_64 && CC_HAS_IBT && HAVE_OBJTOOL
# https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/commit/9d7001eba9c4cb311e03cd8cdc231f9e579f2d0f
depends on !LD_IS_LLD || LLD_VERSION >= 140000
--
2.34.1