[PATCH] net/tls: Fix flipped sign in tls_err_abort() calls

From: Daniel Jordan
Date: Thu Oct 21 2021 - 14:31:30 EST


sk->sk_err appears to expect a positive value, a convention that ktls
doesn't always follow and that leads to memory corruption in other code.
For instance,

[task1]
tls_encrypt_done(..., err=<negative error from crypto request>)
tls_err_abort(.., err)
sk->sk_err = err;

[task2]
splice_from_pipe_feed
...
tls_sw_do_sendpage
if (sk->sk_err) {
ret = -sk->sk_err; // ret is positive

splice_from_pipe_feed (continued)
ret = actor(...) // ret is still positive and interpreted as bytes
// written, resulting in underflow of buf->len and
// sd->len, leading to huge buf->offset and bogus
// addresses computed in later calls to actor()

Fix all tls_err_abort() callers to pass a negative error code
consistently and centralize the error-prone sign flip there, throwing in
a warning to catch future misuse.

Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Fixes: c46234ebb4d1e ("tls: RX path for ktls")
Reported-by: syzbot+b187b77c8474f9648fae@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@xxxxxxxxxx>
---

I could be wrong about sk->sk_err expecting a positive value, but at
least the sign of the error code is inconsistent. Open to suggestions.

include/net/tls.h | 7 +++++--
net/tls/tls_sw.c | 8 ++++----
2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/net/tls.h b/include/net/tls.h
index be4b3e1cac46..206505df2f1c 100644
--- a/include/net/tls.h
+++ b/include/net/tls.h
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@

#include <linux/types.h>
#include <asm/byteorder.h>
+#include <linux/bug.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
#include <linux/socket.h>
#include <linux/tcp.h>
@@ -468,7 +469,9 @@ static inline bool tls_is_sk_tx_device_offloaded(struct sock *sk)

static inline void tls_err_abort(struct sock *sk, int err)
{
- sk->sk_err = err;
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(err >= 0);
+ /* sk->sk_err should contain a positive error code. */
+ sk->sk_err = -err;
sk_error_report(sk);
}

@@ -512,7 +515,7 @@ static inline void tls_advance_record_sn(struct sock *sk,
struct cipher_context *ctx)
{
if (tls_bigint_increment(ctx->rec_seq, prot->rec_seq_size))
- tls_err_abort(sk, EBADMSG);
+ tls_err_abort(sk, -EBADMSG);

if (prot->version != TLS_1_3_VERSION &&
prot->cipher_type != TLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305)
diff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
index 4feb95e34b64..9705262749e6 100644
--- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c
+++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
@@ -419,7 +419,7 @@ int tls_tx_records(struct sock *sk, int flags)

tx_err:
if (rc < 0 && rc != -EAGAIN)
- tls_err_abort(sk, EBADMSG);
+ tls_err_abort(sk, -EBADMSG);

return rc;
}
@@ -763,7 +763,7 @@ static int tls_push_record(struct sock *sk, int flags,
msg_pl->sg.size + prot->tail_size, i);
if (rc < 0) {
if (rc != -EINPROGRESS) {
- tls_err_abort(sk, EBADMSG);
+ tls_err_abort(sk, -EBADMSG);
if (split) {
tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags = true;
tls_merge_open_record(sk, rec, tmp, orig_end);
@@ -1827,7 +1827,7 @@ int tls_sw_recvmsg(struct sock *sk,
err = decrypt_skb_update(sk, skb, &msg->msg_iter,
&chunk, &zc, async_capable);
if (err < 0 && err != -EINPROGRESS) {
- tls_err_abort(sk, EBADMSG);
+ tls_err_abort(sk, -EBADMSG);
goto recv_end;
}

@@ -2007,7 +2007,7 @@ ssize_t tls_sw_splice_read(struct socket *sock, loff_t *ppos,
}

if (err < 0) {
- tls_err_abort(sk, EBADMSG);
+ tls_err_abort(sk, -EBADMSG);
goto splice_read_end;
}
ctx->decrypted = 1;
--
2.27.0