diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
index ffc064c1ec68..49311f3da6f2 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
@@ -9,5 +9,6 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
.. toctree::
:maxdepth: 1
+ spectre
l1tf
mds
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..25f3b2532198
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,697 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+Spectre Side Channels
+=====================
+
+Spectre is a class of side channel attacks that exploit branch prediction
+and speculative execution on modern CPUs to read memory, possibly
+bypassing access controls. Speculative execution side channel exploits
+do not modify memory but attempt to infer privileged data in the memory.
+
+This document covers Spectre variant 1 and Spectre variant 2.
+
+Affected processors
+-------------------
+
+Speculative execution side channel methods affect a wide range of modern
+high performance processors, since most modern high speed processors
+use branch prediction and speculative execution.
+
+The following CPUs are vulnerable:
+
+ - Intel Core, Atom, Pentium, and Xeon processors
+
+ - AMD Phenom, EPYC, and Zen processors
+
+ - IBM POWER and zSeries processors
+
+ - Higher end ARM processors
+
+ - Apple CPUs
+
+ - Higher end MIPS CPUs
+
+ - Likely most other high performance CPUs. Contact your CPU vendor for details.
+
+Whether a processor is affected or not can be read out from the Spectre
+vulnerability files in sysfs. See :ref:`spectre_sys_info`.
+
+Related CVEs
+------------
+
+The following CVE entries describe Spectre variants:
+
+ ============= ======================= =================
+ CVE-2017-5753 Bounds check bypass Spectre variant 1
+ CVE-2017-5715 Branch target injection Spectre variant 2
+ ============= ======================= =================
+
+Problem
+-------
+
+CPUs use speculative operations to improve performance. That may leave
+traces of memory accesses or computations in the processor's caches,
+buffers, and branch predictors. Malicious software may be able to
+influence the speculative execution paths, and then use the side effects
+of the speculative execution in the CPUs' caches and buffers to infer
+privileged data touched during the speculative execution.
+
+Spectre variant 1 attacks take advantage of speculative execution of
+conditional branches, while Spectre variant 2 attacks use speculative
+execution of indirect branches to leak privileged memory.
+See :ref:`[1] <spec_ref1>` :ref:`[5] <spec_ref5>` :ref:`[7] <spec_ref7>`
+:ref:`[10] <spec_ref10>` :ref:`[11] <spec_ref11>`.
+
+Spectre variant 1 (Bounds Check Bypass)
+---------------------------------------
+
+The bounds check bypass attack :ref:`[2] <spec_ref2>` takes advantage
+of speculative execution that bypasses conditional branch instructions
+used for memory access bounds check (e.g. checking if the index of an
+array results in memory access within a valid range). This results in
+memory accesses to invalid memory (with out-of-bound index) that are
+done speculatively before validation checks resolve. Such speculative
+memory accesses can leave side effects, creating side channels which
+leak information to the attacker.
+
+There are some extensions of Spectre variant 1 attacks for reading data
+over the network, see :ref:`[12] <spec_ref12>`. However such attacks
+are difficult, low bandwidth, fragile, and are considered low risk.
+
+Spectre variant 2 (Branch Target Injection)
+-------------------------------------------
+
+The branch target injection attack takes advantage of speculative
+execution of indirect branches :ref:`[3] <spec_ref3>`. The indirect
+branch predictors inside the processor used to guess the target of
+indirect branches can be influenced by an attacker, causing gadget code
+to be speculatively executed, thus exposing sensitive data touched by
+the victim. The side effects left in the CPU's caches during speculative
+execution can be measured to infer data values.
+
+.. _poison_btb:
+
+In Spectre variant 2 attacks, the attacker can steer speculative indirect
+branches in the victim to gadget code by poisoning the branch target
+buffer of a CPU used for predicting indirect branch addresses. Such
+poisoning could be done by indirect branching into existing code,
+with the address offset of the indirect branch under the attacker's
+control. Since the branch prediction on impacted hardware does not
+fully disambiguate branch address and uses the offset for prediction,
+this could cause privileged code's indirect branch to jump to a gadget
+code with the same offset.
+
+The most useful gadgets take an attacker-controlled input parameter (such
+as a register value) so that the memory read can be controlled. Gadgets
+without input parameters might be possible, but the attacker would have
+very little control over what memory can be read, reducing the risk of
+the attack revealing useful data.
+
+One other variant 2 attack vector is for the attacker to poison the
+return stack buffer (RSB) :ref:`[13] <spec_ref13>` to cause speculative
+subroutine return instruction execution to go to a gadget. An attacker's
+imbalanced subroutine call instructions might "poison" entries in the
+return stack buffer which are later consumed by a victim's subroutine
+return instructions. This attack can be mitigated by flushing the return
+stack buffer on context switch, or virtual machine (VM) exit.
+
+On systems with simultaneous multi-threading (SMT), attacks are possible
+from the sibling thread, as level 1 cache and branch target buffer
+(BTB) may be shared between hardware threads in a CPU core. A malicious
+program running on the sibling thread may influence its peer's BTB to
+steer its indirect branch speculations to gadget code, and measure the
+speculative execution's side effects left in level 1 cache to infer the
+victim's data.
+
+Attack scenarios
+----------------
+
+The following list of attack scenarios have been anticipated, but may
+not cover all possible attack vectors.
+
+1. A user process attacking the kernel
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ The attacker passes a parameter to the kernel via a register or
+ via a known address in memory during a syscall. Such parameter may
+ be used later by the kernel as an index to an array or to derive
+ a pointer for a Spectre variant 1 attack. The index or pointer
+ is invalid, but bound checks are bypassed in the code branch taken
+ for speculative execution. This could cause privileged memory to be
+ accessed and leaked.
+
+ For kernel code that has been identified where data pointers could
+ potentially be influenced for Spectre attacks, new "nospec" accessor
+ macros are used to prevent speculative loading of data.
+
+ Spectre variant 2 attacker can :ref:`poison <poison_btb>` the branch
+ target buffer (BTB) before issuing syscall to launch an attack.
+ After entering the kernel, the kernel could use the poisoned branch
+ target buffer on indirect jump and jump to gadget code in speculative
+ execution.
+
+ If an attacker tries to control the memory addresses leaked during
+ speculative execution, he would also need to pass a parameter to the
+ gadget, either through a register or a known address in memory. After
+ the gadget has executed, he can measure the side effect.
+
+ The kernel can protect itself against consuming poisoned branch
+ target buffer entries by using return trampolines (also known as
+ "retpoline") :ref:`[3] <spec_ref3>` :ref:`[9] <spec_ref9>` for all
+ indirect branches. Return trampolines trap speculative execution paths
+ to prevent jumping to gadget code during speculative execution.
+ x86 CPUs with Enhanced Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation
+ (Enhanced IBRS) available in hardware should use the feature to
+ mitigate Spectre variant 2 instead of retpoline. Enhanced IBRS is
+ more efficient than retpoline.
+
+ There may be gadget code in firmware which could be exploited with
+ Spectre variant 2 attack by a rogue user process. To mitigate such
+ attacks on x86, Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS) feature
+ is turned on before the kernel invokes any firmware code.
+
+2. A user process attacking another user process
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ A malicious user process can try to attack another user process,
+ either via a context switch on the same hardware thread, or from the
+ sibling hyperthread sharing a physical processor core on simultaneous
+ multi-threading (SMT) system.
+
+ Spectre variant 1 attacks generally require passing parameters
+ between the processes, which needs a data passing relationship, such
+ as remote procedure calls (RPC). Those parameters are used in gadget
+ code to derive invalid data pointers accessing privileged memory in
+ the attacked process.
+
+ Spectre variant 2 attacks can be launched from a rogue process by
+ :ref:`poisoning <poison_btb>` the branch target buffer. This can
+ influence the indirect branch targets for a victim process that either
+ runs later on the same hardware thread, or running concurrently on
+ a sibling hardware thread sharing the same physical core.
+
+ A user process can protect itself against Spectre variant 2 attacks
+ by using the prctl() syscall to disable indirect branch speculation
+ for itself. An administrator can also cordon off an unsafe process
+ from polluting the branch target buffer by disabling the process's
+ indirect branch speculation. This comes with a performance cost
+ from not using indirect branch speculation and clearing the branch
+ target buffer. When SMT is enabled on x86, for a process that has
+ indirect branch speculation disabled, Single Threaded Indirect Branch
+ Predictors (STIBP) :ref:`[4] <spec_ref4>` are turned on to prevent the
+ sibling thread from controlling branch target buffer. In addition,
+ the Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB) is issued to clear the
+ branch target buffer when context switching to and from such process.
+
+ On x86, the return stack buffer is stuffed on context switch.
+ This prevents the branch target buffer from being used for branch
+ prediction when the return stack buffer underflows while switching to
+ a deeper call stack. Any poisoned entries in the return stack buffer
+ left by the previous process will also be cleared.
+
+ User programs should use address space randomization to make attacks
+ more difficult (Set /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space = 1 or 2).
+
+3. A virtualized guest attacking the host
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ The attack mechanism is similar to how user processes attack the
+ kernel. The kernel is entered via hyper-calls or other virtualization
+ exit paths.
+
+ For Spectre variant 1 attacks, rogue guests can pass parameters
+ (e.g. in registers) via hyper-calls to derive invalid pointers to
+ speculate into privileged memory after entering the kernel. For places
+ where such kernel code has been identified, nospec accessor macros
+ are used to stop speculative memory access.
+
+ For Spectre variant 2 attacks, rogue guests can :ref:`poison
+ <poison_btb>` the branch target buffer or return stack buffer, causing
+ the kernel to jump to gadget code in the speculative execution paths.
+
+ To mitigate variant 2, the host kernel can use return trampolines
+ for indirect branches to bypass the poisoned branch target buffer,
+ and flushing the return stack buffer on VM exit. This prevents rogue
+ guests from affecting indirect branching in the host kernel.
+
+ To protect host processes from rogue guests, host processes can have
+ indirect branch speculation disabled via prctl(). The branch target
+ buffer is cleared before context switching to such processes.
+
+4. A virtualized guest attacking other guest
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ A rogue guest may attack another guest to get data accessible by the
+ other guest.
+
+ Spectre variant 1 attacks are possible if parameters can be passed
+ between guests. This may be done via mechanisms such as shared memory
+ or message passing. Such parameters could be used to derive data
+ pointers to privileged data in guest. The privileged data could be
+ accessed by gadget code in the victim's speculation paths.
+
+ Spectre variant 2 attacks can be launched from a rogue guest by
+ :ref:`poisoning <poison_btb>` the branch target buffer or the return
+ stack buffer. Such poisoned entries could be used to influence
+ speculation execution paths in the victim guest.
+
+ Linux kernel mitigates attacks to other guests running in the same
+ CPU hardware thread by flushing the return stack buffer on VM exit,
+ and clearing the branch target buffer before switching to a new guest.
+
+ If SMT is used, Spectre variant 2 attacks from an untrusted guest
+ in the sibling hyperthread can be mitigated by the administrator,
+ by turning off the unsafe guest's indirect branch speculation via
+ prctl(). A guest can also protect itself by turning on microcode
+ based mitigations (such as IBPB or STIBP on x86) within the guest.
+
+.. _spectre_sys_info:
+
+Spectre system information
+--------------------------
+
+The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current
+mitigation status of the system for Spectre: whether the system is
+vulnerable, and which mitigations are active.
+
+The sysfs file showing Spectre variant 1 mitigation status is:
+
+ /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+ ======================================= =================================
+ 'Mitigation: __user pointer sanitation' Protection in kernel on a case by
+ case base with explicit pointer
+ sanitation.
+ ======================================= =================================
+
+However, the protections are put in place on a case by case basis,
+and there is no guarantee that all possible attack vectors for Spectre
+variant 1 are covered.
+
+The spectre_v2 kernel file reports if the kernel has been compiled with
+retpoline mitigation or if the CPU has hardware mitigation, and if the
+CPU has support for additional process-specific mitigation.
+
+This file also reports CPU features enabled by microcode to mitigate
+attack between user processes:
+
+1. Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB) to add additional
+ isolation between processes of different users.
+2. Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors (STIBP) to add additional
+ isolation between CPU threads running on the same core.
+
+These CPU features may impact performance when used and can be enabled
+per process on a case-by-case base.
+
+The sysfs file showing Spectre variant 2 mitigation status is:
+
+ /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+ - Kernel status:
+
+ ==================================== =================================
+ 'Not affected' The processor is not vulnerable
+ 'Vulnerable' Vulnerable, no mitigation
+ 'Mitigation: Full generic retpoline' Software-focused mitigation
+ 'Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline' AMD-specific software mitigation
+ 'Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS' Hardware-focused mitigation
+ ==================================== =================================
+
+ - Firmware status: Show if Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS) is
+ used to protect against Spectre variant 2 attacks when calling firmware (x86 only).
+
+ ========== =============================================================
+ 'IBRS_FW' Protection against user program attacks when calling firmware
+ ========== =============================================================
+
+ - Indirect branch prediction barrier (IBPB) status for protection between
+ processes of different users. This feature can be controlled through
+ prctl() per process, or through kernel command line options. This is
+ an x86 only feature. For more details see below.
+
+ =================== ========================================================
+ 'IBPB: disabled' IBPB unused
+ 'IBPB: always-on' Use IBPB on all tasks
+ 'IBPB: conditional' Use IBPB on SECCOMP or indirect branch restricted tasks
+ =================== ========================================================
+
+ - Single threaded indirect branch prediction (STIBP) status for protection
+ between different hyper threads. This feature can be controlled through
+ prctl per process, or through kernel command line options. This is x86
+ only feature. For more details see below.
+
+ ==================== ========================================================
+ 'STIBP: disabled' STIBP unused
+ 'STIBP: forced' Use STIBP on all tasks
+ 'STIBP: conditional' Use STIBP on SECCOMP or indirect branch restricted tasks
+ ==================== ========================================================
+
+ - Return stack buffer (RSB) protection status:
+
+ ============= ===========================================
+ 'RSB filling' Protection of RSB on context switch enabled
+ ============= ===========================================
+
+Full mitigation might require a microcode update from the CPU
+vendor. When the necessary microcode is not available, the kernel will
+report vulnerability.
+
+Turning on mitigation for Spectre variant 1 and Spectre variant 2
+-----------------------------------------------------------------
+
+1. Kernel mitigation
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ For the Spectre variant 1, vulnerable kernel code (as determined
+ by code audit or scanning tools) is annotated on a case by case
+ basis to use nospec accessor macros for bounds clipping :ref:`[2]
+ <spec_ref2>` to avoid any usable disclosure gadgets. However, it may
+ not cover all attack vectors for Spectre variant 1.
+
+ For Spectre variant 2 mitigation, the compiler turns indirect calls or
+ jumps in the kernel into equivalent return trampolines (retpolines)
+ :ref:`[3] <spec_ref3>` :ref:`[9] <spec_ref9>` to go to the target
+ addresses. Speculative execution paths under retpolines are trapped
+ in an infinite loop to prevent any speculative execution jumping to
+ a gadget.
+
+ To turn on retpoline mitigation on a vulnerable CPU, the kernel
+ needs to be compiled with a gcc compiler that supports the
+ -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern -mindirect-branch-register options.
+ If the kernel is compiled with a Clang compiler, the compiler needs
+ to support -mretpoline-external-thunk option. The kernel config
+ CONFIG_RETPOLINE needs to be turned on, and the CPU needs to run with
+ the latest updated microcode.
+
+ On Intel Skylake-era systems the mitigation covers most, but not all,
+ cases. See :ref:`[3] <spec_ref3>` for more details.
+
+ On CPUs with hardware mitigation for Spectre variant 2 (e.g. Enhanced
+ IBRS on x86), retpoline is automatically disabled at run time.
+
+ The retpoline mitigation is turned on by default on vulnerable
+ CPUs. It can be forced on or off by the administrator
+ via the kernel command line and sysfs control files. See
+ :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`.
+
+ On x86, indirect branch restricted speculation is turned on by default
+ before invoking any firmware code to prevent Spectre variant 2 exploits
+ using the firmware.
+
+ Using kernel address space randomization (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_SLAB=y
+ and CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM=y in the kernel configuration) makes
+ attacks on the kernel generally more difficult.
+
+2. User program mitigation
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ User programs can mitigate Spectre variant 1 using LFENCE or "bounds
+ clipping". For more details see :ref:`[2] <spec_ref2>`.
+
+ For Spectre variant 2 mitigation, individual user programs
+ can be compiled with return trampolines for indirect branches.
+ This protects them from consuming poisoned entries in the branch
+ target buffer left by malicious software. Alternatively, the
+ programs can disable their indirect branch speculation via prctl()
+ (See :ref:`Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst <set_spec_ctrl>`).
+ On x86, this will turn on STIBP to guard against attacks from the
+ sibling thread when the user program is running, and use IBPB to
+ flush the branch target buffer when switching to/from the program.
+
+ Restricting indirect branch speculation on a user program will
+ also prevent the program from launching a variant 2 attack
+ on x86. All sand-boxed SECCOMP programs have indirect branch
+ speculation restricted by default. Administrators can change
+ that behavior via the kernel command line and sysfs control files.
+ See :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`.
+
+ Programs that disable their indirect branch speculation will have
+ more overhead and run slower.
+
+ User programs should use address space randomization
+ (/proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space = 1 or 2) to make attacks more
+ difficult.
+
+3. VM mitigation
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ Within the kernel, Spectre variant 1 attacks from rogue guests are
+ mitigated on a case by case basis in VM exit paths. Vulnerable code
+ uses nospec accessor macros for "bounds clipping", to avoid any
+ usable disclosure gadgets. However, this may not cover all variant
+ 1 attack vectors.
+
+ For Spectre variant 2 attacks from rogue guests to the kernel, the
+ Linux kernel uses retpoline or Enhanced IBRS to prevent consumption of
+ poisoned entries in branch target buffer left by rogue guests. It also
+ flushes the return stack buffer on every VM exit to prevent a return
+ stack buffer underflow so poisoned branch target buffer could be used,
+ or attacker guests leaving poisoned entries in the return stack buffer.
+
+ To mitigate guest-to-guest attacks in the same CPU hardware thread,
+ the branch target buffer is sanitized by flushing before switching
+ to a new guest on a CPU.
+
+ The above mitigations are turned on by default on vulnerable CPUs.
+
+ To mitigate guest-to-guest attacks from sibling thread when SMT is
+ in use, an untrusted guest running in the sibling thread can have
+ its indirect branch speculation disabled by administrator via prctl().
+
+ The kernel also allows guests to use any microcode based mitigation
+ they choose to use (such as IBPB or STIBP on x86) to protect themselves.
+
+.. _spectre_mitigation_control_command_line:
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+---------------------------------------------
+
+Spectre variant 2 mitigation can be disabled or force enabled at the
+kernel command line.
+
+ nospectre_v2
+
+ [X86] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2
+ (indirect branch prediction) vulnerability. System may
+ allow data leaks with this option, which is equivalent
+ to spectre_v2=off.
+
+
+ spectre_v2=
+
+ [X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
+ (indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.
+ The default operation protects the kernel from
+ user space attacks.
+
+ on
+ unconditionally enable, implies
+ spectre_v2_user=on
+ off
+ unconditionally disable, implies
+ spectre_v2_user=off
+ auto
+ kernel detects whether your CPU model is
+ vulnerable
+
+ Selecting 'on' will, and 'auto' may, choose a
+ mitigation method at run time according to the
+ CPU, the available microcode, the setting of the
+ CONFIG_RETPOLINE configuration option, and the
+ compiler with which the kernel was built.
+
+ Selecting 'on' will also enable the mitigation
+ against user space to user space task attacks.
+
+ Selecting 'off' will disable both the kernel and
+ the user space protections.
+
+ Specific mitigations can also be selected manually:
+
+ retpoline
+ replace indirect branches
+ retpoline,generic
+ google's original retpoline
+ retpoline,amd
+ AMD-specific minimal thunk
+
+ Not specifying this option is equivalent to
+ spectre_v2=auto.
+
+For user space mitigation:
+
+ spectre_v2_user=
+
+ [X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
+ (indirect branch speculation) vulnerability between
+ user space tasks
+
+ on
+ Unconditionally enable mitigations. Is
+ enforced by spectre_v2=on
+
+ off
+ Unconditionally disable mitigations. Is
+ enforced by spectre_v2=off
+
+ prctl
+ Indirect branch speculation is enabled,
+ but mitigation can be enabled via prctl
+ per thread. The mitigation control state
+ is inherited on fork.
+
+ prctl,ibpb
+ Like "prctl" above, but only STIBP is
+ controlled per thread. IBPB is issued
+ always when switching between different user
+ space processes.
+
+ seccomp
+ Same as "prctl" above, but all seccomp
+ threads will enable the mitigation unless
+ they explicitly opt out.
+
+ seccomp,ibpb
+ Like "seccomp" above, but only STIBP is
+ controlled per thread. IBPB is issued
+ always when switching between different
+ user space processes.
+
+ auto
+ Kernel selects the mitigation depending on
+ the available CPU features and vulnerability.
+
+ Default mitigation:
+ If CONFIG_SECCOMP=y then "seccomp", otherwise "prctl"
+
+ Not specifying this option is equivalent to
+ spectre_v2_user=auto.
+
+ In general the kernel by default selects
+ reasonable mitigations for the current CPU. To
+ disable Spectre variant 2 mitigations, boot with
+ spectre_v2=off. Spectre variant 1 mitigations
+ cannot be disabled.
+
+Mitigation selection guide
+--------------------------
+
+1. Trusted userspace
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ If all userspace applications are from trusted sources and do not
+ execute externally supplied untrusted code, then the mitigations can
+ be disabled.
+
+2. Protect sensitive programs
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ For security-sensitive programs that have secrets (e.g. crypto
+ keys), protection against Spectre variant 2 can be put in place by
+ disabling indirect branch speculation when the program is running
+ (See :ref:`Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst <set_spec_ctrl>`).
+
+3. Sandbox untrusted programs
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ Untrusted programs that could be a source of attacks can be cordoned
+ off by disabling their indirect branch speculation when they are run
+ (See :ref:`Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst <set_spec_ctrl>`).
+ This prevents untrusted programs from polluting the branch target
+ buffer. All programs running in SECCOMP sandboxes have indirect
+ branch speculation restricted by default. This behavior can be
+ changed via the kernel command line and sysfs control files. See
+ :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`.
+
+3. High security mode
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ All Spectre variant 2 mitigations can be forced on
+ at boot time for all programs (See the "on" option in
+ :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`). This will add
+ overhead as indirect branch speculations for all programs will be
+ restricted.
+
+ On x86, branch target buffer will be flushed with IBPB when switching
+ to a new program. STIBP is left on all the time to protect programs
+ against variant 2 attacks originating from programs running on
+ sibling threads.
+
+ Alternatively, STIBP can be used only when running programs
+ whose indirect branch speculation is explicitly disabled,
+ while IBPB is still used all the time when switching to a new
+ program to clear the branch target buffer (See "ibpb" option in
+ :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`). This "ibpb" option
+ has less performance cost than the "on" option, which leaves STIBP
+ on all the time.
+
+References on Spectre
+---------------------
+
+Intel white papers:
+
+.. _spec_ref1:
+
+[1] `Intel analysis of speculative execution side channels <https://newsroom.intel.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2018/01/Intel-Analysis-of-Speculative-Execution-Side-Channels.pdf>`_.
+
+.. _spec_ref2:
+
+[2] `Bounds check bypass <https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/software-guidance/bounds-check-bypass>`_.
+
+.. _spec_ref3:
+
+[3] `Deep dive: Retpoline: A branch target injection mitigation <https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/deep-dive-retpoline-branch-target-injection-mitigation>`_.
+
+.. _spec_ref4:
+
+[4] `Deep Dive: Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors <https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/deep-dive-single-thread-indirect-branch-predictors>`_.
+
+AMD white papers:
+
+.. _spec_ref5:
+
+[5] `AMD64 technology indirect branch control extension <https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/Architecture_Guidelines_Update_Indirect_Branch_Control.pdf>`_.
+
+.. _spec_ref6:
+
+[6] `Software techniques for managing speculation on AMD processors <https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/90343-B_SoftwareTechniquesforManagingSpeculation_WP_7-18Update_FNL.pdf>`_.
+
+ARM white papers:
+
+.. _spec_ref7:
+
+[7] `Cache speculation side-channels <https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability/download-the-whitepaper>`_.
+
+.. _spec_ref8:
+
+[8] `Cache speculation issues update <https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability/latest-updates/cache-speculation-issues-update>`_.
+
+Google white paper:
+
+.. _spec_ref9:
+
+[9] `Retpoline: a software construct for preventing branch-target-injection <https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886>`_.
+
+MIPS white paper:
+
+.. _spec_ref10:
+
+[10] `MIPS: response on speculative execution and side channel vulnerabilities <https://www.mips.com/blog/mips-response-on-speculative-execution-and-side-channel-vulnerabilities/>`_.
+
+Academic papers:
+
+.. _spec_ref11:
+
+[11] `Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution <https://spectreattack.com/spectre.pdf>`_.
+
+.. _spec_ref12:
+
+[12] `NetSpectre: Read Arbitrary Memory over Network <https://arxiv.org/abs/1807.10535>`_.
+
+.. _spec_ref13:
+
+[13] `Spectre Returns! Speculation Attacks using the Return Stack Buffer <https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/woot18/woot18-paper-koruyeh.pdf>`_.
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 138f6664b2e2..0082d1e56999 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -5102,12 +5102,6 @@
emulate [default] Vsyscalls turn into traps and are
emulated reasonably safely.
- native Vsyscalls are native syscall instructions.
- This is a little bit faster than trapping
- and makes a few dynamic recompilers work
- better than they would in emulation mode.
- It also makes exploits much easier to write.
-
none Vsyscalls don't work at all. This makes
them quite hard to use for exploits but
might break your system.
diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst
index 1129c7550a48..7ddd8f667459 100644
--- a/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst
+++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst
@@ -49,6 +49,8 @@ If PR_SPEC_PRCTL is set, then the per-task control of the mitigation is
available. If not set, prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL) for the speculation
misfeature will fail.
+.. _set_spec_ctrl:
+
PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL
-----------------------
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 3e4868a6498b..d8f5dbfd6b76 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
VERSION = 5
PATCHLEVEL = 2
-SUBLEVEL = 0
+SUBLEVEL = 1
EXTRAVERSION =
NAME = Bobtail Squid
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
index a166c960bc9e..e9d0bc3a5e88 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/context_tracking.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
@@ -643,9 +644,11 @@ static unsigned long ptrace_get_debugreg(struct task_struct *tsk, int n)
{
struct thread_struct *thread = &tsk->thread;
unsigned long val = 0;
+ int index = n;
if (n < HBP_NUM) {
- struct perf_event *bp = thread->ptrace_bps[n];
+ struct perf_event *bp = thread->ptrace_bps[index];
+ index = array_index_nospec(index, HBP_NUM);
if (bp)
val = bp->hw.info.address;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c
index a5b802a12212..71d3fef1edc9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
#include <linux/user.h>
#include <linux/regset.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/desc.h>
@@ -220,6 +221,7 @@ int do_get_thread_area(struct task_struct *p, int idx,
struct user_desc __user *u_info)
{
struct user_desc info;
+ int index;
if (idx == -1 && get_user(idx, &u_info->entry_number))
return -EFAULT;
@@ -227,8 +229,11 @@ int do_get_thread_area(struct task_struct *p, int idx,
if (idx < GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN || idx > GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
- fill_user_desc(&info, idx,
- &p->thread.tls_array[idx - GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN]);
+ index = idx - GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN;
+ index = array_index_nospec(index,
+ GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MAX - GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN + 1);
+
+ fill_user_desc(&info, idx, &p->thread.tls_array[index]);
if (copy_to_user(u_info, &info, sizeof(info)))
return -EFAULT;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
index 0850b5149345..4d1517022a14 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
@@ -141,10 +141,10 @@ SECTIONS
*(.text.__x86.indirect_thunk)
__indirect_thunk_end = .;
#endif
- } :text = 0x9090
- /* End of text section */
- _etext = .;
+ /* End of text section */
+ _etext = .;
+ } :text = 0x9090
NOTES :text :note
diff --git a/block/bfq-iosched.c b/block/bfq-iosched.c
index f9269ae6da9c..e5db3856b194 100644
--- a/block/bfq-iosched.c
+++ b/block/bfq-iosched.c
@@ -4584,6 +4584,7 @@ static void bfq_exit_icq_bfqq(struct bfq_io_cq *bic, bool is_sync)
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&bfqd->lock, flags);
+ bfqq->bic = NULL;
bfq_exit_bfqq(bfqd, bfqq);
bic_set_bfqq(bic, NULL, is_sync);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&bfqd->lock, flags);
diff --git a/block/bio.c b/block/bio.c
index ce797d73bb43..67bba12d273b 100644
--- a/block/bio.c
+++ b/block/bio.c
@@ -731,7 +731,7 @@ static int __bio_add_pc_page(struct request_queue *q, struct bio *bio,
}
}
- if (bio_full(bio))
+ if (bio_full(bio, len))
return 0;
if (bio->bi_phys_segments >= queue_max_segments(q))
@@ -807,7 +807,7 @@ void __bio_add_page(struct bio *bio, struct page *page,
struct bio_vec *bv = &bio->bi_io_vec[bio->bi_vcnt];
WARN_ON_ONCE(bio_flagged(bio, BIO_CLONED));
- WARN_ON_ONCE(bio_full(bio));
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(bio_full(bio, len));
bv->bv_page = page;
bv->bv_offset = off;
@@ -834,7 +834,7 @@ int bio_add_page(struct bio *bio, struct page *page,
bool same_page = false;
if (!__bio_try_merge_page(bio, page, len, offset, &same_page)) {
- if (bio_full(bio))
+ if (bio_full(bio, len))
return 0;
__bio_add_page(bio, page, len, offset);
}
@@ -922,7 +922,7 @@ static int __bio_iov_iter_get_pages(struct bio *bio, struct iov_iter *iter)
if (same_page)
put_page(page);
} else {
- if (WARN_ON_ONCE(bio_full(bio)))
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(bio_full(bio, len)))
return -EINVAL;
__bio_add_page(bio, page, len, offset);
}
@@ -966,7 +966,7 @@ int bio_iov_iter_get_pages(struct bio *bio, struct iov_iter *iter)
ret = __bio_iov_bvec_add_pages(bio, iter);
else
ret = __bio_iov_iter_get_pages(bio, iter);
- } while (!ret && iov_iter_count(iter) && !bio_full(bio));
+ } while (!ret && iov_iter_count(iter) && !bio_full(bio, 0));
if (iov_iter_bvec_no_ref(iter))
bio_set_flag(bio, BIO_NO_PAGE_REF);
diff --git a/crypto/lrw.c b/crypto/lrw.c
index 58009cf63a6e..be829f6afc8e 100644
--- a/crypto/lrw.c
+++ b/crypto/lrw.c
@@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ static int create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
inst->alg.base.cra_priority = alg->base.cra_priority;
inst->alg.base.cra_blocksize = LRW_BLOCK_SIZE;
inst->alg.base.cra_alignmask = alg->base.cra_alignmask |
- (__alignof__(__be32) - 1);
+ (__alignof__(be128) - 1);
inst->alg.ivsize = LRW_BLOCK_SIZE;
inst->alg.min_keysize = crypto_skcipher_alg_min_keysize(alg) +
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index bc26b5511f0a..38a59a630cd4 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -2059,10 +2059,9 @@ static size_t binder_get_object(struct binder_proc *proc,
read_size = min_t(size_t, sizeof(*object), buffer->data_size - offset);
if (offset > buffer->data_size || read_size < sizeof(*hdr) ||
- !IS_ALIGNED(offset, sizeof(u32)))
+ binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&proc->alloc, object, buffer,
+ offset, read_size))
return 0;
- binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&proc->alloc, object, buffer,
- offset, read_size);
/* Ok, now see if we read a complete object. */
hdr = &object->hdr;
@@ -2131,8 +2130,10 @@ static struct binder_buffer_object *binder_validate_ptr(
return NULL;
buffer_offset = start_offset + sizeof(binder_size_t) * index;
- binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&proc->alloc, &object_offset,
- b, buffer_offset, sizeof(object_offset));
+ if (binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&proc->alloc, &object_offset,
+ b, buffer_offset,
+ sizeof(object_offset)))
+ return NULL;
object_size = binder_get_object(proc, b, object_offset, object);
if (!object_size || object->hdr.type != BINDER_TYPE_PTR)
return NULL;
@@ -2212,10 +2213,12 @@ static bool binder_validate_fixup(struct binder_proc *proc,
return false;
last_min_offset = last_bbo->parent_offset + sizeof(uintptr_t);
buffer_offset = objects_start_offset +
- sizeof(binder_size_t) * last_bbo->parent,
- binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&proc->alloc, &last_obj_offset,
- b, buffer_offset,
- sizeof(last_obj_offset));
+ sizeof(binder_size_t) * last_bbo->parent;
+ if (binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&proc->alloc,
+ &last_obj_offset,
+ b, buffer_offset,
+ sizeof(last_obj_offset)))
+ return false;
}
return (fixup_offset >= last_min_offset);
}
@@ -2301,15 +2304,15 @@ static void binder_transaction_buffer_release(struct binder_proc *proc,
for (buffer_offset = off_start_offset; buffer_offset < off_end_offset;
buffer_offset += sizeof(binder_size_t)) {
struct binder_object_header *hdr;
- size_t object_size;
+ size_t object_size = 0;
struct binder_object object;
binder_size_t object_offset;
- binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&proc->alloc, &object_offset,
- buffer, buffer_offset,
- sizeof(object_offset));
- object_size = binder_get_object(proc, buffer,
- object_offset, &object);
+ if (!binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&proc->alloc, &object_offset,
+ buffer, buffer_offset,
+ sizeof(object_offset)))
+ object_size = binder_get_object(proc, buffer,
+ object_offset, &object);
if (object_size == 0) {
pr_err("transaction release %d bad object at offset %lld, size %zd\n",
debug_id, (u64)object_offset, buffer->data_size);
@@ -2432,15 +2435,16 @@ static void binder_transaction_buffer_release(struct binder_proc *proc,
for (fd_index = 0; fd_index < fda->num_fds;
fd_index++) {
u32 fd;
+ int err;
binder_size_t offset = fda_offset +
fd_index * sizeof(fd);
- binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&proc->alloc,
- &fd,
- buffer,
- offset,
- sizeof(fd));
- binder_deferred_fd_close(fd);
+ err = binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(
+ &proc->alloc, &fd, buffer,
+ offset, sizeof(fd));
+ WARN_ON(err);
+ if (!err)
+ binder_deferred_fd_close(fd);
}
} break;
default:
@@ -2683,11 +2687,12 @@ static int binder_translate_fd_array(struct binder_fd_array_object *fda,
int ret;
binder_size_t offset = fda_offset + fdi * sizeof(fd);
- binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
- &fd, t->buffer,
- offset, sizeof(fd));
- ret = binder_translate_fd(fd, offset, t, thread,
- in_reply_to);
+ ret = binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
+ &fd, t->buffer,
+ offset, sizeof(fd));
+ if (!ret)
+ ret = binder_translate_fd(fd, offset, t, thread,
+ in_reply_to);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
@@ -2740,8 +2745,12 @@ static int binder_fixup_parent(struct binder_transaction *t,
}
buffer_offset = bp->parent_offset +
(uintptr_t)parent->buffer - (uintptr_t)b->user_data;
- binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc, b, buffer_offset,
- &bp->buffer, sizeof(bp->buffer));
+ if (binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc, b, buffer_offset,
+ &bp->buffer, sizeof(bp->buffer))) {
+ binder_user_error("%d:%d got transaction with invalid parent offset\n",
+ proc->pid, thread->pid);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
return 0;
}
@@ -3160,15 +3169,20 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
goto err_binder_alloc_buf_failed;
}
if (secctx) {
+ int err;
size_t buf_offset = ALIGN(tr->data_size, sizeof(void *)) +
ALIGN(tr->offsets_size, sizeof(void *)) +
ALIGN(extra_buffers_size, sizeof(void *)) -
ALIGN(secctx_sz, sizeof(u64));
t->security_ctx = (uintptr_t)t->buffer->user_data + buf_offset;
- binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
- t->buffer, buf_offset,
- secctx, secctx_sz);
+ err = binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
+ t->buffer, buf_offset,
+ secctx, secctx_sz);
+ if (err) {
+ t->security_ctx = 0;
+ WARN_ON(1);
+ }
security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_sz);
secctx = NULL;
}
@@ -3234,11 +3248,16 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
struct binder_object object;
binder_size_t object_offset;
- binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
- &object_offset,
- t->buffer,
- buffer_offset,
- sizeof(object_offset));
+ if (binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
+ &object_offset,
+ t->buffer,
+ buffer_offset,
+ sizeof(object_offset))) {
+ return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
+ return_error_param = -EINVAL;
+ return_error_line = __LINE__;
+ goto err_bad_offset;
+ }
object_size = binder_get_object(target_proc, t->buffer,
object_offset, &object);
if (object_size == 0 || object_offset < off_min) {
@@ -3262,15 +3281,17 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
fp = to_flat_binder_object(hdr);
ret = binder_translate_binder(fp, t, thread);
- if (ret < 0) {
+
+ if (ret < 0 ||
+ binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
+ t->buffer,
+ object_offset,
+ fp, sizeof(*fp))) {
return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
return_error_param = ret;
return_error_line = __LINE__;
goto err_translate_failed;
}
- binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
- t->buffer, object_offset,
- fp, sizeof(*fp));
} break;
case BINDER_TYPE_HANDLE:
case BINDER_TYPE_WEAK_HANDLE: {
@@ -3278,15 +3299,16 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
fp = to_flat_binder_object(hdr);
ret = binder_translate_handle(fp, t, thread);
- if (ret < 0) {
+ if (ret < 0 ||
+ binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
+ t->buffer,
+ object_offset,
+ fp, sizeof(*fp))) {
return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
return_error_param = ret;
return_error_line = __LINE__;
goto err_translate_failed;
}
- binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
- t->buffer, object_offset,
- fp, sizeof(*fp));
} break;
case BINDER_TYPE_FD: {
@@ -3296,16 +3318,17 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
int ret = binder_translate_fd(fp->fd, fd_offset, t,
thread, in_reply_to);
- if (ret < 0) {
+ fp->pad_binder = 0;
+ if (ret < 0 ||
+ binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
+ t->buffer,
+ object_offset,
+ fp, sizeof(*fp))) {
return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
return_error_param = ret;
return_error_line = __LINE__;
goto err_translate_failed;
}
- fp->pad_binder = 0;
- binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
- t->buffer, object_offset,
- fp, sizeof(*fp));
} break;
case BINDER_TYPE_FDA: {
struct binder_object ptr_object;
@@ -3393,15 +3416,16 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
num_valid,
last_fixup_obj_off,
last_fixup_min_off);
- if (ret < 0) {
+ if (ret < 0 ||
+ binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
+ t->buffer,
+ object_offset,
+ bp, sizeof(*bp))) {
return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
return_error_param = ret;
return_error_line = __LINE__;
goto err_translate_failed;
}
- binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
- t->buffer, object_offset,
- bp, sizeof(*bp));
last_fixup_obj_off = object_offset;
last_fixup_min_off = 0;
} break;
@@ -4140,20 +4164,27 @@ static int binder_apply_fd_fixups(struct binder_proc *proc,
trace_binder_transaction_fd_recv(t, fd, fixup->offset);
fd_install(fd, fixup->file);
fixup->file = NULL;
- binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&proc->alloc, t->buffer,
- fixup->offset, &fd,
- sizeof(u32));
+ if (binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&proc->alloc, t->buffer,
+ fixup->offset, &fd,
+ sizeof(u32))) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
}
list_for_each_entry_safe(fixup, tmp, &t->fd_fixups, fixup_entry) {
if (fixup->file) {
fput(fixup->file);
} else if (ret) {
u32 fd;
-
- binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&proc->alloc, &fd,
- t->buffer, fixup->offset,
- sizeof(fd));
- binder_deferred_fd_close(fd);
+ int err;
+
+ err = binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&proc->alloc, &fd,
+ t->buffer,
+ fixup->offset,
+ sizeof(fd));
+ WARN_ON(err);
+ if (!err)
+ binder_deferred_fd_close(fd);
}
list_del(&fixup->fixup_entry);
kfree(fixup);
@@ -4268,6 +4299,8 @@ static int binder_thread_read(struct binder_proc *proc,
case BINDER_WORK_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE: {
binder_inner_proc_unlock(proc);
cmd = BR_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE;
+ kfree(w);
+ binder_stats_deleted(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE);
if (put_user(cmd, (uint32_t __user *)ptr))
return -EFAULT;
ptr += sizeof(uint32_t);
@@ -4276,8 +4309,6 @@ static int binder_thread_read(struct binder_proc *proc,
binder_debug(BINDER_DEBUG_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE,
"%d:%d BR_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE\n",
proc->pid, thread->pid);
- kfree(w);
- binder_stats_deleted(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE);
} break;
case BINDER_WORK_NODE: {
struct binder_node *node = container_of(w, struct binder_node, work);
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c b/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c
index ce5603c2291c..6d79a1b0d446 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c
@@ -1119,15 +1119,16 @@ binder_alloc_copy_user_to_buffer(struct binder_alloc *alloc,
return 0;
}
-static void binder_alloc_do_buffer_copy(struct binder_alloc *alloc,
- bool to_buffer,
- struct binder_buffer *buffer,
- binder_size_t buffer_offset,
- void *ptr,
- size_t bytes)
+static int binder_alloc_do_buffer_copy(struct binder_alloc *alloc,
+ bool to_buffer,
+ struct binder_buffer *buffer,
+ binder_size_t buffer_offset,
+ void *ptr,
+ size_t bytes)
{
/* All copies must be 32-bit aligned and 32-bit size */
- BUG_ON(!check_buffer(alloc, buffer, buffer_offset, bytes));
+ if (!check_buffer(alloc, buffer, buffer_offset, bytes))
+ return -EINVAL;
while (bytes) {
unsigned long size;
@@ -1155,25 +1156,26 @@ static void binder_alloc_do_buffer_copy(struct binder_alloc *alloc,
ptr = ptr + size;
buffer_offset += size;
}
+ return 0;
}
-void binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(struct binder_alloc *alloc,
- struct binder_buffer *buffer,
- binder_size_t buffer_offset,
- void *src,
- size_t bytes)
+int binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(struct binder_alloc *alloc,
+ struct binder_buffer *buffer,
+ binder_size_t buffer_offset,
+ void *src,
+ size_t bytes)
{
- binder_alloc_do_buffer_copy(alloc, true, buffer, buffer_offset,
- src, bytes);
+ return binder_alloc_do_buffer_copy(alloc, true, buffer, buffer_offset,
+ src, bytes);
}
-void binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(struct binder_alloc *alloc,
- void *dest,
- struct binder_buffer *buffer,
- binder_size_t buffer_offset,
- size_t bytes)
+int binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(struct binder_alloc *alloc,
+ void *dest,
+ struct binder_buffer *buffer,
+ binder_size_t buffer_offset,
+ size_t bytes)
{
- binder_alloc_do_buffer_copy(alloc, false, buffer, buffer_offset,
- dest, bytes);
+ return binder_alloc_do_buffer_copy(alloc, false, buffer, buffer_offset,
+ dest, bytes);
}
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder_alloc.h b/drivers/android/binder_alloc.h
index 71bfa95f8e09..db9c1b984695 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder_alloc.h
+++ b/drivers/android/binder_alloc.h
@@ -159,17 +159,17 @@ binder_alloc_copy_user_to_buffer(struct binder_alloc *alloc,
const void __user *from,
size_t bytes);
-void binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(struct binder_alloc *alloc,
- struct binder_buffer *buffer,
- binder_size_t buffer_offset,
- void *src,
- size_t bytes);
-
-void binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(struct binder_alloc *alloc,
- void *dest,
- struct binder_buffer *buffer,
- binder_size_t buffer_offset,
- size_t bytes);
+int binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(struct binder_alloc *alloc,
+ struct binder_buffer *buffer,
+ binder_size_t buffer_offset,
+ void *src,
+ size_t bytes);
+
+int binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(struct binder_alloc *alloc,
+ void *dest,
+ struct binder_buffer *buffer,
+ binder_size_t buffer_offset,
+ size_t bytes);
#endif /* _LINUX_BINDER_ALLOC_H */
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
index 90325e1749fb..d47ad10a35fe 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
@@ -289,15 +289,15 @@ static int tpm_class_shutdown(struct device *dev)
{
struct tpm_chip *chip = container_of(dev, struct tpm_chip, dev);
+ down_write(&chip->ops_sem);
if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) {
- down_write(&chip->ops_sem);
if (!tpm_chip_start(chip)) {
tpm2_shutdown(chip, TPM2_SU_CLEAR);
tpm_chip_stop(chip);
}
- chip->ops = NULL;
- up_write(&chip->ops_sem);
}
+ chip->ops = NULL;
+ up_write(&chip->ops_sem);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c
index 85dcf2654d11..faacbe1ffa1a 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c
@@ -510,7 +510,7 @@ struct tpm1_get_random_out {
*
* Return:
* * number of bytes read
- * * -errno or a TPM return code otherwise
+ * * -errno (positive TPM return codes are masked to -EIO)
*/
int tpm1_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max)
{
@@ -531,8 +531,11 @@ int tpm1_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max)
rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, sizeof(out->rng_data_len),
"attempting get random");
- if (rc)
+ if (rc) {
+ if (rc > 0)
+ rc = -EIO;
goto out;
+ }
out = (struct tpm1_get_random_out *)&buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE];
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
index 4de49924cfc4..d103545e4055 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ struct tpm2_get_random_out {
*
* Return:
* size of the buffer on success,
- * -errno otherwise
+ * -errno otherwise (positive TPM return codes are masked to -EIO)
*/
int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max)
{
@@ -324,8 +324,11 @@ int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max)
offsetof(struct tpm2_get_random_out,
buffer),
"attempting get random");
- if (err)
+ if (err) {
+ if (err > 0)
+ err = -EIO;
goto out;
+ }
out = (struct tpm2_get_random_out *)
&buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE];
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/talitos.c b/drivers/crypto/talitos.c
index fbc7bf9d7380..427c78d4d948 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/talitos.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/talitos.c
@@ -2339,7 +2339,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template driver_algs[] = {
.base = {
.cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha1),cbc(aes))",
.cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha1-"
- "cbc-aes-talitos",
+ "cbc-aes-talitos-hsna",
.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
},
@@ -2384,7 +2384,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template driver_algs[] = {
.cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha1),"
"cbc(des3_ede))",
.cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha1-"
- "cbc-3des-talitos",
+ "cbc-3des-talitos-hsna",
.cra_blocksize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
},
@@ -2427,7 +2427,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template driver_algs[] = {
.base = {
.cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha224),cbc(aes))",
.cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha224-"
- "cbc-aes-talitos",
+ "cbc-aes-talitos-hsna",
.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
},
@@ -2472,7 +2472,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template driver_algs[] = {
.cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha224),"
"cbc(des3_ede))",
.cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha224-"
- "cbc-3des-talitos",
+ "cbc-3des-talitos-hsna",
.cra_blocksize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
},
@@ -2515,7 +2515,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template driver_algs[] = {
.base = {
.cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes))",
.cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha256-"
- "cbc-aes-talitos",
+ "cbc-aes-talitos-hsna",
.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
},
@@ -2560,7 +2560,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template driver_algs[] = {
.cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha256),"
"cbc(des3_ede))",
.cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha256-"
- "cbc-3des-talitos",
+ "cbc-3des-talitos-hsna",
.cra_blocksize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
},
@@ -2689,7 +2689,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template driver_algs[] = {
.base = {
.cra_name = "authenc(hmac(md5),cbc(aes))",
.cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-md5-"
- "cbc-aes-talitos",
+ "cbc-aes-talitos-hsna",
.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
},
@@ -2732,7 +2732,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template driver_algs[] = {
.base = {
.cra_name = "authenc(hmac(md5),cbc(des3_ede))",
.cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-md5-"
- "cbc-3des-talitos",
+ "cbc-3des-talitos-hsna",
.cra_blocksize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
},
diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h b/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h
index b032d3899fa3..bfc584ada4eb 100644
--- a/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h
@@ -1241,6 +1241,7 @@
#define USB_DEVICE_ID_PRIMAX_KEYBOARD 0x4e05
#define USB_DEVICE_ID_PRIMAX_REZEL 0x4e72
#define USB_DEVICE_ID_PRIMAX_PIXART_MOUSE_4D0F 0x4d0f
+#define USB_DEVICE_ID_PRIMAX_PIXART_MOUSE_4D65 0x4d65
#define USB_DEVICE_ID_PRIMAX_PIXART_MOUSE_4E22 0x4e22
diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-quirks.c b/drivers/hid/hid-quirks.c
index 671a285724f9..1549c7a2f04c 100644
--- a/drivers/hid/hid-quirks.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-quirks.c
@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ static const struct hid_device_id hid_quirks[] = {
{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_PIXART, USB_DEVICE_ID_PIXART_USB_OPTICAL_MOUSE), HID_QUIRK_ALWAYS_POLL },
{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_PRIMAX, USB_DEVICE_ID_PRIMAX_MOUSE_4D22), HID_QUIRK_ALWAYS_POLL },
{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_PRIMAX, USB_DEVICE_ID_PRIMAX_PIXART_MOUSE_4D0F), HID_QUIRK_ALWAYS_POLL },
+ { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_PRIMAX, USB_DEVICE_ID_PRIMAX_PIXART_MOUSE_4D65), HID_QUIRK_ALWAYS_POLL },
{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_PRIMAX, USB_DEVICE_ID_PRIMAX_PIXART_MOUSE_4E22), HID_QUIRK_ALWAYS_POLL },
{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_PRODIGE, USB_DEVICE_ID_PRODIGE_CORDLESS), HID_QUIRK_NOGET },
{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_QUANTA, USB_DEVICE_ID_QUANTA_OPTICAL_TOUCH_3001), HID_QUIRK_NOGET },
diff --git a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etb10.c b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etb10.c
index 4ee4c80a4354..543cc3d36e1d 100644
--- a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etb10.c
+++ b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etb10.c
@@ -373,12 +373,10 @@ static void *etb_alloc_buffer(struct coresight_device *csdev,
struct perf_event *event, void **pages,
int nr_pages, bool overwrite)
{
- int node, cpu = event->cpu;
+ int node;
struct cs_buffers *buf;
- if (cpu == -1)
- cpu = smp_processor_id();
- node = cpu_to_node(cpu);
+ node = (event->cpu == -1) ? NUMA_NO_NODE : cpu_to_node(event->cpu);
buf = kzalloc_node(sizeof(struct cs_buffers), GFP_KERNEL, node);
if (!buf)
diff --git a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-funnel.c b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-funnel.c
index 16b0c0e1e43a..ad6e16c96263 100644
--- a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-funnel.c
+++ b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-funnel.c
@@ -241,6 +241,7 @@ static int funnel_probe(struct device *dev, struct resource *res)
}
pm_runtime_put(dev);
+ ret = 0;
out_disable_clk:
if (ret && !IS_ERR_OR_NULL(drvdata->atclk))
diff --git a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-tmc-etf.c b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-tmc-etf.c
index 2527b5d3b65e..8de109de171f 100644
--- a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-tmc-etf.c
+++ b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-tmc-etf.c
@@ -378,12 +378,10 @@ static void *tmc_alloc_etf_buffer(struct coresight_device *csdev,
struct perf_event *event, void **pages,
int nr_pages, bool overwrite)
{
- int node, cpu = event->cpu;
+ int node;
struct cs_buffers *buf;
- if (cpu == -1)
- cpu = smp_processor_id();
- node = cpu_to_node(cpu);
+ node = (event->cpu == -1) ? NUMA_NO_NODE : cpu_to_node(event->cpu);
/* Allocate memory structure for interaction with Perf */
buf = kzalloc_node(sizeof(struct cs_buffers), GFP_KERNEL, node);
diff --git a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-tmc-etr.c b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-tmc-etr.c
index df6e4b0b84e9..9f293b9dce8c 100644
--- a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-tmc-etr.c
+++ b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-tmc-etr.c
@@ -1178,14 +1178,11 @@ static struct etr_buf *
alloc_etr_buf(struct tmc_drvdata *drvdata, struct perf_event *event,
int nr_pages, void **pages, bool snapshot)
{
- int node, cpu = event->cpu;
+ int node;
struct etr_buf *etr_buf;
unsigned long size;
- if (cpu == -1)
- cpu = smp_processor_id();
- node = cpu_to_node(cpu);
-
+ node = (event->cpu == -1) ? NUMA_NO_NODE : cpu_to_node(event->cpu);
/*
* Try to match the perf ring buffer size if it is larger
* than the size requested via sysfs.
@@ -1317,13 +1314,11 @@ static struct etr_perf_buffer *
tmc_etr_setup_perf_buf(struct tmc_drvdata *drvdata, struct perf_event *event,
int nr_pages, void **pages, bool snapshot)
{
- int node, cpu = event->cpu;
+ int node;
struct etr_buf *etr_buf;
struct etr_perf_buffer *etr_perf;
- if (cpu == -1)
- cpu = smp_processor_id();
- node = cpu_to_node(cpu);
+ node = (event->cpu == -1) ? NUMA_NO_NODE : cpu_to_node(event->cpu);
etr_perf = kzalloc_node(sizeof(*etr_perf), GFP_KERNEL, node);
if (!etr_perf)
diff --git a/drivers/iio/adc/stm32-adc-core.c b/drivers/iio/adc/stm32-adc-core.c
index 2327ec18b40c..1f7ce5186dfc 100644
--- a/drivers/iio/adc/stm32-adc-core.c
+++ b/drivers/iio/adc/stm32-adc-core.c
@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ struct stm32_adc_priv_cfg {
* @domain: irq domain reference
* @aclk: clock reference for the analog circuitry
* @bclk: bus clock common for all ADCs, depends on part used
+ * @vdda: vdda analog supply reference
* @vref: regulator reference
* @cfg: compatible configuration data
* @common: common data for all ADC instances
@@ -97,6 +98,7 @@ struct stm32_adc_priv {
struct irq_domain *domain;
struct clk *aclk;
struct clk *bclk;
+ struct regulator *vdda;
struct regulator *vref;
const struct stm32_adc_priv_cfg *cfg;
struct stm32_adc_common common;
@@ -394,10 +396,16 @@ static int stm32_adc_core_hw_start(struct device *dev)
struct stm32_adc_priv *priv = to_stm32_adc_priv(common);
int ret;
+ ret = regulator_enable(priv->vdda);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ dev_err(dev, "vdda enable failed %d\n", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
ret = regulator_enable(priv->vref);
if (ret < 0) {
dev_err(dev, "vref enable failed\n");
- return ret;
+ goto err_vdda_disable;
}
if (priv->bclk) {
@@ -425,6 +433,8 @@ static int stm32_adc_core_hw_start(struct device *dev)
clk_disable_unprepare(priv->bclk);
err_regulator_disable:
regulator_disable(priv->vref);
+err_vdda_disable:
+ regulator_disable(priv->vdda);
return ret;
}
@@ -441,6 +451,7 @@ static void stm32_adc_core_hw_stop(struct device *dev)
if (priv->bclk)
clk_disable_unprepare(priv->bclk);
regulator_disable(priv->vref);
+ regulator_disable(priv->vdda);
}
static int stm32_adc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
@@ -468,6 +479,14 @@ static int stm32_adc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
return PTR_ERR(priv->common.base);
priv->common.phys_base = res->start;
+ priv->vdda = devm_regulator_get(&pdev->dev, "vdda");
+ if (IS_ERR(priv->vdda)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(priv->vdda);
+ if (ret != -EPROBE_DEFER)
+ dev_err(&pdev->dev, "vdda get failed, %d\n", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
priv->vref = devm_regulator_get(&pdev->dev, "vref");
if (IS_ERR(priv->vref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(priv->vref);
diff --git a/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/stv0297.c b/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/stv0297.c
index dac396c95a59..6d5962d5697a 100644
--- a/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/stv0297.c
+++ b/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/stv0297.c
@@ -682,7 +682,7 @@ static const struct dvb_frontend_ops stv0297_ops = {
.delsys = { SYS_DVBC_ANNEX_A },
.info = {
.name = "ST STV0297 DVB-C",
- .frequency_min_hz = 470 * MHz,
+ .frequency_min_hz = 47 * MHz,
.frequency_max_hz = 862 * MHz,
.frequency_stepsize_hz = 62500,
.symbol_rate_min = 870000,
diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/Makefile b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/Makefile
index 951c984de61a..fb10eafe9bde 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/Makefile
@@ -15,8 +15,7 @@ KCOV_INSTRUMENT_rodata.o := n
OBJCOPYFLAGS :=
OBJCOPYFLAGS_rodata_objcopy.o := \
- --set-section-flags .text=alloc,readonly \
- --rename-section .text=.rodata
+ --rename-section .text=.rodata,alloc,readonly,load
targets += rodata.o rodata_objcopy.o
$(obj)/rodata_objcopy.o: $(obj)/rodata.o FORCE
$(call if_changed,objcopy)
diff --git a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c
index 300ed69fe2c7..16695366ec92 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c
@@ -21,6 +21,9 @@
#include "vmci_driver.h"
#include "vmci_event.h"
+/* Use a wide upper bound for the maximum contexts. */
+#define VMCI_MAX_CONTEXTS 2000
+
/*
* List of current VMCI contexts. Contexts can be added by
* vmci_ctx_create() and removed via vmci_ctx_destroy().
@@ -117,19 +120,22 @@ struct vmci_ctx *vmci_ctx_create(u32 cid, u32 priv_flags,
/* Initialize host-specific VMCI context. */
init_waitqueue_head(&context->host_context.wait_queue);
- context->queue_pair_array = vmci_handle_arr_create(0);
+ context->queue_pair_array =
+ vmci_handle_arr_create(0, VMCI_MAX_GUEST_QP_COUNT);
if (!context->queue_pair_array) {
error = -ENOMEM;
goto err_free_ctx;
}
- context->doorbell_array = vmci_handle_arr_create(0);
+ context->doorbell_array =
+ vmci_handle_arr_create(0, VMCI_MAX_GUEST_DOORBELL_COUNT);
if (!context->doorbell_array) {
error = -ENOMEM;
goto err_free_qp_array;
}
- context->pending_doorbell_array = vmci_handle_arr_create(0);
+ context->pending_doorbell_array =
+ vmci_handle_arr_create(0, VMCI_MAX_GUEST_DOORBELL_COUNT);
if (!context->pending_doorbell_array) {
error = -ENOMEM;
goto err_free_db_array;
@@ -204,7 +210,7 @@ static int ctx_fire_notification(u32 context_id, u32 priv_flags)
* We create an array to hold the subscribers we find when
* scanning through all contexts.
*/
- subscriber_array = vmci_handle_arr_create(0);
+ subscriber_array = vmci_handle_arr_create(0, VMCI_MAX_CONTEXTS);
if (subscriber_array == NULL)
return VMCI_ERROR_NO_MEM;
@@ -623,20 +629,26 @@ int vmci_ctx_add_notification(u32 context_id, u32 remote_cid)
spin_lock(&context->lock);
- list_for_each_entry(n, &context->notifier_list, node) {
- if (vmci_handle_is_equal(n->handle, notifier->handle)) {
- exists = true;
- break;
+ if (context->n_notifiers < VMCI_MAX_CONTEXTS) {
+ list_for_each_entry(n, &context->notifier_list, node) {
+ if (vmci_handle_is_equal(n->handle, notifier->handle)) {
+ exists = true;
+ break;
+ }
}
- }
- if (exists) {
- kfree(notifier);
- result = VMCI_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS;
+ if (exists) {
+ kfree(notifier);
+ result = VMCI_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS;
+ } else {
+ list_add_tail_rcu(¬ifier->node,
+ &context->notifier_list);
+ context->n_notifiers++;
+ result = VMCI_SUCCESS;
+ }
} else {
- list_add_tail_rcu(¬ifier->node, &context->notifier_list);
- context->n_notifiers++;
- result = VMCI_SUCCESS;
+ kfree(notifier);
+ result = VMCI_ERROR_NO_MEM;
}
spin_unlock(&context->lock);
@@ -721,8 +733,7 @@ static int vmci_ctx_get_chkpt_doorbells(struct vmci_ctx *context,
u32 *buf_size, void **pbuf)
{
struct dbell_cpt_state *dbells;
- size_t n_doorbells;
- int i;
+ u32 i, n_doorbells;
n_doorbells = vmci_handle_arr_get_size(context->doorbell_array);
if (n_doorbells > 0) {
@@ -860,7 +871,8 @@ int vmci_ctx_rcv_notifications_get(u32 context_id,
spin_lock(&context->lock);
*db_handle_array = context->pending_doorbell_array;
- context->pending_doorbell_array = vmci_handle_arr_create(0);
+ context->pending_doorbell_array =
+ vmci_handle_arr_create(0, VMCI_MAX_GUEST_DOORBELL_COUNT);
if (!context->pending_doorbell_array) {
context->pending_doorbell_array = *db_handle_array;
*db_handle_array = NULL;
@@ -942,12 +954,11 @@ int vmci_ctx_dbell_create(u32 context_id, struct vmci_handle handle)
return VMCI_ERROR_NOT_FOUND;
spin_lock(&context->lock);
- if (!vmci_handle_arr_has_entry(context->doorbell_array, handle)) {
- vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(&context->doorbell_array, handle);
- result = VMCI_SUCCESS;
- } else {
+ if (!vmci_handle_arr_has_entry(context->doorbell_array, handle))
+ result = vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(&context->doorbell_array,
+ handle);
+ else
result = VMCI_ERROR_DUPLICATE_ENTRY;
- }
spin_unlock(&context->lock);
vmci_ctx_put(context);
@@ -1083,15 +1094,16 @@ int vmci_ctx_notify_dbell(u32 src_cid,
if (!vmci_handle_arr_has_entry(
dst_context->pending_doorbell_array,
handle)) {
- vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(
+ result = vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(
&dst_context->pending_doorbell_array,
handle);
-
- ctx_signal_notify(dst_context);
- wake_up(&dst_context->host_context.wait_queue);
-
+ if (result == VMCI_SUCCESS) {
+ ctx_signal_notify(dst_context);
+ wake_up(&dst_context->host_context.wait_queue);
+ }
+ } else {
+ result = VMCI_SUCCESS;
}
- result = VMCI_SUCCESS;
}
spin_unlock(&dst_context->lock);
}
@@ -1118,13 +1130,11 @@ int vmci_ctx_qp_create(struct vmci_ctx *context, struct vmci_handle handle)
if (context == NULL || vmci_handle_is_invalid(handle))
return VMCI_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS;
- if (!vmci_handle_arr_has_entry(context->queue_pair_array, handle)) {
- vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(&context->queue_pair_array,
- handle);
- result = VMCI_SUCCESS;
- } else {
+ if (!vmci_handle_arr_has_entry(context->queue_pair_array, handle))
+ result = vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(
+ &context->queue_pair_array, handle);
+ else
result = VMCI_ERROR_DUPLICATE_ENTRY;
- }
return result;
}
diff --git a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_handle_array.c b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_handle_array.c
index c527388f5d7b..de7fee7ead1b 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_handle_array.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_handle_array.c
@@ -8,24 +8,29 @@
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include "vmci_handle_array.h"
-static size_t handle_arr_calc_size(size_t capacity)
+static size_t handle_arr_calc_size(u32 capacity)
{
- return sizeof(struct vmci_handle_arr) +
+ return VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_HEADER_SIZE +
capacity * sizeof(struct vmci_handle);
}
-struct vmci_handle_arr *vmci_handle_arr_create(size_t capacity)
+struct vmci_handle_arr *vmci_handle_arr_create(u32 capacity, u32 max_capacity)
{
struct vmci_handle_arr *array;
+ if (max_capacity == 0 || capacity > max_capacity)
+ return NULL;
+
if (capacity == 0)
- capacity = VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_DEFAULT_SIZE;
+ capacity = min((u32)VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_DEFAULT_CAPACITY,
+ max_capacity);
array = kmalloc(handle_arr_calc_size(capacity), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!array)
return NULL;
array->capacity = capacity;
+ array->max_capacity = max_capacity;
array->size = 0;
return array;
@@ -36,27 +41,34 @@ void vmci_handle_arr_destroy(struct vmci_handle_arr *array)
kfree(array);
}
-void vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(struct vmci_handle_arr **array_ptr,
- struct vmci_handle handle)
+int vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(struct vmci_handle_arr **array_ptr,
+ struct vmci_handle handle)
{
struct vmci_handle_arr *array = *array_ptr;
if (unlikely(array->size >= array->capacity)) {
/* reallocate. */
struct vmci_handle_arr *new_array;
- size_t new_capacity = array->capacity * VMCI_ARR_CAP_MULT;
- size_t new_size = handle_arr_calc_size(new_capacity);
+ u32 capacity_bump = min(array->max_capacity - array->capacity,
+ array->capacity);
+ size_t new_size = handle_arr_calc_size(array->capacity +
+ capacity_bump);
+
+ if (array->size >= array->max_capacity)
+ return VMCI_ERROR_NO_MEM;
new_array = krealloc(array, new_size, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!new_array)
- return;
+ return VMCI_ERROR_NO_MEM;
- new_array->capacity = new_capacity;
+ new_array->capacity += capacity_bump;
*array_ptr = array = new_array;
}
array->entries[array->size] = handle;
array->size++;
+
+ return VMCI_SUCCESS;
}
/*
@@ -66,7 +78,7 @@ struct vmci_handle vmci_handle_arr_remove_entry(struct vmci_handle_arr *array,
struct vmci_handle entry_handle)
{
struct vmci_handle handle = VMCI_INVALID_HANDLE;
- size_t i;
+ u32 i;
for (i = 0; i < array->size; i++) {
if (vmci_handle_is_equal(array->entries[i], entry_handle)) {
@@ -101,7 +113,7 @@ struct vmci_handle vmci_handle_arr_remove_tail(struct vmci_handle_arr *array)
* Handle at given index, VMCI_INVALID_HANDLE if invalid index.
*/
struct vmci_handle
-vmci_handle_arr_get_entry(const struct vmci_handle_arr *array, size_t index)
+vmci_handle_arr_get_entry(const struct vmci_handle_arr *array, u32 index)
{
if (unlikely(index >= array->size))
return VMCI_INVALID_HANDLE;
@@ -112,7 +124,7 @@ vmci_handle_arr_get_entry(const struct vmci_handle_arr *array, size_t index)
bool vmci_handle_arr_has_entry(const struct vmci_handle_arr *array,
struct vmci_handle entry_handle)
{
- size_t i;
+ u32 i;
for (i = 0; i < array->size; i++)
if (vmci_handle_is_equal(array->entries[i], entry_handle))
diff --git a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_handle_array.h b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_handle_array.h
index bd1559a548e9..96193f85be5b 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_handle_array.h
+++ b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_handle_array.h
@@ -9,32 +9,41 @@
#define _VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_H_
#include <linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h>
+#include <linux/limits.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
-#define VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_DEFAULT_SIZE 4
-#define VMCI_ARR_CAP_MULT 2 /* Array capacity multiplier */
-
struct vmci_handle_arr {
- size_t capacity;
- size_t size;
+ u32 capacity;
+ u32 max_capacity;
+ u32 size;
+ u32 pad;
struct vmci_handle entries[];
};
-struct vmci_handle_arr *vmci_handle_arr_create(size_t capacity);
+#define VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_HEADER_SIZE \
+ offsetof(struct vmci_handle_arr, entries)
+/* Select a default capacity that results in a 64 byte sized array */
+#define VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_DEFAULT_CAPACITY 6
+/* Make sure that the max array size can be expressed by a u32 */
+#define VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_MAX_CAPACITY \
+ ((U32_MAX - VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_HEADER_SIZE - 1) / \
+ sizeof(struct vmci_handle))
+
+struct vmci_handle_arr *vmci_handle_arr_create(u32 capacity, u32 max_capacity);
void vmci_handle_arr_destroy(struct vmci_handle_arr *array);
-void vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(struct vmci_handle_arr **array_ptr,
- struct vmci_handle handle);
+int vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(struct vmci_handle_arr **array_ptr,
+ struct vmci_handle handle);
struct vmci_handle vmci_handle_arr_remove_entry(struct vmci_handle_arr *array,
struct vmci_handle
entry_handle);
struct vmci_handle vmci_handle_arr_remove_tail(struct vmci_handle_arr *array);
struct vmci_handle
-vmci_handle_arr_get_entry(const struct vmci_handle_arr *array, size_t index);
+vmci_handle_arr_get_entry(const struct vmci_handle_arr *array, u32 index);
bool vmci_handle_arr_has_entry(const struct vmci_handle_arr *array,
struct vmci_handle entry_handle);
struct vmci_handle *vmci_handle_arr_get_handles(struct vmci_handle_arr *array);
-static inline size_t vmci_handle_arr_get_size(
+static inline u32 vmci_handle_arr_get_size(
const struct vmci_handle_arr *array)
{
return array->size;
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/usb.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/usb.c
index e7c3f3b8457d..99f1897a775d 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/usb.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/usb.c
@@ -128,6 +128,8 @@ static const struct usb_device_id carl9170_usb_ids[] = {
};
MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(usb, carl9170_usb_ids);
+static struct usb_driver carl9170_driver;
+
static void carl9170_usb_submit_data_urb(struct ar9170 *ar)
{
struct urb *urb;
@@ -966,32 +968,28 @@ static int carl9170_usb_init_device(struct ar9170 *ar)
static void carl9170_usb_firmware_failed(struct ar9170 *ar)
{
- struct device *parent = ar->udev->dev.parent;
- struct usb_device *udev;
-
- /*
- * Store a copy of the usb_device pointer locally.
- * This is because device_release_driver initiates
- * carl9170_usb_disconnect, which in turn frees our
- * driver context (ar).
+ /* Store a copies of the usb_interface and usb_device pointer locally.
+ * This is because release_driver initiates carl9170_usb_disconnect,
+ * which in turn frees our driver context (ar).
*/
- udev = ar->udev;
+ struct usb_interface *intf = ar->intf;
+ struct usb_device *udev = ar->udev;
complete(&ar->fw_load_wait);
+ /* at this point 'ar' could be already freed. Don't use it anymore */
+ ar = NULL;
/* unbind anything failed */
- if (parent)
- device_lock(parent);
-
- device_release_driver(&udev->dev);
- if (parent)
- device_unlock(parent);
+ usb_lock_device(udev);
+ usb_driver_release_interface(&carl9170_driver, intf);
+ usb_unlock_device(udev);
- usb_put_dev(udev);
+ usb_put_intf(intf);
}
static void carl9170_usb_firmware_finish(struct ar9170 *ar)
{
+ struct usb_interface *intf = ar->intf;
int err;
err = carl9170_parse_firmware(ar);
@@ -1009,7 +1007,7 @@ static void carl9170_usb_firmware_finish(struct ar9170 *ar)
goto err_unrx;
complete(&ar->fw_load_wait);
- usb_put_dev(ar->udev);
+ usb_put_intf(intf);
return;
err_unrx:
@@ -1052,7 +1050,6 @@ static int carl9170_usb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf,
return PTR_ERR(ar);
udev = interface_to_usbdev(intf);
- usb_get_dev(udev);
ar->udev = udev;
ar->intf = intf;
ar->features = id->driver_info;
@@ -1094,15 +1091,14 @@ static int carl9170_usb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf,
atomic_set(&ar->rx_anch_urbs, 0);
atomic_set(&ar->rx_pool_urbs, 0);
- usb_get_dev(ar->udev);
+ usb_get_intf(intf);
carl9170_set_state(ar, CARL9170_STOPPED);
err = request_firmware_nowait(THIS_MODULE, 1, CARL9170FW_NAME,
&ar->udev->dev, GFP_KERNEL, ar, carl9170_usb_firmware_step2);
if (err) {
- usb_put_dev(udev);
- usb_put_dev(udev);
+ usb_put_intf(intf);
carl9170_free(ar);
}
return err;
@@ -1131,7 +1127,6 @@ static void carl9170_usb_disconnect(struct usb_interface *intf)
carl9170_release_firmware(ar);
carl9170_free(ar);
- usb_put_dev(udev);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_PM
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/p54usb.c b/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/p54usb.c
index f937815f0f2c..b94764c88750 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/p54usb.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/p54usb.c
@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ MODULE_ALIAS("prism54usb");
MODULE_FIRMWARE("isl3886usb");
MODULE_FIRMWARE("isl3887usb");
+static struct usb_driver p54u_driver;
+
/*
* Note:
*
@@ -918,9 +920,9 @@ static void p54u_load_firmware_cb(const struct firmware *firmware,
{
struct p54u_priv *priv = context;
struct usb_device *udev = priv->udev;
+ struct usb_interface *intf = priv->intf;
int err;
- complete(&priv->fw_wait_load);
if (firmware) {
priv->fw = firmware;
err = p54u_start_ops(priv);
@@ -929,26 +931,22 @@ static void p54u_load_firmware_cb(const struct firmware *firmware,
dev_err(&udev->dev, "Firmware not found.\n");
}
- if (err) {
- struct device *parent = priv->udev->dev.parent;
-
- dev_err(&udev->dev, "failed to initialize device (%d)\n", err);
-
- if (parent)
- device_lock(parent);
+ complete(&priv->fw_wait_load);
+ /*
+ * At this point p54u_disconnect may have already freed
+ * the "priv" context. Do not use it anymore!
+ */
+ priv = NULL;
- device_release_driver(&udev->dev);
- /*
- * At this point p54u_disconnect has already freed
- * the "priv" context. Do not use it anymore!
- */
- priv = NULL;
+ if (err) {
+ dev_err(&intf->dev, "failed to initialize device (%d)\n", err);
- if (parent)
- device_unlock(parent);
+ usb_lock_device(udev);
+ usb_driver_release_interface(&p54u_driver, intf);
+ usb_unlock_device(udev);
}
- usb_put_dev(udev);
+ usb_put_intf(intf);
}
static int p54u_load_firmware(struct ieee80211_hw *dev,
@@ -969,14 +967,14 @@ static int p54u_load_firmware(struct ieee80211_hw *dev,
dev_info(&priv->udev->dev, "Loading firmware file %s\n",
p54u_fwlist[i].fw);
- usb_get_dev(udev);
+ usb_get_intf(intf);
err = request_firmware_nowait(THIS_MODULE, 1, p54u_fwlist[i].fw,
device, GFP_KERNEL, priv,
p54u_load_firmware_cb);
if (err) {
dev_err(&priv->udev->dev, "(p54usb) cannot load firmware %s "
"(%d)!\n", p54u_fwlist[i].fw, err);
- usb_put_dev(udev);
+ usb_put_intf(intf);
}
return err;
@@ -1008,8 +1006,6 @@ static int p54u_probe(struct usb_interface *intf,
skb_queue_head_init(&priv->rx_queue);
init_usb_anchor(&priv->submitted);
- usb_get_dev(udev);
-
/* really lazy and simple way of figuring out if we're a 3887 */
/* TODO: should just stick the identification in the device table */
i = intf->altsetting->desc.bNumEndpoints;
@@ -1050,10 +1046,8 @@ static int p54u_probe(struct usb_interface *intf,
priv->upload_fw = p54u_upload_firmware_net2280;
}
err = p54u_load_firmware(dev, intf);
- if (err) {
- usb_put_dev(udev);
+ if (err)
p54_free_common(dev);
- }
return err;
}
@@ -1069,7 +1063,6 @@ static void p54u_disconnect(struct usb_interface *intf)
wait_for_completion(&priv->fw_wait_load);
p54_unregister_common(dev);
- usb_put_dev(interface_to_usbdev(intf));
release_firmware(priv->fw);
p54_free_common(dev);
}
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/txrx.c b/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/txrx.c
index ff9acd1563f4..5892898f8853 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/txrx.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/txrx.c
@@ -139,7 +139,10 @@ static int p54_assign_address(struct p54_common *priv, struct sk_buff *skb)
unlikely(GET_HW_QUEUE(skb) == P54_QUEUE_BEACON))
priv->beacon_req_id = data->req_id;
- __skb_queue_after(&priv->tx_queue, target_skb, skb);
+ if (target_skb)
+ __skb_queue_after(&priv->tx_queue, target_skb, skb);
+ else
+ __skb_queue_head(&priv->tx_queue, skb);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->tx_queue.lock, flags);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/fw.h b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/fw.h
index b73f99dc5a72..1fb76d2f5d3f 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/fw.h
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/fw.h
@@ -1759,9 +1759,10 @@ struct mwifiex_ie_types_wmm_queue_status {
struct ieee_types_vendor_header {
u8 element_id;
u8 len;
- u8 oui[4]; /* 0~2: oui, 3: oui_type */
- u8 oui_subtype;
- u8 version;
+ struct {
+ u8 oui[3];
+ u8 oui_type;
+ } __packed oui;
} __packed;
struct ieee_types_wmm_parameter {
@@ -1775,6 +1776,9 @@ struct ieee_types_wmm_parameter {
* Version [1]
*/
struct ieee_types_vendor_header vend_hdr;
+ u8 oui_subtype;
+ u8 version;
+
u8 qos_info_bitmap;
u8 reserved;
struct ieee_types_wmm_ac_parameters ac_params[IEEE80211_NUM_ACS];
@@ -1792,6 +1796,8 @@ struct ieee_types_wmm_info {
* Version [1]
*/
struct ieee_types_vendor_header vend_hdr;
+ u8 oui_subtype;
+ u8 version;
u8 qos_info_bitmap;
} __packed;
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c
index c269a0de9413..e2786ab612ca 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c
@@ -1361,21 +1361,25 @@ int mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie(struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter,
break;
case WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC:
- if (element_len + 2 < sizeof(vendor_ie->vend_hdr))
- return -EINVAL;
-
vendor_ie = (struct ieee_types_vendor_specific *)
current_ptr;
- if (!memcmp
- (vendor_ie->vend_hdr.oui, wpa_oui,
- sizeof(wpa_oui))) {
+ /* 802.11 requires at least 3-byte OUI. */
+ if (element_len < sizeof(vendor_ie->vend_hdr.oui.oui))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Not long enough for a match? Skip it. */
+ if (element_len < sizeof(wpa_oui))
+ break;
+
+ if (!memcmp(&vendor_ie->vend_hdr.oui, wpa_oui,
+ sizeof(wpa_oui))) {
bss_entry->bcn_wpa_ie =
(struct ieee_types_vendor_specific *)
current_ptr;
bss_entry->wpa_offset = (u16)
(current_ptr - bss_entry->beacon_buf);
- } else if (!memcmp(vendor_ie->vend_hdr.oui, wmm_oui,
+ } else if (!memcmp(&vendor_ie->vend_hdr.oui, wmm_oui,
sizeof(wmm_oui))) {
if (total_ie_len ==
sizeof(struct ieee_types_wmm_parameter) ||
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sta_ioctl.c b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sta_ioctl.c
index ebc0e41e5d3b..74e50566db1f 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sta_ioctl.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sta_ioctl.c
@@ -1351,7 +1351,7 @@ mwifiex_set_gen_ie_helper(struct mwifiex_private *priv, u8 *ie_data_ptr,
/* Test to see if it is a WPA IE, if not, then
* it is a gen IE
*/
- if (!memcmp(pvendor_ie->oui, wpa_oui,
+ if (!memcmp(&pvendor_ie->oui, wpa_oui,
sizeof(wpa_oui))) {
/* IE is a WPA/WPA2 IE so call set_wpa function
*/
@@ -1361,7 +1361,7 @@ mwifiex_set_gen_ie_helper(struct mwifiex_private *priv, u8 *ie_data_ptr,
goto next_ie;
}
- if (!memcmp(pvendor_ie->oui, wps_oui,
+ if (!memcmp(&pvendor_ie->oui, wps_oui,
sizeof(wps_oui))) {
/* Test to see if it is a WPS IE,
* if so, enable wps session flag
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/wmm.c b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/wmm.c
index 407b9932ca4d..64916ba15df5 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/wmm.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/wmm.c
@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ mwifiex_wmm_setup_queue_priorities(struct mwifiex_private *priv,
mwifiex_dbg(priv->adapter, INFO,
"info: WMM Parameter IE: version=%d,\t"
"qos_info Parameter Set Count=%d, Reserved=%#x\n",
- wmm_ie->vend_hdr.version, wmm_ie->qos_info_bitmap &
+ wmm_ie->version, wmm_ie->qos_info_bitmap &
IEEE80211_WMM_IE_AP_QOSINFO_PARAM_SET_CNT_MASK,
wmm_ie->reserved);
diff --git a/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/amplc_pci230.c b/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/amplc_pci230.c
index 65f60c2b702a..f7e673121864 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/amplc_pci230.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/amplc_pci230.c
@@ -2330,7 +2330,8 @@ static irqreturn_t pci230_interrupt(int irq, void *d)
devpriv->intr_running = false;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&devpriv->isr_spinlock, irqflags);
- comedi_handle_events(dev, s_ao);
+ if (s_ao)
+ comedi_handle_events(dev, s_ao);
comedi_handle_events(dev, s_ai);
return IRQ_HANDLED;
diff --git a/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/dt282x.c b/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/dt282x.c
index 3be927f1d3a9..e15e33ed94ae 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/dt282x.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/dt282x.c
@@ -557,7 +557,8 @@ static irqreturn_t dt282x_interrupt(int irq, void *d)
}
#endif
comedi_handle_events(dev, s);
- comedi_handle_events(dev, s_ao);
+ if (s_ao)
+ comedi_handle_events(dev, s_ao);
return IRQ_RETVAL(handled);
}
diff --git a/drivers/staging/fsl-dpaa2/ethsw/ethsw.c b/drivers/staging/fsl-dpaa2/ethsw/ethsw.c
index e3c3e427309a..f73edaf6ce87 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/fsl-dpaa2/ethsw/ethsw.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/fsl-dpaa2/ethsw/ethsw.c
@@ -1086,6 +1086,7 @@ static int port_switchdev_event(struct notifier_block *unused,
dev_hold(dev);
break;
default:
+ kfree(switchdev_work);
return NOTIFY_DONE;
}
diff --git a/drivers/staging/mt7621-pci/pci-mt7621.c b/drivers/staging/mt7621-pci/pci-mt7621.c
index 03d919a94552..93763d40e3a1 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/mt7621-pci/pci-mt7621.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/mt7621-pci/pci-mt7621.c
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
/* MediaTek specific configuration registers */
#define PCIE_FTS_NUM 0x70c
#define PCIE_FTS_NUM_MASK GENMASK(15, 8)
-#define PCIE_FTS_NUM_L0(x) ((x) & 0xff << 8)
+#define PCIE_FTS_NUM_L0(x) (((x) & 0xff) << 8)
/* rt_sysc_membase relative registers */
#define RALINK_PCIE_CLK_GEN 0x7c
diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8712/rtl871x_ioctl_linux.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8712/rtl871x_ioctl_linux.c
index a7230c0c7b23..8f5a8ac1b010 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/rtl8712/rtl871x_ioctl_linux.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8712/rtl871x_ioctl_linux.c
@@ -124,10 +124,91 @@ static inline void handle_group_key(struct ieee_param *param,
}
}
-static noinline_for_stack char *translate_scan(struct _adapter *padapter,
- struct iw_request_info *info,
- struct wlan_network *pnetwork,
- char *start, char *stop)
+static noinline_for_stack char *translate_scan_wpa(struct iw_request_info *info,
+ struct wlan_network *pnetwork,
+ struct iw_event *iwe,
+ char *start, char *stop)
+{
+ /* parsing WPA/WPA2 IE */
+ u8 buf[MAX_WPA_IE_LEN];
+ u8 wpa_ie[255], rsn_ie[255];
+ u16 wpa_len = 0, rsn_len = 0;
+ int n, i;
+
+ r8712_get_sec_ie(pnetwork->network.IEs,
+ pnetwork->network.IELength, rsn_ie, &rsn_len,
+ wpa_ie, &wpa_len);
+ if (wpa_len > 0) {
+ memset(buf, 0, MAX_WPA_IE_LEN);
+ n = sprintf(buf, "wpa_ie=");
+ for (i = 0; i < wpa_len; i++) {
+ n += snprintf(buf + n, MAX_WPA_IE_LEN - n,
+ "%02x", wpa_ie[i]);
+ if (n >= MAX_WPA_IE_LEN)
+ break;
+ }
+ memset(iwe, 0, sizeof(*iwe));
+ iwe->cmd = IWEVCUSTOM;
+ iwe->u.data.length = (u16)strlen(buf);
+ start = iwe_stream_add_point(info, start, stop,
+ iwe, buf);
+ memset(iwe, 0, sizeof(*iwe));
+ iwe->cmd = IWEVGENIE;
+ iwe->u.data.length = (u16)wpa_len;
+ start = iwe_stream_add_point(info, start, stop,
+ iwe, wpa_ie);
+ }
+ if (rsn_len > 0) {
+ memset(buf, 0, MAX_WPA_IE_LEN);
+ n = sprintf(buf, "rsn_ie=");
+ for (i = 0; i < rsn_len; i++) {
+ n += snprintf(buf + n, MAX_WPA_IE_LEN - n,
+ "%02x", rsn_ie[i]);
+ if (n >= MAX_WPA_IE_LEN)
+ break;
+ }
+ memset(iwe, 0, sizeof(*iwe));
+ iwe->cmd = IWEVCUSTOM;
+ iwe->u.data.length = strlen(buf);
+ start = iwe_stream_add_point(info, start, stop,
+ iwe, buf);
+ memset(iwe, 0, sizeof(*iwe));
+ iwe->cmd = IWEVGENIE;
+ iwe->u.data.length = rsn_len;
+ start = iwe_stream_add_point(info, start, stop, iwe,
+ rsn_ie);
+ }
+
+ return start;
+}
+
+static noinline_for_stack char *translate_scan_wps(struct iw_request_info *info,
+ struct wlan_network *pnetwork,
+ struct iw_event *iwe,
+ char *start, char *stop)
+{
+ /* parsing WPS IE */
+ u8 wps_ie[512];
+ uint wps_ielen;
+
+ if (r8712_get_wps_ie(pnetwork->network.IEs,
+ pnetwork->network.IELength,
+ wps_ie, &wps_ielen)) {
+ if (wps_ielen > 2) {
+ iwe->cmd = IWEVGENIE;
+ iwe->u.data.length = (u16)wps_ielen;
+ start = iwe_stream_add_point(info, start, stop,
+ iwe, wps_ie);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return start;
+}
+
+static char *translate_scan(struct _adapter *padapter,
+ struct iw_request_info *info,
+ struct wlan_network *pnetwork,
+ char *start, char *stop)
{
struct iw_event iwe;
struct ieee80211_ht_cap *pht_capie;
@@ -240,73 +321,11 @@ static noinline_for_stack char *translate_scan(struct _adapter *padapter,
/* Check if we added any event */
if ((current_val - start) > iwe_stream_lcp_len(info))
start = current_val;
- /* parsing WPA/WPA2 IE */
- {
- u8 buf[MAX_WPA_IE_LEN];
- u8 wpa_ie[255], rsn_ie[255];
- u16 wpa_len = 0, rsn_len = 0;
- int n;
-
- r8712_get_sec_ie(pnetwork->network.IEs,
- pnetwork->network.IELength, rsn_ie, &rsn_len,
- wpa_ie, &wpa_len);
- if (wpa_len > 0) {
- memset(buf, 0, MAX_WPA_IE_LEN);
- n = sprintf(buf, "wpa_ie=");
- for (i = 0; i < wpa_len; i++) {
- n += snprintf(buf + n, MAX_WPA_IE_LEN - n,
- "%02x", wpa_ie[i]);
- if (n >= MAX_WPA_IE_LEN)
- break;
- }
- memset(&iwe, 0, sizeof(iwe));
- iwe.cmd = IWEVCUSTOM;
- iwe.u.data.length = (u16)strlen(buf);
- start = iwe_stream_add_point(info, start, stop,
- &iwe, buf);
- memset(&iwe, 0, sizeof(iwe));
- iwe.cmd = IWEVGENIE;
- iwe.u.data.length = (u16)wpa_len;
- start = iwe_stream_add_point(info, start, stop,
- &iwe, wpa_ie);
- }
- if (rsn_len > 0) {
- memset(buf, 0, MAX_WPA_IE_LEN);
- n = sprintf(buf, "rsn_ie=");
- for (i = 0; i < rsn_len; i++) {
- n += snprintf(buf + n, MAX_WPA_IE_LEN - n,
- "%02x", rsn_ie[i]);
- if (n >= MAX_WPA_IE_LEN)
- break;
- }
- memset(&iwe, 0, sizeof(iwe));
- iwe.cmd = IWEVCUSTOM;
- iwe.u.data.length = strlen(buf);
- start = iwe_stream_add_point(info, start, stop,
- &iwe, buf);
- memset(&iwe, 0, sizeof(iwe));
- iwe.cmd = IWEVGENIE;
- iwe.u.data.length = rsn_len;
- start = iwe_stream_add_point(info, start, stop, &iwe,
- rsn_ie);
- }
- }
- { /* parsing WPS IE */
- u8 wps_ie[512];
- uint wps_ielen;
+ start = translate_scan_wpa(info, pnetwork, &iwe, start, stop);
+
+ start = translate_scan_wps(info, pnetwork, &iwe, start, stop);
- if (r8712_get_wps_ie(pnetwork->network.IEs,
- pnetwork->network.IELength,
- wps_ie, &wps_ielen)) {
- if (wps_ielen > 2) {
- iwe.cmd = IWEVGENIE;
- iwe.u.data.length = (u16)wps_ielen;
- start = iwe_stream_add_point(info, start, stop,
- &iwe, wps_ie);
- }
- }
- }
/* Add quality statistics */
iwe.cmd = IWEVQUAL;
rssi = r8712_signal_scale_mapping(pnetwork->network.Rssi);
diff --git a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/bcm2835-camera.c b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/bcm2835-camera.c
index 68f08dc18da9..5e9187edeef4 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/bcm2835-camera.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/bcm2835-camera.c
@@ -336,16 +336,13 @@ static void buffer_cb(struct vchiq_mmal_instance *instance,
return;
} else if (length == 0) {
/* stream ended */
- if (buf) {
- /* this should only ever happen if the port is
- * disabled and there are buffers still queued
+ if (dev->capture.frame_count) {
+ /* empty buffer whilst capturing - expected to be an
+ * EOS, so grab another frame
*/
- vb2_buffer_done(&buf->vb.vb2_buf, VB2_BUF_STATE_ERROR);
- pr_debug("Empty buffer");
- } else if (dev->capture.frame_count) {
- /* grab another frame */
if (is_capturing(dev)) {
- pr_debug("Grab another frame");
+ v4l2_dbg(1, bcm2835_v4l2_debug, &dev->v4l2_dev,
+ "Grab another frame");
vchiq_mmal_port_parameter_set(
instance,
dev->capture.camera_port,
@@ -353,8 +350,14 @@ static void buffer_cb(struct vchiq_mmal_instance *instance,
&dev->capture.frame_count,
sizeof(dev->capture.frame_count));
}
+ if (vchiq_mmal_submit_buffer(instance, port, buf))
+ v4l2_dbg(1, bcm2835_v4l2_debug, &dev->v4l2_dev,
+ "Failed to return EOS buffer");
} else {
- /* signal frame completion */
+ /* stopping streaming.
+ * return buffer, and signal frame completion
+ */
+ vb2_buffer_done(&buf->vb.vb2_buf, VB2_BUF_STATE_ERROR);
complete(&dev->capture.frame_cmplt);
}
} else {
@@ -576,6 +579,7 @@ static void stop_streaming(struct vb2_queue *vq)
int ret;
unsigned long timeout;
struct bm2835_mmal_dev *dev = vb2_get_drv_priv(vq);
+ struct vchiq_mmal_port *port = dev->capture.port;
v4l2_dbg(1, bcm2835_v4l2_debug, &dev->v4l2_dev, "%s: dev:%p\n",
__func__, dev);
@@ -599,12 +603,6 @@ static void stop_streaming(struct vb2_queue *vq)
&dev->capture.frame_count,
sizeof(dev->capture.frame_count));
- /* wait for last frame to complete */
- timeout = wait_for_completion_timeout(&dev->capture.frame_cmplt, HZ);
- if (timeout == 0)
- v4l2_err(&dev->v4l2_dev,
- "timed out waiting for frame completion\n");
-
v4l2_dbg(1, bcm2835_v4l2_debug, &dev->v4l2_dev,
"disabling connection\n");
@@ -619,6 +617,21 @@ static void stop_streaming(struct vb2_queue *vq)
ret);
}
+ /* wait for all buffers to be returned */
+ while (atomic_read(&port->buffers_with_vpu)) {
+ v4l2_dbg(1, bcm2835_v4l2_debug, &dev->v4l2_dev,
+ "%s: Waiting for buffers to be returned - %d outstanding\n",
+ __func__, atomic_read(&port->buffers_with_vpu));
+ timeout = wait_for_completion_timeout(&dev->capture.frame_cmplt,
+ HZ);
+ if (timeout == 0) {
+ v4l2_err(&dev->v4l2_dev, "%s: Timeout waiting for buffers to be returned - %d outstanding\n",
+ __func__,
+ atomic_read(&port->buffers_with_vpu));
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
if (disable_camera(dev) < 0)
v4l2_err(&dev->v4l2_dev, "Failed to disable camera\n");
}
diff --git a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/controls.c b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/controls.c
index dade79738a29..12ac3ef61fe6 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/controls.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/controls.c
@@ -603,15 +603,28 @@ static int ctrl_set_bitrate(struct bm2835_mmal_dev *dev,
struct v4l2_ctrl *ctrl,
const struct bm2835_mmal_v4l2_ctrl *mmal_ctrl)
{
+ int ret;
struct vchiq_mmal_port *encoder_out;
dev->capture.encode_bitrate = ctrl->val;
encoder_out = &dev->component[MMAL_COMPONENT_VIDEO_ENCODE]->output[0];
- return vchiq_mmal_port_parameter_set(dev->instance, encoder_out,
- mmal_ctrl->mmal_id, &ctrl->val,
- sizeof(ctrl->val));
+ ret = vchiq_mmal_port_parameter_set(dev->instance, encoder_out,
+ mmal_ctrl->mmal_id, &ctrl->val,
+ sizeof(ctrl->val));
+
+ v4l2_dbg(1, bcm2835_v4l2_debug, &dev->v4l2_dev,
+ "%s: After: mmal_ctrl:%p ctrl id:0x%x ctrl val:%d ret %d(%d)\n",
+ __func__, mmal_ctrl, ctrl->id, ctrl->val, ret,
+ (ret == 0 ? 0 : -EINVAL));
+
+ /*
+ * Older firmware versions (pre July 2019) have a bug in handling
+ * MMAL_PARAMETER_VIDEO_BIT_RATE that result in the call
+ * returning -MMAL_MSG_STATUS_EINVAL. So ignore errors from this call.
+ */
+ return 0;
}
static int ctrl_set_bitrate_mode(struct bm2835_mmal_dev *dev,
diff --git a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/mmal-vchiq.c b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/mmal-vchiq.c
index 16af735af5c3..29761f6c3b55 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/mmal-vchiq.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/mmal-vchiq.c
@@ -161,7 +161,8 @@ struct vchiq_mmal_instance {
void *bulk_scratch;
struct idr context_map;
- spinlock_t context_map_lock;
+ /* protect accesses to context_map */
+ struct mutex context_map_lock;
/* component to use next */
int component_idx;
@@ -184,10 +185,10 @@ get_msg_context(struct vchiq_mmal_instance *instance)
* that when we service the VCHI reply, we can look up what
* message is being replied to.
*/
- spin_lock(&instance->context_map_lock);
+ mutex_lock(&instance->context_map_lock);
handle = idr_alloc(&instance->context_map, msg_context,
0, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
- spin_unlock(&instance->context_map_lock);
+ mutex_unlock(&instance->context_map_lock);
if (handle < 0) {
kfree(msg_context);
@@ -211,9 +212,9 @@ release_msg_context(struct mmal_msg_context *msg_context)
{
struct vchiq_mmal_instance *instance = msg_context->instance;
- spin_lock(&instance->context_map_lock);
+ mutex_lock(&instance->context_map_lock);
idr_remove(&instance->context_map, msg_context->handle);
- spin_unlock(&instance->context_map_lock);
+ mutex_unlock(&instance->context_map_lock);
kfree(msg_context);
}
@@ -239,6 +240,8 @@ static void buffer_work_cb(struct work_struct *work)
struct mmal_msg_context *msg_context =
container_of(work, struct mmal_msg_context, u.bulk.work);
+ atomic_dec(&msg_context->u.bulk.port->buffers_with_vpu);
+
msg_context->u.bulk.port->buffer_cb(msg_context->u.bulk.instance,
msg_context->u.bulk.port,
msg_context->u.bulk.status,
@@ -287,8 +290,6 @@ static int bulk_receive(struct vchiq_mmal_instance *instance,
/* store length */
msg_context->u.bulk.buffer_used = rd_len;
- msg_context->u.bulk.mmal_flags =
- msg->u.buffer_from_host.buffer_header.flags;
msg_context->u.bulk.dts = msg->u.buffer_from_host.buffer_header.dts;
msg_context->u.bulk.pts = msg->u.buffer_from_host.buffer_header.pts;
@@ -379,6 +380,8 @@ buffer_from_host(struct vchiq_mmal_instance *instance,
/* initialise work structure ready to schedule callback */
INIT_WORK(&msg_context->u.bulk.work, buffer_work_cb);
+ atomic_inc(&port->buffers_with_vpu);
+
/* prep the buffer from host message */
memset(&m, 0xbc, sizeof(m)); /* just to make debug clearer */
@@ -447,6 +450,9 @@ static void buffer_to_host_cb(struct vchiq_mmal_instance *instance,
return;
}
+ msg_context->u.bulk.mmal_flags =
+ msg->u.buffer_from_host.buffer_header.flags;
+
if (msg->h.status != MMAL_MSG_STATUS_SUCCESS) {
/* message reception had an error */
pr_warn("error %d in reply\n", msg->h.status);
@@ -1323,16 +1329,6 @@ static int port_enable(struct vchiq_mmal_instance *instance,
if (port->enabled)
return 0;
- /* ensure there are enough buffers queued to cover the buffer headers */
- if (port->buffer_cb) {
- hdr_count = 0;
- list_for_each(buf_head, &port->buffers) {
- hdr_count++;
- }
- if (hdr_count < port->current_buffer.num)
- return -ENOSPC;
- }
-
ret = port_action_port(instance, port,
MMAL_MSG_PORT_ACTION_TYPE_ENABLE);
if (ret)
@@ -1849,7 +1845,7 @@ int vchiq_mmal_init(struct vchiq_mmal_instance **out_instance)
instance->bulk_scratch = vmalloc(PAGE_SIZE);
- spin_lock_init(&instance->context_map_lock);
+ mutex_init(&instance->context_map_lock);
idr_init_base(&instance->context_map, 1);
params.callback_param = instance;
diff --git a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/mmal-vchiq.h b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/mmal-vchiq.h
index 22b839ecd5f0..b0ee1716525b 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/mmal-vchiq.h
+++ b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/mmal-vchiq.h
@@ -71,6 +71,9 @@ struct vchiq_mmal_port {
struct list_head buffers;
/* lock to serialise adding and removing buffers from list */
spinlock_t slock;
+
+ /* Count of buffers the VPU has yet to return */
+ atomic_t buffers_with_vpu;
/* callback on buffer completion */
vchiq_mmal_buffer_cb buffer_cb;
/* callback context */
diff --git a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_2835_arm.c b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_2835_arm.c
index c557c9953724..aa20fcaefa9d 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_2835_arm.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_2835_arm.c
@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ create_pagelist(char __user *buf, size_t count, unsigned short type)
(g_cache_line_size - 1)))) {
char *fragments;
- if (down_killable(&g_free_fragments_sema)) {
+ if (down_interruptible(&g_free_fragments_sema) != 0) {
cleanup_pagelistinfo(pagelistinfo);
return NULL;
}
diff --git a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_arm.c b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_arm.c
index ab7d6a0ce94c..62d8f599e765 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_arm.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_arm.c
@@ -532,7 +532,8 @@ add_completion(VCHIQ_INSTANCE_T instance, VCHIQ_REASON_T reason,
vchiq_log_trace(vchiq_arm_log_level,
"%s - completion queue full", __func__);
DEBUG_COUNT(COMPLETION_QUEUE_FULL_COUNT);
- if (wait_for_completion_killable(&instance->remove_event)) {
+ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(
+ &instance->remove_event)) {
vchiq_log_info(vchiq_arm_log_level,
"service_callback interrupted");
return VCHIQ_RETRY;
@@ -643,7 +644,7 @@ service_callback(VCHIQ_REASON_T reason, struct vchiq_header *header,
}
DEBUG_TRACE(SERVICE_CALLBACK_LINE);
- if (wait_for_completion_killable(
+ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(
&user_service->remove_event)
!= 0) {
vchiq_log_info(vchiq_arm_log_level,
@@ -978,7 +979,7 @@ vchiq_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
has been closed until the client library calls the
CLOSE_DELIVERED ioctl, signalling close_event. */
if (user_service->close_pending &&
- wait_for_completion_killable(
+ wait_for_completion_interruptible(
&user_service->close_event))
status = VCHIQ_RETRY;
break;
@@ -1154,7 +1155,7 @@ vchiq_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
DEBUG_TRACE(AWAIT_COMPLETION_LINE);
mutex_unlock(&instance->completion_mutex);
- rc = wait_for_completion_killable(
+ rc = wait_for_completion_interruptible(
&instance->insert_event);
mutex_lock(&instance->completion_mutex);
if (rc != 0) {
@@ -1324,7 +1325,7 @@ vchiq_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
do {
spin_unlock(&msg_queue_spinlock);
DEBUG_TRACE(DEQUEUE_MESSAGE_LINE);
- if (wait_for_completion_killable(
+ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(
&user_service->insert_event)) {
vchiq_log_info(vchiq_arm_log_level,
"DEQUEUE_MESSAGE interrupted");
@@ -2328,7 +2329,7 @@ vchiq_keepalive_thread_func(void *v)
while (1) {
long rc = 0, uc = 0;
- if (wait_for_completion_killable(&arm_state->ka_evt)
+ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(&arm_state->ka_evt)
!= 0) {
vchiq_log_error(vchiq_susp_log_level,
"%s interrupted", __func__);
@@ -2579,7 +2580,7 @@ block_resume(struct vchiq_arm_state *arm_state)
write_unlock_bh(&arm_state->susp_res_lock);
vchiq_log_info(vchiq_susp_log_level, "%s wait for previously "
"blocked clients", __func__);
- if (wait_for_completion_killable_timeout(
+ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout(
&arm_state->blocked_blocker, timeout_val)
<= 0) {
vchiq_log_error(vchiq_susp_log_level, "%s wait for "
@@ -2605,7 +2606,7 @@ block_resume(struct vchiq_arm_state *arm_state)
write_unlock_bh(&arm_state->susp_res_lock);
vchiq_log_info(vchiq_susp_log_level, "%s wait for resume",
__func__);
- if (wait_for_completion_killable_timeout(
+ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout(
&arm_state->vc_resume_complete, timeout_val)
<= 0) {
vchiq_log_error(vchiq_susp_log_level, "%s wait for "
@@ -2812,7 +2813,7 @@ vchiq_arm_force_suspend(struct vchiq_state *state)
do {
write_unlock_bh(&arm_state->susp_res_lock);
- rc = wait_for_completion_killable_timeout(
+ rc = wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout(
&arm_state->vc_suspend_complete,
msecs_to_jiffies(FORCE_SUSPEND_TIMEOUT_MS));
@@ -2908,7 +2909,7 @@ vchiq_arm_allow_resume(struct vchiq_state *state)
write_unlock_bh(&arm_state->susp_res_lock);
if (resume) {
- if (wait_for_completion_killable(
+ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(
&arm_state->vc_resume_complete) < 0) {
vchiq_log_error(vchiq_susp_log_level,
"%s interrupted", __func__);
diff --git a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_core.c b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_core.c
index 0c387b6473a5..44bfa890e0e5 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_core.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_core.c
@@ -395,13 +395,21 @@ remote_event_create(wait_queue_head_t *wq, struct remote_event *event)
init_waitqueue_head(wq);
}
+/*
+ * All the event waiting routines in VCHIQ used a custom semaphore
+ * implementation that filtered most signals. This achieved a behaviour similar
+ * to the "killable" family of functions. While cleaning up this code all the
+ * routines where switched to the "interruptible" family of functions, as the
+ * former was deemed unjustified and the use "killable" set all VCHIQ's
+ * threads in D state.
+ */
static inline int
remote_event_wait(wait_queue_head_t *wq, struct remote_event *event)
{
if (!event->fired) {
event->armed = 1;
dsb(sy);
- if (wait_event_killable(*wq, event->fired)) {
+ if (wait_event_interruptible(*wq, event->fired)) {
event->armed = 0;
return 0;
}
@@ -560,7 +568,7 @@ reserve_space(struct vchiq_state *state, size_t space, int is_blocking)
remote_event_signal(&state->remote->trigger);
if (!is_blocking ||
- (wait_for_completion_killable(
+ (wait_for_completion_interruptible(
&state->slot_available_event)))
return NULL; /* No space available */
}
@@ -830,7 +838,7 @@ queue_message(struct vchiq_state *state, struct vchiq_service *service,
spin_unlock("a_spinlock);
mutex_unlock(&state->slot_mutex);
- if (wait_for_completion_killable(
+ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(
&state->data_quota_event))
return VCHIQ_RETRY;
@@ -861,7 +869,7 @@ queue_message(struct vchiq_state *state, struct vchiq_service *service,
service_quota->slot_use_count);
VCHIQ_SERVICE_STATS_INC(service, quota_stalls);
mutex_unlock(&state->slot_mutex);
- if (wait_for_completion_killable(
+ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(
&service_quota->quota_event))
return VCHIQ_RETRY;
if (service->closing)
@@ -1710,7 +1718,8 @@ parse_rx_slots(struct vchiq_state *state)
&service->bulk_rx : &service->bulk_tx;
DEBUG_TRACE(PARSE_LINE);
- if (mutex_lock_killable(&service->bulk_mutex)) {
+ if (mutex_lock_killable(
+ &service->bulk_mutex) != 0) {
DEBUG_TRACE(PARSE_LINE);
goto bail_not_ready;
}
@@ -2428,7 +2437,7 @@ vchiq_open_service_internal(struct vchiq_service *service, int client_id)
QMFLAGS_IS_BLOCKING);
if (status == VCHIQ_SUCCESS) {
/* Wait for the ACK/NAK */
- if (wait_for_completion_killable(&service->remove_event)) {
+ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(&service->remove_event)) {
status = VCHIQ_RETRY;
vchiq_release_service_internal(service);
} else if ((service->srvstate != VCHIQ_SRVSTATE_OPEN) &&
@@ -2795,7 +2804,7 @@ vchiq_connect_internal(struct vchiq_state *state, VCHIQ_INSTANCE_T instance)
}
if (state->conn_state == VCHIQ_CONNSTATE_CONNECTING) {
- if (wait_for_completion_killable(&state->connect))
+ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(&state->connect))
return VCHIQ_RETRY;
vchiq_set_conn_state(state, VCHIQ_CONNSTATE_CONNECTED);
@@ -2894,7 +2903,7 @@ vchiq_close_service(VCHIQ_SERVICE_HANDLE_T handle)
}
while (1) {
- if (wait_for_completion_killable(&service->remove_event)) {
+ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(&service->remove_event)) {
status = VCHIQ_RETRY;
break;
}
@@ -2955,7 +2964,7 @@ vchiq_remove_service(VCHIQ_SERVICE_HANDLE_T handle)
request_poll(service->state, service, VCHIQ_POLL_REMOVE);
}
while (1) {
- if (wait_for_completion_killable(&service->remove_event)) {
+ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(&service->remove_event)) {
status = VCHIQ_RETRY;
break;
}
@@ -3038,7 +3047,7 @@ VCHIQ_STATUS_T vchiq_bulk_transfer(VCHIQ_SERVICE_HANDLE_T handle,
VCHIQ_SERVICE_STATS_INC(service, bulk_stalls);
do {
mutex_unlock(&service->bulk_mutex);
- if (wait_for_completion_killable(
+ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(
&service->bulk_remove_event)) {
status = VCHIQ_RETRY;
goto error_exit;
@@ -3115,7 +3124,7 @@ VCHIQ_STATUS_T vchiq_bulk_transfer(VCHIQ_SERVICE_HANDLE_T handle,
if (bulk_waiter) {
bulk_waiter->bulk = bulk;
- if (wait_for_completion_killable(&bulk_waiter->event))
+ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(&bulk_waiter->event))
status = VCHIQ_RETRY;
else if (bulk_waiter->actual == VCHIQ_BULK_ACTUAL_ABORTED)
status = VCHIQ_ERROR;
diff --git a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_util.c b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_util.c
index 6c519d8e48cb..8ee85c5e6f77 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_util.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_util.c
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ void vchiu_queue_push(struct vchiu_queue *queue, struct vchiq_header *header)
return;
while (queue->write == queue->read + queue->size) {
- if (wait_for_completion_killable(&queue->pop))
+ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(&queue->pop))
flush_signals(current);
}
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ void vchiu_queue_push(struct vchiu_queue *queue, struct vchiq_header *header)
struct vchiq_header *vchiu_queue_peek(struct vchiu_queue *queue)
{
while (queue->write == queue->read) {
- if (wait_for_completion_killable(&queue->push))
+ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(&queue->push))
flush_signals(current);
}
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ struct vchiq_header *vchiu_queue_pop(struct vchiu_queue *queue)
struct vchiq_header *header;
while (queue->write == queue->read) {
- if (wait_for_completion_killable(&queue->push))
+ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(&queue->push))
flush_signals(current);
}
diff --git a/drivers/staging/wilc1000/wilc_netdev.c b/drivers/staging/wilc1000/wilc_netdev.c
index ba78c08a17f1..5338d7d2b248 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/wilc1000/wilc_netdev.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/wilc1000/wilc_netdev.c
@@ -530,17 +530,17 @@ static int wilc_wlan_initialize(struct net_device *dev, struct wilc_vif *vif)
goto fail_locks;
}
- if (wl->gpio_irq && init_irq(dev)) {
- ret = -EIO;
- goto fail_locks;
- }
-
ret = wlan_initialize_threads(dev);
if (ret < 0) {
ret = -EIO;
goto fail_wilc_wlan;
}
+ if (wl->gpio_irq && init_irq(dev)) {
+ ret = -EIO;
+ goto fail_threads;
+ }
+
if (!wl->dev_irq_num &&
wl->hif_func->enable_interrupt &&
wl->hif_func->enable_interrupt(wl)) {
@@ -596,7 +596,7 @@ static int wilc_wlan_initialize(struct net_device *dev, struct wilc_vif *vif)
fail_irq_init:
if (wl->dev_irq_num)
deinit_irq(dev);
-
+fail_threads:
wlan_deinitialize_threads(dev);
fail_wilc_wlan:
wilc_wlan_cleanup(dev);
diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c b/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c
index d2f3310abe54..682300713be4 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c
@@ -1869,8 +1869,7 @@ int serial8250_handle_irq(struct uart_port *port, unsigned int iir)
status = serial_port_in(port, UART_LSR);
- if (status & (UART_LSR_DR | UART_LSR_BI) &&
- iir & UART_IIR_RDI) {
+ if (status & (UART_LSR_DR | UART_LSR_BI)) {
if (!up->dma || handle_rx_dma(up, iir))
status = serial8250_rx_chars(up, status);
}
diff --git a/drivers/usb/dwc2/core.c b/drivers/usb/dwc2/core.c
index 8b499d643461..8e41d70fd298 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/dwc2/core.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/dwc2/core.c
@@ -531,7 +531,7 @@ int dwc2_core_reset(struct dwc2_hsotg *hsotg, bool skip_wait)
}
/* Wait for AHB master IDLE state */
- if (dwc2_hsotg_wait_bit_set(hsotg, GRSTCTL, GRSTCTL_AHBIDLE, 50)) {
+ if (dwc2_hsotg_wait_bit_set(hsotg, GRSTCTL, GRSTCTL_AHBIDLE, 10000)) {
dev_warn(hsotg->dev, "%s: HANG! AHB Idle timeout GRSTCTL GRSTCTL_AHBIDLE\n",
__func__);
return -EBUSY;
diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c
index 47be961f1bf3..c7ed90084d1a 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c
@@ -997,7 +997,6 @@ static ssize_t ffs_epfile_io(struct file *file, struct ffs_io_data *io_data)
* earlier
*/
gadget = epfile->ffs->gadget;
- io_data->use_sg = gadget->sg_supported && data_len > PAGE_SIZE;
spin_lock_irq(&epfile->ffs->eps_lock);
/* In the meantime, endpoint got disabled or changed. */
@@ -1012,6 +1011,8 @@ static ssize_t ffs_epfile_io(struct file *file, struct ffs_io_data *io_data)
*/
if (io_data->read)
data_len = usb_ep_align_maybe(gadget, ep->ep, data_len);
+
+ io_data->use_sg = gadget->sg_supported && data_len > PAGE_SIZE;
spin_unlock_irq(&epfile->ffs->eps_lock);
data = ffs_alloc_buffer(io_data, data_len);
diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c
index 737bd77a575d..2929bb47a618 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c
@@ -186,11 +186,12 @@ rx_submit(struct eth_dev *dev, struct usb_request *req, gfp_t gfp_flags)
out = dev->port_usb->out_ep;
else
out = NULL;
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
if (!out)
+ {
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
return -ENOTCONN;
-
+ }
/* Padding up to RX_EXTRA handles minor disagreements with host.
* Normally we use the USB "terminate on short read" convention;
@@ -214,6 +215,7 @@ rx_submit(struct eth_dev *dev, struct usb_request *req, gfp_t gfp_flags)
if (dev->port_usb->is_fixed)
size = max_t(size_t, size, dev->port_usb->fixed_out_len);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
skb = __netdev_alloc_skb(dev->net, size + NET_IP_ALIGN, gfp_flags);
if (skb == NULL) {
diff --git a/drivers/usb/renesas_usbhs/fifo.c b/drivers/usb/renesas_usbhs/fifo.c
index 39fa2fc1b8b7..6036cbae8c78 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/renesas_usbhs/fifo.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/renesas_usbhs/fifo.c
@@ -802,9 +802,8 @@ static int __usbhsf_dma_map_ctrl(struct usbhs_pkt *pkt, int map)
}
static void usbhsf_dma_complete(void *arg);
-static void xfer_work(struct work_struct *work)
+static void usbhsf_dma_xfer_preparing(struct usbhs_pkt *pkt)
{
- struct usbhs_pkt *pkt = container_of(work, struct usbhs_pkt, work);
struct usbhs_pipe *pipe = pkt->pipe;
struct usbhs_fifo *fifo;
struct usbhs_priv *priv = usbhs_pipe_to_priv(pipe);
@@ -812,12 +811,10 @@ static void xfer_work(struct work_struct *work)
struct dma_chan *chan;
struct device *dev = usbhs_priv_to_dev(priv);
enum dma_transfer_direction dir;
- unsigned long flags;
- usbhs_lock(priv, flags);
fifo = usbhs_pipe_to_fifo(pipe);
if (!fifo)
- goto xfer_work_end;
+ return;
chan = usbhsf_dma_chan_get(fifo, pkt);
dir = usbhs_pipe_is_dir_in(pipe) ? DMA_DEV_TO_MEM : DMA_MEM_TO_DEV;
@@ -826,7 +823,7 @@ static void xfer_work(struct work_struct *work)
pkt->trans, dir,
DMA_PREP_INTERRUPT | DMA_CTRL_ACK);
if (!desc)
- goto xfer_work_end;
+ return;
desc->callback = usbhsf_dma_complete;
desc->callback_param = pipe;
@@ -834,7 +831,7 @@ static void xfer_work(struct work_struct *work)
pkt->cookie = dmaengine_submit(desc);
if (pkt->cookie < 0) {
dev_err(dev, "Failed to submit dma descriptor\n");
- goto xfer_work_end;
+ return;
}
dev_dbg(dev, " %s %d (%d/ %d)\n",
@@ -845,8 +842,17 @@ static void xfer_work(struct work_struct *work)
dma_async_issue_pending(chan);
usbhsf_dma_start(pipe, fifo);
usbhs_pipe_enable(pipe);
+}
+
+static void xfer_work(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+ struct usbhs_pkt *pkt = container_of(work, struct usbhs_pkt, work);
+ struct usbhs_pipe *pipe = pkt->pipe;
+ struct usbhs_priv *priv = usbhs_pipe_to_priv(pipe);
+ unsigned long flags;
-xfer_work_end:
+ usbhs_lock(priv, flags);
+ usbhsf_dma_xfer_preparing(pkt);
usbhs_unlock(priv, flags);
}
@@ -899,8 +905,13 @@ static int usbhsf_dma_prepare_push(struct usbhs_pkt *pkt, int *is_done)
pkt->trans = len;
usbhsf_tx_irq_ctrl(pipe, 0);
- INIT_WORK(&pkt->work, xfer_work);
- schedule_work(&pkt->work);
+ /* FIXME: Workaound for usb dmac that driver can be used in atomic */
+ if (usbhs_get_dparam(priv, has_usb_dmac)) {
+ usbhsf_dma_xfer_preparing(pkt);
+ } else {
+ INIT_WORK(&pkt->work, xfer_work);
+ schedule_work(&pkt->work);
+ }
return 0;
@@ -1006,8 +1017,7 @@ static int usbhsf_dma_prepare_pop_with_usb_dmac(struct usbhs_pkt *pkt,
pkt->trans = pkt->length;
- INIT_WORK(&pkt->work, xfer_work);
- schedule_work(&pkt->work);
+ usbhsf_dma_xfer_preparing(pkt);
return 0;
diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio.c b/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio.c
index 1d8461ae2c34..23669a584bae 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio.c
@@ -1029,6 +1029,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_table_combined[] = {
{ USB_DEVICE(AIRBUS_DS_VID, AIRBUS_DS_P8GR) },
/* EZPrototypes devices */
{ USB_DEVICE(EZPROTOTYPES_VID, HJELMSLUND_USB485_ISO_PID) },
+ { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_NUMBER(UNJO_VID, UNJO_ISODEBUG_V1_PID, 1) },
{ } /* Terminating entry */
};
diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio_ids.h b/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio_ids.h
index 5755f0df0025..f12d806220b4 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio_ids.h
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio_ids.h
@@ -1543,3 +1543,9 @@
#define CHETCO_SEASMART_DISPLAY_PID 0xA5AD /* SeaSmart NMEA2000 Display */
#define CHETCO_SEASMART_LITE_PID 0xA5AE /* SeaSmart Lite USB Adapter */
#define CHETCO_SEASMART_ANALOG_PID 0xA5AF /* SeaSmart Analog Adapter */
+
+/*
+ * Unjo AB
+ */
+#define UNJO_VID 0x22B7
+#define UNJO_ISODEBUG_V1_PID 0x150D
diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/option.c b/drivers/usb/serial/option.c
index a0aaf0635359..c1582fbd1150 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/serial/option.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/option.c
@@ -1343,6 +1343,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id option_ids[] = {
.driver_info = RSVD(4) },
{ USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(ZTE_VENDOR_ID, 0x0414, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff) },
{ USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(ZTE_VENDOR_ID, 0x0417, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff) },
+ { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(ZTE_VENDOR_ID, 0x0601, 0xff) }, /* GosunCn ZTE WeLink ME3630 (RNDIS mode) */
{ USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(ZTE_VENDOR_ID, 0x0602, 0xff) }, /* GosunCn ZTE WeLink ME3630 (MBIM mode) */
{ USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(ZTE_VENDOR_ID, 0x1008, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff),
.driver_info = RSVD(4) },
diff --git a/drivers/usb/typec/tps6598x.c b/drivers/usb/typec/tps6598x.c
index c674abe3cf99..a38d1409f15b 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/typec/tps6598x.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/typec/tps6598x.c
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@
#define TPS_STATUS_VCONN(s) (!!((s) & BIT(7)))
/* TPS_REG_SYSTEM_CONF bits */
-#define TPS_SYSCONF_PORTINFO(c) ((c) & 3)
+#define TPS_SYSCONF_PORTINFO(c) ((c) & 7)
enum {
TPS_PORTINFO_SINK,
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ tps6598x_block_read(struct tps6598x *tps, u8 reg, void *val, size_t len)
}
static int tps6598x_block_write(struct tps6598x *tps, u8 reg,
- void *val, size_t len)
+ const void *val, size_t len)
{
u8 data[TPS_MAX_LEN + 1];
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ static inline int tps6598x_write64(struct tps6598x *tps, u8 reg, u64 val)
static inline int
tps6598x_write_4cc(struct tps6598x *tps, u8 reg, const char *val)
{
- return tps6598x_block_write(tps, reg, &val, sizeof(u32));
+ return tps6598x_block_write(tps, reg, val, 4);
}
static int tps6598x_read_partner_identity(struct tps6598x *tps)
diff --git a/fs/crypto/policy.c b/fs/crypto/policy.c
index d536889ac31b..4941fe8471ce 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/policy.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/policy.c
@@ -81,6 +81,8 @@ int fscrypt_ioctl_set_policy(struct file *filp, const void __user *arg)
if (ret == -ENODATA) {
if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
ret = -ENOTDIR;
+ else if (IS_DEADDIR(inode))
+ ret = -ENOENT;
else if (!inode->i_sb->s_cop->empty_dir(inode))
ret = -ENOTEMPTY;
else
diff --git a/fs/iomap.c b/fs/iomap.c
index 12654c2e78f8..da961fca3180 100644
--- a/fs/iomap.c
+++ b/fs/iomap.c
@@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ iomap_readpage_actor(struct inode *inode, loff_t pos, loff_t length, void *data,
if (iop)
atomic_inc(&iop->read_count);
- if (!ctx->bio || !is_contig || bio_full(ctx->bio)) {
+ if (!ctx->bio || !is_contig || bio_full(ctx->bio, plen)) {
gfp_t gfp = mapping_gfp_constraint(page->mapping, GFP_KERNEL);
int nr_vecs = (length + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
diff --git a/fs/udf/inode.c b/fs/udf/inode.c
index e7276932e433..9bb18311a22f 100644
--- a/fs/udf/inode.c
+++ b/fs/udf/inode.c
@@ -470,13 +470,15 @@ static struct buffer_head *udf_getblk(struct inode *inode, udf_pblk_t block,
return NULL;
}
-/* Extend the file by 'blocks' blocks, return the number of extents added */
+/* Extend the file with new blocks totaling 'new_block_bytes',
+ * return the number of extents added
+ */
static int udf_do_extend_file(struct inode *inode,
struct extent_position *last_pos,
struct kernel_long_ad *last_ext,
- sector_t blocks)
+ loff_t new_block_bytes)
{
- sector_t add;
+ uint32_t add;
int count = 0, fake = !(last_ext->extLength & UDF_EXTENT_LENGTH_MASK);
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
struct kernel_lb_addr prealloc_loc = {};
@@ -486,7 +488,7 @@ static int udf_do_extend_file(struct inode *inode,
/* The previous extent is fake and we should not extend by anything
* - there's nothing to do... */
- if (!blocks && fake)
+ if (!new_block_bytes && fake)
return 0;
iinfo = UDF_I(inode);
@@ -517,13 +519,12 @@ static int udf_do_extend_file(struct inode *inode,
/* Can we merge with the previous extent? */
if ((last_ext->extLength & UDF_EXTENT_FLAG_MASK) ==
EXT_NOT_RECORDED_NOT_ALLOCATED) {
- add = ((1 << 30) - sb->s_blocksize -
- (last_ext->extLength & UDF_EXTENT_LENGTH_MASK)) >>
- sb->s_blocksize_bits;
- if (add > blocks)
- add = blocks;
- blocks -= add;
- last_ext->extLength += add << sb->s_blocksize_bits;
+ add = (1 << 30) - sb->s_blocksize -
+ (last_ext->extLength & UDF_EXTENT_LENGTH_MASK);
+ if (add > new_block_bytes)
+ add = new_block_bytes;
+ new_block_bytes -= add;
+ last_ext->extLength += add;
}
if (fake) {
@@ -544,28 +545,27 @@ static int udf_do_extend_file(struct inode *inode,
}
/* Managed to do everything necessary? */
- if (!blocks)
+ if (!new_block_bytes)
goto out;
/* All further extents will be NOT_RECORDED_NOT_ALLOCATED */
last_ext->extLocation.logicalBlockNum = 0;
last_ext->extLocation.partitionReferenceNum = 0;
- add = (1 << (30-sb->s_blocksize_bits)) - 1;
- last_ext->extLength = EXT_NOT_RECORDED_NOT_ALLOCATED |
- (add << sb->s_blocksize_bits);
+ add = (1 << 30) - sb->s_blocksize;
+ last_ext->extLength = EXT_NOT_RECORDED_NOT_ALLOCATED | add;
/* Create enough extents to cover the whole hole */
- while (blocks > add) {
- blocks -= add;
+ while (new_block_bytes > add) {
+ new_block_bytes -= add;
err = udf_add_aext(inode, last_pos, &last_ext->extLocation,
last_ext->extLength, 1);
if (err)
return err;
count++;
}
- if (blocks) {
+ if (new_block_bytes) {
last_ext->extLength = EXT_NOT_RECORDED_NOT_ALLOCATED |
- (blocks << sb->s_blocksize_bits);
+ new_block_bytes;
err = udf_add_aext(inode, last_pos, &last_ext->extLocation,
last_ext->extLength, 1);
if (err)
@@ -596,6 +596,24 @@ static int udf_do_extend_file(struct inode *inode,
return count;
}
+/* Extend the final block of the file to final_block_len bytes */
+static void udf_do_extend_final_block(struct inode *inode,
+ struct extent_position *last_pos,
+ struct kernel_long_ad *last_ext,
+ uint32_t final_block_len)
+{
+ struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
+ uint32_t added_bytes;
+
+ added_bytes = final_block_len -
+ (last_ext->extLength & (sb->s_blocksize - 1));
+ last_ext->extLength += added_bytes;
+ UDF_I(inode)->i_lenExtents += added_bytes;
+
+ udf_write_aext(inode, last_pos, &last_ext->extLocation,
+ last_ext->extLength, 1);
+}
+
static int udf_extend_file(struct inode *inode, loff_t newsize)
{
@@ -605,10 +623,12 @@ static int udf_extend_file(struct inode *inode, loff_t newsize)
int8_t etype;
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
sector_t first_block = newsize >> sb->s_blocksize_bits, offset;
+ unsigned long partial_final_block;
int adsize;
struct udf_inode_info *iinfo = UDF_I(inode);
struct kernel_long_ad extent;
- int err;
+ int err = 0;
+ int within_final_block;
if (iinfo->i_alloc_type == ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_SHORT)
adsize = sizeof(struct short_ad);
@@ -618,18 +638,8 @@ static int udf_extend_file(struct inode *inode, loff_t newsize)
BUG();
etype = inode_bmap(inode, first_block, &epos, &eloc, &elen, &offset);
+ within_final_block = (etype != -1);
- /* File has extent covering the new size (could happen when extending
- * inside a block)? */
- if (etype != -1)
- return 0;
- if (newsize & (sb->s_blocksize - 1))
- offset++;
- /* Extended file just to the boundary of the last file block? */
- if (offset == 0)
- return 0;
-
- /* Truncate is extending the file by 'offset' blocks */
if ((!epos.bh && epos.offset == udf_file_entry_alloc_offset(inode)) ||
(epos.bh && epos.offset == sizeof(struct allocExtDesc))) {
/* File has no extents at all or has empty last
@@ -643,7 +653,22 @@ static int udf_extend_file(struct inode *inode, loff_t newsize)
&extent.extLength, 0);
extent.extLength |= etype << 30;
}
- err = udf_do_extend_file(inode, &epos, &extent, offset);
+
+ partial_final_block = newsize & (sb->s_blocksize - 1);
+
+ /* File has extent covering the new size (could happen when extending
+ * inside a block)?
+ */
+ if (within_final_block) {
+ /* Extending file within the last file block */
+ udf_do_extend_final_block(inode, &epos, &extent,
+ partial_final_block);
+ } else {
+ loff_t add = ((loff_t)offset << sb->s_blocksize_bits) |
+ partial_final_block;
+ err = udf_do_extend_file(inode, &epos, &extent, add);
+ }
+
if (err < 0)
goto out;
err = 0;
@@ -745,6 +770,7 @@ static sector_t inode_getblk(struct inode *inode, sector_t block,
/* Are we beyond EOF? */
if (etype == -1) {
int ret;
+ loff_t hole_len;
isBeyondEOF = true;
if (count) {
if (c)
@@ -760,7 +786,8 @@ static sector_t inode_getblk(struct inode *inode, sector_t block,
startnum = (offset > 0);
}
/* Create extents for the hole between EOF and offset */
- ret = udf_do_extend_file(inode, &prev_epos, laarr, offset);
+ hole_len = (loff_t)offset << inode->i_blkbits;
+ ret = udf_do_extend_file(inode, &prev_epos, laarr, hole_len);
if (ret < 0) {
*err = ret;
newblock = 0;
diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_aops.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_aops.c
index 8da5e6637771..11f703d4a605 100644
--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_aops.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_aops.c
@@ -782,7 +782,7 @@ xfs_add_to_ioend(
atomic_inc(&iop->write_count);
if (!merged) {
- if (bio_full(wpc->ioend->io_bio))
+ if (bio_full(wpc->ioend->io_bio, len))
xfs_chain_bio(wpc->ioend, wbc, bdev, sector);
bio_add_page(wpc->ioend->io_bio, page, len, poff);
}
diff --git a/include/linux/bio.h b/include/linux/bio.h
index f87abaa898f0..e36b8fc1b1c3 100644
--- a/include/linux/bio.h
+++ b/include/linux/bio.h
@@ -102,9 +102,23 @@ static inline void *bio_data(struct bio *bio)
return NULL;
}
-static inline bool bio_full(struct bio *bio)
+/**
+ * bio_full - check if the bio is full
+ * @bio: bio to check
+ * @len: length of one segment to be added
+ *
+ * Return true if @bio is full and one segment with @len bytes can't be
+ * added to the bio, otherwise return false
+ */
+static inline bool bio_full(struct bio *bio, unsigned len)
{
- return bio->bi_vcnt >= bio->bi_max_vecs;
+ if (bio->bi_vcnt >= bio->bi_max_vecs)
+ return true;
+
+ if (bio->bi_iter.bi_size > UINT_MAX - len)
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
}
static inline bool bio_next_segment(const struct bio *bio,
diff --git a/include/linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h b/include/linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h
index 77ac9c7b9483..762f793e92f6 100644
--- a/include/linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h
@@ -62,9 +62,18 @@ enum {
/*
* A single VMCI device has an upper limit of 128MB on the amount of
- * memory that can be used for queue pairs.
+ * memory that can be used for queue pairs. Since each queue pair
+ * consists of at least two pages, the memory limit also dictates the
+ * number of queue pairs a guest can create.
*/
#define VMCI_MAX_GUEST_QP_MEMORY (128 * 1024 * 1024)
+#define VMCI_MAX_GUEST_QP_COUNT (VMCI_MAX_GUEST_QP_MEMORY / PAGE_SIZE / 2)
+
+/*
+ * There can be at most PAGE_SIZE doorbells since there is one doorbell
+ * per byte in the doorbell bitmap page.
+ */
+#define VMCI_MAX_GUEST_DOORBELL_COUNT PAGE_SIZE
/*
* Queues with pre-mapped data pages must be small, so that we don't pin
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/usb/audio.h b/include/uapi/linux/usb/audio.h
index ddc5396800aa..76b7c3f6cd0d 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/usb/audio.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/usb/audio.h
@@ -450,6 +450,43 @@ static inline __u8 *uac_processing_unit_specific(struct uac_processing_unit_desc
}
}
+/*
+ * Extension Unit (XU) has almost compatible layout with Processing Unit, but
+ * on UAC2, it has a different bmControls size (bControlSize); it's 1 byte for
+ * XU while 2 bytes for PU. The last iExtension field is a one-byte index as
+ * well as iProcessing field of PU.
+ */
+static inline __u8 uac_extension_unit_bControlSize(struct uac_processing_unit_descriptor *desc,
+ int protocol)
+{
+ switch (protocol) {
+ case UAC_VERSION_1:
+ return desc->baSourceID[desc->bNrInPins + 4];
+ case UAC_VERSION_2:
+ return 1; /* in UAC2, this value is constant */
+ case UAC_VERSION_3:
+ return 4; /* in UAC3, this value is constant */
+ default:
+ return 1;
+ }
+}
+
+static inline __u8 uac_extension_unit_iExtension(struct uac_processing_unit_descriptor *desc,
+ int protocol)
+{
+ __u8 control_size = uac_extension_unit_bControlSize(desc, protocol);
+
+ switch (protocol) {
+ case UAC_VERSION_1:
+ case UAC_VERSION_2:
+ default:
+ return *(uac_processing_unit_bmControls(desc, protocol)
+ + control_size);
+ case UAC_VERSION_3:
+ return 0; /* UAC3 does not have this field */
+ }
+}
+
/* 4.5.2 Class-Specific AS Interface Descriptor */
struct uac1_as_header_descriptor {
__u8 bLength; /* in bytes: 7 */
diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c
index 6f3a35949cdd..f24a757f8239 100644
--- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c
+++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c
@@ -3255,6 +3255,7 @@ static void alc256_init(struct hda_codec *codec)
alc_update_coefex_idx(codec, 0x57, 0x04, 0x0007, 0x4); /* Hight power */
alc_update_coefex_idx(codec, 0x53, 0x02, 0x8000, 1 << 15); /* Clear bit */
alc_update_coefex_idx(codec, 0x53, 0x02, 0x8000, 0 << 15);
+ alc_update_coef_idx(codec, 0x36, 1 << 13, 1 << 5); /* Switch pcbeep path to Line in path*/
}
static void alc256_shutup(struct hda_codec *codec)
@@ -7825,7 +7826,6 @@ static int patch_alc269(struct hda_codec *codec)
spec->shutup = alc256_shutup;
spec->init_hook = alc256_init;
spec->gen.mixer_nid = 0; /* ALC256 does not have any loopback mixer path */
- alc_update_coef_idx(codec, 0x36, 1 << 13, 1 << 5); /* Switch pcbeep path to Line in path*/
break;
case 0x10ec0257:
spec->codec_variant = ALC269_TYPE_ALC257;
diff --git a/sound/usb/mixer.c b/sound/usb/mixer.c
index c703f8534b07..7498b5191b68 100644
--- a/sound/usb/mixer.c
+++ b/sound/usb/mixer.c
@@ -2303,7 +2303,7 @@ static struct procunit_info extunits[] = {
*/
static int build_audio_procunit(struct mixer_build *state, int unitid,
void *raw_desc, struct procunit_info *list,
- char *name)
+ bool extension_unit)
{
struct uac_processing_unit_descriptor *desc = raw_desc;
int num_ins;
@@ -2320,6 +2320,8 @@ static int build_audio_procunit(struct mixer_build *state, int unitid,
static struct procunit_info default_info = {
0, NULL, default_value_info
};
+ const char *name = extension_unit ?
+ "Extension Unit" : "Processing Unit";
if (desc->bLength < 13) {
usb_audio_err(state->chip, "invalid %s descriptor (id %d)\n", name, unitid);
@@ -2433,7 +2435,10 @@ static int build_audio_procunit(struct mixer_build *state, int unitid,
} else if (info->name) {
strlcpy(kctl->id.name, info->name, sizeof(kctl->id.name));
} else {
- nameid = uac_processing_unit_iProcessing(desc, state->mixer->protocol);
+ if (extension_unit)
+ nameid = uac_extension_unit_iExtension(desc, state->mixer->protocol);
+ else
+ nameid = uac_processing_unit_iProcessing(desc, state->mixer->protocol);
len = 0;
if (nameid)
len = snd_usb_copy_string_desc(state->chip,
@@ -2466,10 +2471,10 @@ static int parse_audio_processing_unit(struct mixer_build *state, int unitid,
case UAC_VERSION_2:
default:
return build_audio_procunit(state, unitid, raw_desc,
- procunits, "Processing Unit");
+ procunits, false);
case UAC_VERSION_3:
return build_audio_procunit(state, unitid, raw_desc,
- uac3_procunits, "Processing Unit");
+ uac3_procunits, false);
}
}
@@ -2480,8 +2485,7 @@ static int parse_audio_extension_unit(struct mixer_build *state, int unitid,
* Note that we parse extension units with processing unit descriptors.
* That's ok as the layout is the same.
*/
- return build_audio_procunit(state, unitid, raw_desc,
- extunits, "Extension Unit");
+ return build_audio_procunit(state, unitid, raw_desc, extunits, true);
}
/*
diff --git a/tools/perf/Documentation/intel-pt.txt b/tools/perf/Documentation/intel-pt.txt
index 115eaacc455f..60d99e5e7921 100644
--- a/tools/perf/Documentation/intel-pt.txt
+++ b/tools/perf/Documentation/intel-pt.txt
@@ -88,16 +88,16 @@ smaller.
To represent software control flow, "branches" samples are produced. By default
a branch sample is synthesized for every single branch. To get an idea what
-data is available you can use the 'perf script' tool with no parameters, which
-will list all the samples.
+data is available you can use the 'perf script' tool with all itrace sampling
+options, which will list all the samples.
perf record -e intel_pt//u ls
- perf script
+ perf script --itrace=ibxwpe
An interesting field that is not printed by default is 'flags' which can be
displayed as follows:
- perf script -Fcomm,tid,pid,time,cpu,event,trace,ip,sym,dso,addr,symoff,flags
+ perf script --itrace=ibxwpe -F+flags
The flags are "bcrosyiABEx" which stand for branch, call, return, conditional,
system, asynchronous, interrupt, transaction abort, trace begin, trace end, and
@@ -713,7 +713,7 @@ Having no option is the same as
which, in turn, is the same as
- --itrace=ibxwpe
+ --itrace=cepwx
The letters are:
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/auxtrace.c b/tools/perf/util/auxtrace.c
index 66e82bd0683e..cfdbf65f1e02 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/auxtrace.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/auxtrace.c
@@ -1001,7 +1001,8 @@ int itrace_parse_synth_opts(const struct option *opt, const char *str,
}
if (!str) {
- itrace_synth_opts__set_default(synth_opts, false);
+ itrace_synth_opts__set_default(synth_opts,
+ synth_opts->default_no_sample);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/header.c b/tools/perf/util/header.c
index 847ae51a524b..fb0aa661644b 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/header.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/header.c
@@ -3602,6 +3602,7 @@ int perf_event__synthesize_features(struct perf_tool *tool,
return -ENOMEM;
ff.size = sz - sz_hdr;
+ ff.ph = &session->header;
for_each_set_bit(feat, header->adds_features, HEADER_FEAT_BITS) {
if (!feat_ops[feat].synthesize) {
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/intel-pt.c b/tools/perf/util/intel-pt.c
index d6f1b2a03f9b..f7dd4657535d 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/intel-pt.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/intel-pt.c
@@ -2579,7 +2579,8 @@ int intel_pt_process_auxtrace_info(union perf_event *event,
} else {
itrace_synth_opts__set_default(&pt->synth_opts,
session->itrace_synth_opts->default_no_sample);
- if (use_browser != -1) {
+ if (!session->itrace_synth_opts->default_no_sample &&
+ !session->itrace_synth_opts->inject) {
pt->synth_opts.branches = false;
pt->synth_opts.callchain = true;
}
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/pmu.c b/tools/perf/util/pmu.c
index e0429f4ef335..faa8eb231e1b 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/pmu.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/pmu.c
@@ -709,9 +709,7 @@ static void pmu_add_cpu_aliases(struct list_head *head, struct perf_pmu *pmu)
{
int i;
struct pmu_events_map *map;
- struct pmu_event *pe;
const char *name = pmu->name;
- const char *pname;
map = perf_pmu__find_map(pmu);
if (!map)
@@ -722,28 +720,26 @@ static void pmu_add_cpu_aliases(struct list_head *head, struct perf_pmu *pmu)
*/
i = 0;
while (1) {
+ const char *cpu_name = is_arm_pmu_core(name) ? name : "cpu";
+ struct pmu_event *pe = &map->table[i++];
+ const char *pname = pe->pmu ? pe->pmu : cpu_name;
- pe = &map->table[i++];
if (!pe->name) {
if (pe->metric_group || pe->metric_name)
continue;
break;
}
- if (!is_arm_pmu_core(name)) {
- pname = pe->pmu ? pe->pmu : "cpu";
-
- /*
- * uncore alias may be from different PMU
- * with common prefix
- */
- if (pmu_is_uncore(name) &&
- !strncmp(pname, name, strlen(pname)))
- goto new_alias;
+ /*
+ * uncore alias may be from different PMU
+ * with common prefix
+ */
+ if (pmu_is_uncore(name) &&
+ !strncmp(pname, name, strlen(pname)))
+ goto new_alias;
- if (strcmp(pname, name))
- continue;
- }
+ if (strcmp(pname, name))
+ continue;
new_alias:
/* need type casts to override 'const' */
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/thread-stack.c b/tools/perf/util/thread-stack.c
index 4ba9e866b076..60c9d955c4d7 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/thread-stack.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/thread-stack.c
@@ -616,6 +616,23 @@ static int thread_stack__bottom(struct thread_stack *ts,
true, false);
}
+static int thread_stack__pop_ks(struct thread *thread, struct thread_stack *ts,
+ struct perf_sample *sample, u64 ref)
+{
+ u64 tm = sample->time;
+ int err;
+
+ /* Return to userspace, so pop all kernel addresses */
+ while (thread_stack__in_kernel(ts)) {
+ err = thread_stack__call_return(thread, ts, --ts->cnt,
+ tm, ref, true);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int thread_stack__no_call_return(struct thread *thread,
struct thread_stack *ts,
struct perf_sample *sample,
@@ -896,7 +913,18 @@ int thread_stack__process(struct thread *thread, struct comm *comm,
ts->rstate = X86_RETPOLINE_DETECTED;
} else if (sample->flags & PERF_IP_FLAG_RETURN) {
- if (!sample->ip || !sample->addr)
+ if (!sample->addr) {
+ u32 return_from_kernel = PERF_IP_FLAG_SYSCALLRET |
+ PERF_IP_FLAG_INTERRUPT;
+
+ if (!(sample->flags & return_from_kernel))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Pop kernel stack */
+ return thread_stack__pop_ks(thread, ts, sample, ref);
+ }
+
+ if (!sample->ip)
return 0;
/* x86 retpoline 'return' doesn't match the stack */
Attachment:
signature.asc
Description: PGP signature