Re: [PATCH] x86/tsx: Use MSR_TSX_CTRL to clear CPUID bits

From: Pawan Gupta
Date: Wed Feb 16 2022 - 01:08:37 EST


On 15.02.2022 17:28, Pawan Gupta wrote:
On 16.02.2022 00:49, Andrew Cooper wrote:
On 16/02/2022 00:39, Pawan Gupta wrote:
On 15.02.2022 20:33, Borislav Petkov wrote:
On Tue, Feb 15, 2022 at 10:19:31AM -0800, Pawan Gupta wrote:
I admit it has gotten complicated with so many bits associated with
TSX.

Yah, and looka here:

https://github.com/andyhhp/xen/commit/ad9f7c3b2e0df38ad6d54f4769d4dccf765fbcee


It seems it isn't complicated enough. ;-\

Andy just made me aware of this thing where you guys have added a new
MSR bit:

MSR_MCU_OPT_CTRL[1] which is called something like
MCU_OPT_CTRL_RTM_ALLOW or so.

RTM_ALLOW bit was added to MSR_MCU_OPT_CTRL, but its not set by default,
and it is *not* recommended to be used in production deployments [1]:

  Although MSR 0x122 (TSX_CTRL) and MSR 0x123 (IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL) can be
  used to reenable Intel TSX for development, doing so is not recommended
  for production deployments. In particular, applying MD_CLEAR flows for
  mitigation of the Intel TSX Asynchronous Abort (TAA) transient
execution
  attack may not be effective on these processors when Intel TSX is
  enabled with updated microcode. The processors continue to be mitigated
  against TAA when Intel TSX is disabled.

The purpose of setting RTM_ALLOW isn't to enable TSX per say.

The purpose is to make MSR_TSX_CTRL.RTM_DISABLE behaves consistently on
all hardware, which reduces the complexity and invasiveness of dealing
with this special case, because the TAA workaround will still turn TSX
off by default.

The configuration you don't want to be running with is RTM_ALLOW &&
!RTM_DISABLE, because that is "still vulnerable to TSX Async Abort".

I am not sure how a system can end up with RTM_ALLOW && !RTM_DISABLE? I
have no problem taking care of this case, I am just debating why we need
it.

One way to get to this state is BIOS sets RTM_ALLOW (dont know why?) and
linux cmdline has tsx=on.

If RTM_ALLOW is set for any reason, we can still deny tsx=on request.
Below patch should do that (I haven't tested it yet).

Alternatively, we can reset RTM_ALLOW, which will set
CPUID.RTM_ALWAYS_ABORT and may require re-enumeration of CPU features or
otherwise setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RTM_ALWAYS_ABORT) should also
work.

---
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index 3faf0f97edb1..2ef58bcfb1e4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -131,6 +131,8 @@
/* SRBDS support */
#define MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL 0x00000123
#define RNGDS_MITG_DIS BIT(0)
+#define MCU_OPT_CTRL_RTM_ALLOW BIT(1)
+#define MCU_OPT_CTRL_RTM_LOCKED BIT(2)
#define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS 0x00000174
#define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP 0x00000175
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c
index 2835fa89fc6f..8ac085ac597f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c
@@ -142,6 +142,29 @@ void tsx_clear_cpuid(void)
}
}
+/*
+ * When the microcode released in Feb 2022 is applied, TSX will be disabled by
+ * default on some processors. MSR 0x122 (TSX_CTRL) and MSR 0x123
+ * (IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL) can be used to re-enable TSX for development, doing so is
+ * not recommended for production deployments. In particular, applying MD_CLEAR
+ * flows for mitigation of the Intel TSX Asynchronous Abort (TAA) transient
+ * execution attack may not be effective on these processors when TSX is
+ * enabled with updated microcode.
+ *
+ * Detect if this unsafe TSX development mode is enabled.
+ */
+static bool tsx_is_unsafe(void)
+{
+ u64 mcu_opt_ctrl;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRBDS_CTRL))
+ return false;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_opt_ctrl);
+
+ return !!(mcu_opt_ctrl & MCU_OPT_CTRL_RTM_ALLOW);
+}
+
void __init tsx_init(void)
{
char arg[5] = {};
@@ -163,6 +186,13 @@ void __init tsx_init(void)
if (!tsx_ctrl_is_supported()) {
tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_NOT_SUPPORTED;
return;
+ } else if (tsx_is_unsafe()) {
+ /* Do not allow tsx=on, when TSX is unsafe to use */
+ tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_DISABLE;
+ tsx_disable();
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RTM);
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_HLE);
+ return;
}
ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "tsx", arg, sizeof(arg));