[PATCH v13 13/26] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking

From: Yu-cheng Yu
Date: Fri Sep 25 2020 - 11:25:32 EST


Shadow stack accesses are those that are performed by the CPU where it
expects to encounter a shadow stack mapping. These accesses are performed
implicitly by CALL/RET at the site of the shadow stack pointer. These
accesses are made explicitly by shadow stack management instructions like
WRUSSQ.

Shadow stacks accesses to shadow-stack mapping can see faults in normal,
valid operation just like regular accesses to regular mappings. Shadow
stacks need some of the same features like delayed allocation, swap and
copy-on-write.

Shadow stack accesses can also result in errors, such as when a shadow
stack overflows, or if a shadow stack access occurs to a non-shadow-stack
mapping.

In handling a shadow stack page fault, verify it occurs within a shadow
stack mapping. It is always an error otherwise. For valid shadow stack
accesses, set FAULT_FLAG_WRITE to effect copy-on-write. Because clearing
_PAGE_DIRTY_HW (vs. _PAGE_RW) is used to trigger the fault, shadow stack
read fault and shadow stack write fault are not differentiated and both are
handled as a write access.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
v10:
-Revise commit log.

arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 21 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
index 714b1a30e7b0..28b493c53d70 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ void __noreturn handle_stack_overflow(const char *message,
* bit 3 == 1: use of reserved bit detected
* bit 4 == 1: fault was an instruction fetch
* bit 5 == 1: protection keys block access
+ * bit 6 == 1: shadow stack access fault
*/
enum x86_pf_error_code {
X86_PF_PROT = 1 << 0,
@@ -58,5 +59,6 @@ enum x86_pf_error_code {
X86_PF_RSVD = 1 << 3,
X86_PF_INSTR = 1 << 4,
X86_PF_PK = 1 << 5,
+ X86_PF_SHSTK = 1 << 6,
};
#endif /* _ASM_X86_TRAPS_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
index 6e3e8a124903..2390399c157f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -1110,6 +1110,17 @@ access_error(unsigned long error_code, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
(error_code & X86_PF_INSTR), foreign))
return 1;

+ /*
+ * Verify a shadow stack access is within a shadow stack VMA.
+ * It is always an error otherwise. Normal data access to a
+ * shadow stack area is checked in the case followed.
+ */
+ if (error_code & X86_PF_SHSTK) {
+ if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHSTK))
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
if (error_code & X86_PF_WRITE) {
/* write, present and write, not present: */
if (unlikely(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)))
@@ -1275,6 +1286,14 @@ void do_user_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs,

perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS, 1, regs, address);

+ /*
+ * Clearing _PAGE_DIRTY_HW is used to detect shadow stack access.
+ * This method cannot distinguish shadow stack read vs. write.
+ * For valid shadow stack accesses, set FAULT_FLAG_WRITE to effect
+ * copy-on-write.
+ */
+ if (hw_error_code & X86_PF_SHSTK)
+ flags |= FAULT_FLAG_WRITE;
if (hw_error_code & X86_PF_WRITE)
flags |= FAULT_FLAG_WRITE;
if (hw_error_code & X86_PF_INSTR)
--
2.21.0