[PATCH 5.15 30/30] x86/speculation: Add LFENCE to RSB fill sequence

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman
Date: Tue Aug 09 2022 - 14:19:55 EST


From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

commit ba6e31af2be96c4d0536f2152ed6f7b6c11bca47 upstream.

RSB fill sequence does not have any protection for miss-prediction of
conditional branch at the end of the sequence. CPU can speculatively
execute code immediately after the sequence, while RSB filling hasn't
completed yet.

#define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr, sp) \
mov $(nr/2), reg; \
771: \
ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL; \
call 772f; \
773: /* speculation trap */ \
UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY; \
pause; \
lfence; \
jmp 773b; \
772: \
ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL; \
call 774f; \
775: /* speculation trap */ \
UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY; \
pause; \
lfence; \
jmp 775b; \
774: \
add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * 2, sp; \
dec reg; \
jnz 771b; <----- CPU can miss-predict here.

Before RSB is filled, RETs that come in program order after this macro
can be executed speculatively, making them vulnerable to RSB-based
attacks.

Mitigate it by adding an LFENCE after the conditional branch to prevent
speculation while RSB is being filled.

Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -60,7 +60,9 @@
774: \
add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * 2, sp; \
dec reg; \
- jnz 771b;
+ jnz 771b; \
+ /* barrier for jnz misprediction */ \
+ lfence;

#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__