[PATCH] x86/hw_breakpoint: Prevent data breakpoints on cpu_entry_area

From: Andy Lutomirski
Date: Thu Jul 25 2019 - 14:08:28 EST


A data breakpoint near the top of an IST stack will cause unresoverable
recursion. A data breakpoint on the GDT, IDT, or TSS is terrifying.
Prevent either of these from happening.

Co-developed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
---

The rest of my series is still in progress -- as we all know, idtentry
is a morass. But this is self-contained and is an obvious fix.

arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h | 10 ++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 27 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h
index e23e2d9a92d7..3f50d4738487 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h
@@ -126,6 +126,16 @@ static inline struct entry_stack *cpu_entry_stack(int cpu)
return &get_cpu_entry_area(cpu)->entry_stack_page.stack;
}

+/*
+ * Checks whether the range from addr to end, inclusive, overlaps the CPU
+ * entry area range.
+ */
+static inline bool within_cpu_entry_area(unsigned long addr, unsigned long end)
+{
+ return end >= CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PER_CPU &&
+ addr < (CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PER_CPU + CPU_ENTRY_AREA_TOT_SIZE);
+}
+
#define __this_cpu_ist_top_va(name) \
CEA_ESTACK_TOP(__this_cpu_read(cea_exception_stacks), name)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c b/arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c
index 218c8917118e..dc4581fe4b4e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c
@@ -231,6 +231,23 @@ static int arch_build_bp_info(struct perf_event *bp,
const struct perf_event_attr *attr,
struct arch_hw_breakpoint *hw)
{
+ unsigned long bp_end;
+
+ /* Ensure that bp_end does not oveflow. */
+ if (attr->bp_len >= ULONG_MAX - attr->bp_addr)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ bp_end = attr->bp_addr + attr->bp_len - 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Prevent any breakpoint of any type that overlaps the
+ * cpu_entry_area. This protects the IST stacks and also
+ * reduces the chance that we ever find out what happens if
+ * there's a data breakpoint on the GDT, IDT, or TSS.
+ */
+ if (within_cpu_entry_area(attr->bp_addr, bp_end))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
hw->address = attr->bp_addr;
hw->mask = 0;

--
2.21.0