Re: [PATCH v43 01/15] Linux Random Number Generator

[John Haxby]

> On 2 Dec 2021, at 07:12, Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> 
> On Wed, Dec 01, 2021 at 07:24:43PM -0500, Jeffrey Walton wrote:
>> On Wed, Dec 1, 2021 at 1:25 PM Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>> 
>>> On Wed, Dec 1, 2021 at 12:19 PM Simo Sorce <simo@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>> that much it is, and it is a required one. However having worked a lot
>>>> on this I can tell you there is actually real cryptographic value in
>>>> the requirements FIPS introduced over the years
>>>> Well I think most of the requirements are sane practices, hopefully
>>>> controversial stuff will be minimal.
>>>> I happen to think quite a few of the requirements are actually good
>>>> ideas to implement to improve the guarantees of randomness
>>> 
>>> If you think there are good ways to improve the RNG, of course send
>>> patches for this, justifying why, taking into account recent research
>>> into the topic you wish to patch, etc. Don't write, "because FIPS";
>>> instead argue rationale for each patch. And if you _do_ feel the need
>>> to appeal to authority, perhaps links to the various eprint papers you
>>> consulted would be worthwhile. Preferably you're able to do this in a
>>> small, incremental way, with small standalone patchsets, instead of
>>> gigantic series.
>> 
>> I may be parsing things incorrectly, but you seem to be rejecting the
>> NIST requirements, and then positioning your personal opinion as
>> superior. It sounds like one authority is being replaced by another.
>> Perhaps I am missing something.
>> 
>> I am also guessing you've never read the relevant NIST documents. The
>> documents state the security goals and provide the steps to achieve
>> them in an implementation.
> 
> Ok, I think this thread has gone on long enough without any real
> patches.
> 
> Please, if you want to support NIST, or any other type of thing, submit
> patches that implement what you think will help achieve this.  Absent of
> that, we have no idea what NIST or any other random document aims to
> require or wish.


Part of the problem here is that NIST (and the concomitant fips certification) is a moving target.   A couple of years ago, we were fine. Today's requirements are different, tomorrow's will be different again.  Today's requirements being different are what resulted in the small patch I mentioned earlier.

You suggested, Greg, that I submit that and see what happens.   I can take a hint :) so I'm working on that as a possible way forward to decouple things a bit without too much churn.

jch



> 
> thanks,
> 
> greg k-h

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