[PATCH 1/2] random: fix locking in crng_fast_load()

From: Dominik Brodowski
Date: Sat Feb 05 2022 - 05:35:42 EST


crng_init is protected by primary_crng->lock, so keep holding that lock
when incrementing crng_init from 0 to 1 in crng_fast_load(). The call to
pr_notice() can wait until the lock is released; this code path cannot
be reached twice, as crng_fast_load() aborts early if crng_init > 0.

Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
drivers/char/random.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 5d7d6e01bbc4..2df08d05e850 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -653,12 +653,13 @@ static size_t crng_fast_load(const u8 *cp, size_t len)
p[crng_init_cnt % CHACHA_KEY_SIZE] ^= *cp;
cp++; crng_init_cnt++; len--; ret++;
}
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
if (crng_init_cnt >= CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) {
invalidate_batched_entropy();
crng_init = 1;
- pr_notice("fast init done\n");
}
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
+ if (crng_init == 1)
+ pr_notice("fast init done\n");
return ret;
}

--
2.35.1