[tip: x86/seves] x86/boot/compressed/64: Sanity-check CPUID results in the early #VC handler

From: tip-bot2 for Joerg Roedel
Date: Thu Oct 29 2020 - 15:18:37 EST


The following commit has been merged into the x86/seves branch of tip:

Commit-ID: ed7b895f3efb5df184722f5a30f8164fcaffceb1
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/ed7b895f3efb5df184722f5a30f8164fcaffceb1
Author: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@xxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 17:46:56 +01:00
Committer: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
CommitterDate: Thu, 29 Oct 2020 13:48:49 +01:00

x86/boot/compressed/64: Sanity-check CPUID results in the early #VC handler

The early #VC handler which doesn't have a GHCB can only handle CPUID
exit codes. It is needed by the early boot code to handle #VC exceptions
raised in verify_cpu() and to get the position of the C-bit.

But the CPUID information comes from the hypervisor which is untrusted
and might return results which trick the guest into the no-SEV boot path
with no C-bit set in the page-tables. All data written to memory would
then be unencrypted and could leak sensitive data to the hypervisor.

Add sanity checks to the early #VC handler to make sure the hypervisor
can not pretend that SEV is disabled.

[ bp: Massage a bit. ]

Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@xxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201028164659.27002-3-joro@xxxxxxxxxx
---
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 26 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
index 5f83cca..7d04b35 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
@@ -178,6 +178,32 @@ void __init do_vc_no_ghcb(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long exit_code)
goto fail;
regs->dx = val >> 32;

+ /*
+ * This is a VC handler and the #VC is only raised when SEV-ES is
+ * active, which means SEV must be active too. Do sanity checks on the
+ * CPUID results to make sure the hypervisor does not trick the kernel
+ * into the no-sev path. This could map sensitive data unencrypted and
+ * make it accessible to the hypervisor.
+ *
+ * In particular, check for:
+ * - Hypervisor CPUID bit
+ * - Availability of CPUID leaf 0x8000001f
+ * - SEV CPUID bit.
+ *
+ * The hypervisor might still report the wrong C-bit position, but this
+ * can't be checked here.
+ */
+
+ if ((fn == 1 && !(regs->cx & BIT(31))))
+ /* Hypervisor bit */
+ goto fail;
+ else if (fn == 0x80000000 && (regs->ax < 0x8000001f))
+ /* SEV leaf check */
+ goto fail;
+ else if ((fn == 0x8000001f && !(regs->ax & BIT(1))))
+ /* SEV bit */
+ goto fail;
+
/* Skip over the CPUID two-byte opcode */
regs->ip += 2;