Re: [PATCH 0/5] Introduce support for PSF mitigation

[Josh Poimboeuf]

On Tue, Apr 06, 2021 at 10:49:59AM -0500, Ramakrishna Saripalli wrote:
> Because PSF speculation is limited to the current program context,
> the impact of bad PSF speculation is very similar to that of
> Speculative Store Bypass (Spectre v4)
> 
> Predictive Store Forwarding controls:
> There are two hardware control bits which influence the PSF feature:
> - MSR 48h bit 2 – Speculative Store Bypass (SSBD)
> - MSR 48h bit 7 – Predictive Store Forwarding Disable (PSFD)
> 
> The PSF feature is disabled if either of these bits are set.  These bits
> are controllable on a per-thread basis in an SMT system. By default, both
> SSBD and PSFD are 0 meaning that the speculation features are enabled.
> 
> While the SSBD bit disables PSF and speculative store bypass, PSFD only
> disables PSF.
> 
> PSFD may be desirable for software which is concerned with the
> speculative behavior of PSF but desires a smaller performance impact than
> setting SSBD.

Hi Ramakrishna,

Is there a realistic scenario where an application would want to disable
PSF, but not disable SSB?

Maybe I'm missing something, but I'd presume an application would either
care about this class of attacks, or not.

-- 
Josh