Re: [PATCH RFC] mm: add MAP_EXCLUSIVE to create exclusive user mappings

From: Andy Lutomirski
Date: Tue Oct 29 2019 - 13:03:58 EST


On Tue, Oct 29, 2019 at 4:25 AM Reshetova, Elena
<elena.reshetova@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> > The patch below aims to allow applications to create mappins that have
> > pages visible only to the owning process. Such mappings could be used to
> > store secrets so that these secrets are not visible neither to other
> > processes nor to the kernel.
>
> Hi Mike,
>
> I have actually been looking into the closely related problem for the past
> couple of weeks (on and off). What is common here is the need for userspace
> to indicate to kernel that some pages contain secrets. And then there are
> actually a number of things that kernel can do to try to protect these secrets
> better. Unmap from direct map is one of them. Another thing is to map such
> pages as non-cached, which can help us to prevent or considerably restrict
> speculation on such pages. The initial proof of concept for marking pages as
> "UNCACHED" that I got from Dave Hansen was actually based on mlock2()
> and a new flag for it for this purpose. Since then I have been thinking on what
> interface suits the use case better and actually selected going with new madvise()
> flag instead because of all possible implications for fragmentation and performance.

Doing all of this with MAP_SECRET seems bad to me. If user code wants
UC memory, it should ask for UC memory -- having the kernel involved
in the decision to use UC memory is a bad idea, because the
performance impact of using UC memory where user code wasn't expecting
it wil be so bad that the system might as well not work at all. (For
kicks, I once added a sysctl to turn off caching in CR0. I enabled it
in gnome-shell. The system slowed down to such an extent that I was
unable to enter the three or so keystrokes to turn it back off.)

EXCLUSIVE makes sense. Saying "don't ptrace this" makes sense. UC
makes sense. But having one flag to rule them all does not make sense
to me.