[PATCH 5.15 013/177] bpf: Fix kernel address leakage in atomic fetch

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman
Date: Mon Dec 20 2021 - 10:04:11 EST


From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>

commit 7d3baf0afa3aa9102d6a521a8e4c41888bb79882 upstream.

The change in commit 37086bfdc737 ("bpf: Propagate stack bounds to registers
in atomics w/ BPF_FETCH") around check_mem_access() handling is buggy since
this would allow for unprivileged users to leak kernel pointers. For example,
an atomic fetch/and with -1 on a stack destination which holds a spilled
pointer will migrate the spilled register type into a scalar, which can then
be exported out of the program (since scalar != pointer) by dumping it into
a map value.

The original implementation of XADD was preventing this situation by using
a double call to check_mem_access() one with BPF_READ and a subsequent one
with BPF_WRITE, in both cases passing -1 as a placeholder value instead of
register as per XADD semantics since it didn't contain a value fetch. The
BPF_READ also included a check in check_stack_read_fixed_off() which rejects
the program if the stack slot is of __is_pointer_value() if dst_regno < 0.
The latter is to distinguish whether we're dealing with a regular stack spill/
fill or some arithmetical operation which is disallowed on non-scalars, see
also 6e7e63cbb023 ("bpf: Forbid XADD on spilled pointers for unprivileged
users") for more context on check_mem_access() and its handling of placeholder
value -1.

One minimally intrusive option to fix the leak is for the BPF_FETCH case to
initially check the BPF_READ case via check_mem_access() with -1 as register,
followed by the actual load case with non-negative load_reg to propagate
stack bounds to registers.

Fixes: 37086bfdc737 ("bpf: Propagate stack bounds to registers in atomics w/ BPF_FETCH")
Reported-by: <n4ke4mry@xxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 12 +++++++++---
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -4417,13 +4417,19 @@ static int check_atomic(struct bpf_verif
load_reg = -1;
}

- /* check whether we can read the memory */
+ /* Check whether we can read the memory, with second call for fetch
+ * case to simulate the register fill.
+ */
err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
- BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, load_reg, true);
+ BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, -1, true);
+ if (!err && load_reg >= 0)
+ err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
+ BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, load_reg,
+ true);
if (err)
return err;

- /* check whether we can write into the same memory */
+ /* Check whether we can write into the same memory. */
err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, -1, true);
if (err)