[PATCH v5 21/40] kasan: hide invalid free check implementation

From: Andrey Konovalov
Date: Mon Oct 12 2020 - 16:45:53 EST


This is a preparatory commit for the upcoming addition of a new hardware
tag-based (MTE-based) KASAN mode.

For software KASAN modes the check is based on the value in the shadow
memory. Hardware tag-based KASAN won't be using shadow, so hide the
implementation of the check in check_invalid_free().

Also simplify the code for software tag-based mode.

No functional changes for software modes.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@xxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
Change-Id: I5fae9531c9fc948eb4d4e0c589744032fc5a0789
---
mm/kasan/common.c | 19 +------------------
mm/kasan/generic.c | 7 +++++++
mm/kasan/kasan.h | 2 ++
mm/kasan/sw_tags.c | 9 +++++++++
4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
index 123abfb760d4..543e6bf2168f 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/common.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
@@ -272,25 +272,9 @@ void * __must_check kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache,
return (void *)object;
}

-static inline bool shadow_invalid(u8 tag, s8 shadow_byte)
-{
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC))
- return shadow_byte < 0 ||
- shadow_byte >= KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
-
- /* else CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS: */
- if ((u8)shadow_byte == KASAN_TAG_INVALID)
- return true;
- if ((tag != KASAN_TAG_KERNEL) && (tag != (u8)shadow_byte))
- return true;
-
- return false;
-}
-
static bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
unsigned long ip, bool quarantine)
{
- s8 shadow_byte;
u8 tag;
void *tagged_object;
unsigned long rounded_up_size;
@@ -309,8 +293,7 @@ static bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
if (unlikely(cache->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU))
return false;

- shadow_byte = READ_ONCE(*(s8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(object));
- if (shadow_invalid(tag, shadow_byte)) {
+ if (check_invalid_free(tagged_object)) {
kasan_report_invalid_free(tagged_object, ip);
return true;
}
diff --git a/mm/kasan/generic.c b/mm/kasan/generic.c
index ec4417156943..e1af3b6c53b8 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/generic.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/generic.c
@@ -187,6 +187,13 @@ bool check_memory_region(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool write,
return check_memory_region_inline(addr, size, write, ret_ip);
}

+bool check_invalid_free(void *addr)
+{
+ s8 shadow_byte = READ_ONCE(*(s8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr));
+
+ return shadow_byte < 0 || shadow_byte >= KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
+}
+
void kasan_cache_shrink(struct kmem_cache *cache)
{
quarantine_remove_cache(cache);
diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.h b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
index a2e71818d464..325bfd82bce4 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/kasan.h
+++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
@@ -164,6 +164,8 @@ void kasan_poison_memory(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value);
bool check_memory_region(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool write,
unsigned long ret_ip);

+bool check_invalid_free(void *addr);
+
void *find_first_bad_addr(void *addr, size_t size);
const char *get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info);

diff --git a/mm/kasan/sw_tags.c b/mm/kasan/sw_tags.c
index 4bdd7dbd6647..b2638c2cd58a 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/sw_tags.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/sw_tags.c
@@ -121,6 +121,15 @@ bool check_memory_region(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool write,
return true;
}

+bool check_invalid_free(void *addr)
+{
+ u8 tag = get_tag(addr);
+ u8 shadow_byte = READ_ONCE(*(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(reset_tag(addr)));
+
+ return (shadow_byte == KASAN_TAG_INVALID) ||
+ (tag != KASAN_TAG_KERNEL && tag != shadow_byte);
+}
+
#define DEFINE_HWASAN_LOAD_STORE(size) \
void __hwasan_load##size##_noabort(unsigned long addr) \
{ \
--
2.28.0.1011.ga647a8990f-goog