Re: [RFC PATCH v3 2/4] ceph: handle encrypted snapshot names in subdirectories

From: Jeff Layton
Date: Fri Mar 18 2022 - 05:57:16 EST

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In reply to: Xiubo Li: "Re: [RFC PATCH v3 2/4] ceph: handle encrypted snapshot names in subdirectories"
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On Fri, 2022-03-18 at 12:57 +0800, Xiubo Li wrote:
> On 3/17/22 11:45 PM, Luís Henriques wrote:
> > When creating a snapshot, the .snap directories for every subdirectory will
> > show the snapshot name in the "long format":
> >
> > # mkdir .snap/my-snap
> > # ls my-dir/.snap/
> > _my-snap_1099511627782
> >
> > Encrypted snapshots will need to be able to handle these snapshot names by
> > encrypting/decrypting only the snapshot part of the string ('my-snap').
> >
> > Also, since the MDS prevents snapshot names to be bigger than 240 characters
> > it is necessary to adapt CEPH_NOHASH_NAME_MAX to accommodate this extra
> > limitation.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Luís Henriques <lhenriques@xxxxxxx>
> > ---
> > fs/ceph/crypto.c | 189 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
> > fs/ceph/crypto.h | 11 ++-
> > 2 files changed, 169 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/fs/ceph/crypto.c b/fs/ceph/crypto.c
> > index beb73bbdd868..caa9863dee93 100644
> > --- a/fs/ceph/crypto.c
> > +++ b/fs/ceph/crypto.c
> > @@ -128,16 +128,100 @@ void ceph_fscrypt_as_ctx_to_req(struct ceph_mds_request *req, struct ceph_acl_se
> > swap(req->r_fscrypt_auth, as->fscrypt_auth);
> > }
> >
> > -int ceph_encode_encrypted_dname(const struct inode *parent, struct qstr *d_name, char *buf)
> > +/*
> > + * User-created snapshots can't start with '_'. Snapshots that start with this
> > + * character are special (hint: there aren't real snapshots) and use the
> > + * following format:
> > + *
> > + * _<SNAPSHOT-NAME>_<INODE-NUMBER>
> > + *
> > + * where:
> > + * - <SNAPSHOT-NAME> - the real snapshot name that may need to be decrypted,
> > + * - <INODE-NUMBER> - the inode number for the actual snapshot
> > + *
> > + * This function parses these snapshot names and returns the inode
> > + * <INODE-NUMBER>. 'name_len' will also bet set with the <SNAPSHOT-NAME>
> > + * length.
> > + */
> > +static struct inode *parse_longname(const struct inode *parent, const char *name,
> > + int *name_len)
> > {
> > + struct inode *dir = NULL;
> > + struct ceph_vino vino = { .snap = CEPH_NOSNAP };
> > + char *inode_number;
> > + char *name_end;
> > + int orig_len = *name_len;
> > + int ret = -EIO;
> > +
> > + /* Skip initial '_' */
> > + name++;
> > + name_end = strrchr(name, '_');
> > + if (!name_end) {
> > + dout("Failed to parse long snapshot name: %s\n", name);
> > + return ERR_PTR(-EIO);
> > + }
> > + *name_len = (name_end - name);
> > + if (*name_len <= 0) {
> > + pr_err("Failed to parse long snapshot name\n");
> > + return ERR_PTR(-EIO);
> > + }
> > +
> > + /* Get the inode number */
> > + inode_number = kmemdup_nul(name_end + 1,
> > + orig_len - *name_len - 2,
> > + GFP_KERNEL);
> > + if (!inode_number)
> > + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
> > + ret = kstrtou64(inode_number, 0, &vino.ino);
> > + if (ret) {
> > + dout("Failed to parse inode number: %s\n", name);
> > + dir = ERR_PTR(ret);
> > + goto out;
> > + }
> > +
> > + /* And finally the inode */
> > + dir = ceph_find_inode(parent->i_sb, vino);
> > + if (!dir) {
> > + /* This can happen if we're not mounting cephfs on the root */
> > + dir = ceph_get_inode(parent->i_sb, vino, NULL);
>
> In this case IMO you should lookup the inode from MDS instead create it
> in the cache, which won't setup the encryption info needed.
>
> So later when you try to use this to dencrypt the snapshot names, you
> will hit errors ? And also the case Jeff mentioned in previous thread
> could happen.
>
> I figured out another approach could resolve this more gracefully:
>
> For all the subdirs just let them inherit the encryption info from the
> same ancestor, which is initially encrypted, then in ceph_new_inode()
> you can just skip setting up the encryption info for all the subdirs and
> in MDS side will send back the parent's encryption info and fill it in
> handle_reply(), this is just what the .snap does.
>
> Then here you can use current inode to do the dencryption for all the
> snapshots including the long snapshot names.
>
> I have raise one PR and send a kclient patch for the above basic
> framework [1][2]. But there still need a little more work you need to do
> based them:
>
> When lssnap you need to add one flag in LeaseStat to tell the kclient
> whether the long snap names are encrypted, this is very easy in MDS
> side. Then in kclient side you can just skip dencrypting the long snap
> names which are from none-encyrpted parents and for all the other just
> use current inode to do the dencryption. No need to search the parent
> inodes for long snaps.
>
> And when lookuping a long snap name, which could be encyrpted and could
> be not, then you need to parse the inode out and lookup the inode from
> MDS if it does not exist in cache.
>
>
> [1] https://github.com/ceph/ceph/pull/45516
>
> [2] https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/ceph-devel/list/?series=624492
>

So basically all directories and parents would share the same nonce?

That doesn't sound very secure. Doing that for snapshots is one thing,
but I think having a different nonce for each directories is generally a
better outcome.

Can we not just do this sort of inheritance for snapshot directories?

>
> > + if (!dir)
> > + dir = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
> > + }
> > + if (IS_ERR(dir))
> > + dout("Can't find inode %s (%s)\n", inode_number, name);
> > +
> > +out:
> > + kfree(inode_number);
> > + return dir;
> > +}
> > +
> > +int ceph_encode_encrypted_dname(struct inode *parent, struct qstr *d_name, char *buf)
> > +{
> > + struct inode *dir = parent;
> > + struct qstr iname;
> > u32 len;
> > + int name_len;
> > int elen;
> > int ret;
> > - u8 *cryptbuf;
> > + u8 *cryptbuf = NULL;
> > +
> > + iname.name = d_name->name;
> > + name_len = d_name->len;
> > +
> > + /* Handle the special case of snapshot names that start with '_' */
> > + if ((ceph_snap(dir) == CEPH_SNAPDIR) && (name_len > 0) &&
> > + (iname.name[0] == '_')) {
> > + dir = parse_longname(parent, iname.name, &name_len);
> > + if (IS_ERR(dir))
> > + return PTR_ERR(dir);
> > + iname.name++; /* skip initial '_' */
> > + }
> > + iname.len = name_len;
> >
> > - if (!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(parent)) {
> > + if (!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(dir)) {
> > memcpy(buf, d_name->name, d_name->len);
> > - return d_name->len;
> > + elen = d_name->len;
> > + goto out;
> > }
> >
> > /*
> > @@ -146,18 +230,22 @@ int ceph_encode_encrypted_dname(const struct inode *parent, struct qstr *d_name,
> > *
> > * See: fscrypt_setup_filename
> > */
> > - if (!fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size(parent, d_name->len, NAME_MAX, &len))
> > - return -ENAMETOOLONG;
> > + if (!fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size(dir, iname.len, NAME_MAX, &len)) {
> > + elen = -ENAMETOOLONG;
> > + goto out;
> > + }
> >
> > /* Allocate a buffer appropriate to hold the result */
> > cryptbuf = kmalloc(len > CEPH_NOHASH_NAME_MAX ? NAME_MAX : len, GFP_KERNEL);
> > - if (!cryptbuf)
> > - return -ENOMEM;
> > + if (!cryptbuf) {
> > + elen = -ENOMEM;
> > + goto out;
> > + }
> >
> > - ret = fscrypt_fname_encrypt(parent, d_name, cryptbuf, len);
> > + ret = fscrypt_fname_encrypt(dir, &iname, cryptbuf, len);
> > if (ret) {
> > - kfree(cryptbuf);
> > - return ret;
> > + elen = ret;
> > + goto out;
> > }
> >
> > /* hash the end if the name is long enough */
> > @@ -173,12 +261,29 @@ int ceph_encode_encrypted_dname(const struct inode *parent, struct qstr *d_name,
> >
> > /* base64 encode the encrypted name */
> > elen = fscrypt_base64url_encode(cryptbuf, len, buf);
> > - kfree(cryptbuf);
> > dout("base64-encoded ciphertext name = %.*s\n", elen, buf);
> > +
> > + WARN_ON(elen > (CEPH_NOHASH_NAME_MAX + SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE));
> > + if ((elen > 0) && (dir != parent)) {
> > + char tmp_buf[NAME_MAX];
> > +
> > + elen = snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof(tmp_buf), "_%.*s_%ld",
> > + elen, buf, dir->i_ino);
> > + memcpy(buf, tmp_buf, elen);
> > + }
> > +
> > +out:
> > + kfree(cryptbuf);
> > + if (dir != parent) {
> > + if ((dir->i_state & I_NEW))
> > + discard_new_inode(dir);
> > + else
> > + iput(dir);
> > + }
> > return elen;
> > }
> >
> > -int ceph_encode_encrypted_fname(const struct inode *parent, struct dentry *dentry, char *buf)
> > +int ceph_encode_encrypted_fname(struct inode *parent, struct dentry *dentry, char *buf)
> > {
> > WARN_ON_ONCE(!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(parent));
> >
> > @@ -203,29 +308,42 @@ int ceph_encode_encrypted_fname(const struct inode *parent, struct dentry *dentr
> > int ceph_fname_to_usr(const struct ceph_fname *fname, struct fscrypt_str *tname,
> > struct fscrypt_str *oname, bool *is_nokey)
> > {
> > - int ret;
> > + struct inode *dir = fname->dir;
> > struct fscrypt_str _tname = FSTR_INIT(NULL, 0);
> > struct fscrypt_str iname;
> > -
> > - if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(fname->dir)) {
> > - oname->name = fname->name;
> > - oname->len = fname->name_len;
> > - return 0;
> > - }
> > + char *name = fname->name;
> > + int name_len = fname->name_len;
> > + int ret;
> >
> > /* Sanity check that the resulting name will fit in the buffer */
> > if (fname->name_len > NAME_MAX || fname->ctext_len > NAME_MAX)
> > return -EIO;
> >
> > - ret = __fscrypt_prepare_readdir(fname->dir);
> > + /* Handle the special case of snapshot names that start with '_' */
> > + if ((ceph_snap(dir) == CEPH_SNAPDIR) && (name_len > 0) &&
> > + (name[0] == '_')) {
> > + dir = parse_longname(dir, name, &name_len);
> > + if (IS_ERR(dir))
> > + return PTR_ERR(dir);
> > + name++; /* skip initial '_' */
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(dir)) {
> > + oname->name = fname->name;
> > + oname->len = fname->name_len;
> > + ret = 0;
> > + goto out_inode;
> > + }
> > +
> > + ret = __fscrypt_prepare_readdir(dir);
> > if (ret)
> > - return ret;
> > + goto out_inode;
> >
> > /*
> > * Use the raw dentry name as sent by the MDS instead of
> > * generating a nokey name via fscrypt.
> > */
> > - if (!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(fname->dir)) {
> > + if (!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(dir)) {
> > if (fname->no_copy)
> > oname->name = fname->name;
> > else
> > @@ -233,7 +351,8 @@ int ceph_fname_to_usr(const struct ceph_fname *fname, struct fscrypt_str *tname,
> > oname->len = fname->name_len;
> > if (is_nokey)
> > *is_nokey = true;
> > - return 0;
> > + ret = 0;
> > + goto out_inode;
> > }
> >
> > if (fname->ctext_len == 0) {
> > @@ -242,11 +361,11 @@ int ceph_fname_to_usr(const struct ceph_fname *fname, struct fscrypt_str *tname,
> > if (!tname) {
> > ret = fscrypt_fname_alloc_buffer(NAME_MAX, &_tname);
> > if (ret)
> > - return ret;
> > + goto out_inode;
> > tname = &_tname;
> > }
> >
> > - declen = fscrypt_base64url_decode(fname->name, fname->name_len, tname->name);
> > + declen = fscrypt_base64url_decode(name, name_len, tname->name);
> > if (declen <= 0) {
> > ret = -EIO;
> > goto out;
> > @@ -258,9 +377,25 @@ int ceph_fname_to_usr(const struct ceph_fname *fname, struct fscrypt_str *tname,
> > iname.len = fname->ctext_len;
> > }
> >
> > - ret = fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(fname->dir, 0, 0, &iname, oname);
> > + ret = fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(dir, 0, 0, &iname, oname);
> > + if (!ret && (dir != fname->dir)) {
> > + char tmp_buf[FSCRYPT_BASE64URL_CHARS(NAME_MAX)];
> > +
> > + name_len = snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof(tmp_buf), "_%.*s_%ld",
> > + oname->len, oname->name, dir->i_ino);
> > + memcpy(oname->name, tmp_buf, name_len);
> > + oname->len = name_len;
> > + }
> > +
> > out:
> > fscrypt_fname_free_buffer(&_tname);
> > +out_inode:
> > + if ((dir != fname->dir) && !IS_ERR(dir)) {
> > + if ((dir->i_state & I_NEW))
> > + discard_new_inode(dir);
> > + else
> > + iput(dir);
> > + }
> > return ret;
> > }
> >
> > diff --git a/fs/ceph/crypto.h b/fs/ceph/crypto.h
> > index 62f0ddd30dee..3273d076a9e5 100644
> > --- a/fs/ceph/crypto.h
> > +++ b/fs/ceph/crypto.h
> > @@ -82,13 +82,16 @@ static inline u32 ceph_fscrypt_auth_len(struct ceph_fscrypt_auth *fa)
> > * struct fscrypt_ceph_nokey_name {
> > * u8 bytes[157];
> > * u8 sha256[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
> > - * }; // 189 bytes => 252 bytes base64-encoded, which is <= NAME_MAX (255)
> > + * }; // 180 bytes => 240 bytes base64-encoded, which is <= NAME_MAX (255)
> > + *
> > + * (240 bytes is the maximum size allowed for snapshot names to take into
> > + * account the format: '_<SNAPSHOT-NAME>_<INODE-NUMBER>'.)
> > *
> > * Note that for long names that end up having their tail portion hashed, we
> > * must also store the full encrypted name (in the dentry's alternate_name
> > * field).
> > */
> > -#define CEPH_NOHASH_NAME_MAX (189 - SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE)
> > +#define CEPH_NOHASH_NAME_MAX (180 - SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE)
> >
> > void ceph_fscrypt_set_ops(struct super_block *sb);
> >
> > @@ -97,8 +100,8 @@ void ceph_fscrypt_free_dummy_policy(struct ceph_fs_client *fsc);
> > int ceph_fscrypt_prepare_context(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode,
> > struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as);
> > void ceph_fscrypt_as_ctx_to_req(struct ceph_mds_request *req, struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as);
> > -int ceph_encode_encrypted_dname(const struct inode *parent, struct qstr *d_name, char *buf);
> > -int ceph_encode_encrypted_fname(const struct inode *parent, struct dentry *dentry, char *buf);
> > +int ceph_encode_encrypted_dname(struct inode *parent, struct qstr *d_name, char *buf);
> > +int ceph_encode_encrypted_fname(struct inode *parent, struct dentry *dentry, char *buf);
> >
> > static inline int ceph_fname_alloc_buffer(struct inode *parent, struct fscrypt_str *fname)
> > {
> >
>

--
Jeff Layton <jlayton@xxxxxxxxxx>

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