Re: general protection fault in open_fs_devices

[Anand Jain]

On 06/06/2018 09:17 PM, syzbot wrote:
> Hello,
>
> syzbot found the following crash on:
>
> HEAD commit:ÂÂÂ af6c5d5e01ad Merge branch 'for-4.18' of 
> git://git.kernel.o..
> git tree:ÂÂÂÂÂÂ upstream
> console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=1732a6f7800000
> kernel config:Â https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=12ff770540994680
> dashboard link: 
> https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=909a5177749d7990ffa4
> compiler:ÂÂÂÂÂÂ gcc (GCC) 8.0.1 20180413 (experimental)
> syzkaller repro:https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=16ba31f7800000
> C reproducer:ÂÂ https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=16d4ac8f800000
>
> IMPORTANT: if you fix the bug, please add the following tag to the commit:
> Reported-by: syzbot+909a5177749d7990ffa4@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>
> random: sshd: uninitialized urandom read (32 bytes read)
> BTRFS: device fsid ecf6f2a2-2997-48ae-b81e-1b00920efd9a devid 0 transid 
> 0 /dev/loop0
> print_req_error: I/O error, dev loop1, sector 128
> kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled

> kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access

> general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
> CPU: 0 PID: 4540 Comm: syz-executor962 Not tainted 4.17.0+ #86
> Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS 
> Google 01/01/2011
> RIP: 0010:open_fs_devices+0x7e8/0xc60 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1124

 Which means there was some other thread which freed our %fs_devices.
 As this thread is still in open_ctree() so the contending thread can't
 be the ioctl(). So btrfs_free_stale_devices() is the only thread which
 can free our %fs_devices in this case.

 This is fixed in [1] in the mailing list.

 [1]
   [PATCH 3/3] btrfs: fix race between mkfs and mount

 Thanks, Anand

> Code: 48 8b 85 e0 fe ff ff 41 c7 87 14 01 00 00 01 00 00 00 48 8d b8 a0 
> 00 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 
> 00 0f 85 01 04 00 00 48 8b 85 e0 fe ff ff 49 8d 7f 50 48
> RSP: 0018:ffff8801d06971d8 EFLAGS: 00010206
> RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffffffff82c386af
> RDX: 0000000000000014 RSI: ffffffff82c386bd RDI: 00000000000000a0
> RBP: ffff8801d0697348 R08: ffff8801ad4fc580 R09: ffff8801d0697240
> R10: ffffed003a0d2e5c R11: ffff8801d06972e7 R12: ffff8801ad4f8158
> R13: ffff8801ad4f80d8 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffff8801ad4f8080
> FS:Â 00000000017dd880(0000) GS:ffff8801dae00000(0000) 
> knlGS:0000000000000000
> CS:Â 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> CR2: 0000000000ede000 CR3: 00000001adaac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
> DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
> DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
> Call Trace:
>  Âbtrfs_open_devices+0xc0/0xd0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1155
>  Âbtrfs_mount_root+0x91f/0x1e70 fs/btrfs/super.c:1568
>  Âmount_fs+0xae/0x328 fs/super.c:1277
>  Âvfs_kern_mount.part.34+0xd4/0x4d0 fs/namespace.c:1037
>  Âvfs_kern_mount+0x40/0x60 fs/namespace.c:1027
>  Âbtrfs_mount+0x4a1/0x213e fs/btrfs/super.c:1661
>  Âmount_fs+0xae/0x328 fs/super.c:1277
>  Âvfs_kern_mount.part.34+0xd4/0x4d0 fs/namespace.c:1037
>  Âvfs_kern_mount fs/namespace.c:1027 [inline]
>  Âdo_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2518 [inline]
>  Âdo_mount+0x564/0x30b0 fs/namespace.c:2848
>  Âksys_mount+0x12d/0x140 fs/namespace.c:3064
>  Â__do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3078 [inline]
>  Â__se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3075 [inline]
>  Â__x64_sys_mount+0xbe/0x150 fs/namespace.c:3075
>  Âdo_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
>  Âentry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
> RIP: 0033:0x4431fa
> Code: b8 08 00 00 00 0f 05 48 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 fd e5 fb ff c3 66 2e 
> 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 
> f0 ff ff 0f 83 da e5 fb ff c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00
> RSP: 002b:00007ffc2d953358 EFLAGS: 00000297 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
> RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00000000004431fa
> RDX: 0000000020000080 RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI: 00007ffc2d953370
> RBP: 0000000000000004 R08: 00000000200000c0 R09: 000000000000000a
> R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000297 R12: 000000000000000d
> R13: 0000000008100000 R14: 0030656c69662f2e R15: fe03f80fe03f80ff
> Modules linked in:
> Dumping ftrace buffer:
>  ÂÂ (ftrace buffer empty)
> ---[ end trace d8b96c29a3ffd356 ]---
> RIP: 0010:open_fs_devices+0x7e8/0xc60 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1124
> Code: 48 8b 85 e0 fe ff ff 41 c7 87 14 01 00 00 01 00 00 00 48 8d b8 a0 
> 00 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 
> 00 0f 85 01 04 00 00 48 8b 85 e0 fe ff ff 49 8d 7f 50 48
> RSP: 0018:ffff8801d06971d8 EFLAGS: 00010206
> RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffffffff82c386af
> RDX: 0000000000000014 RSI: ffffffff82c386bd RDI: 00000000000000a0
> RBP: ffff8801d0697348 R08: ffff8801ad4fc580 R09: ffff8801d0697240
> R10: ffffed003a0d2e5c R11: ffff8801d06972e7 R12: ffff8801ad4f8158
> R13: ffff8801ad4f80d8 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffff8801ad4f8080
> FS:Â 00000000017dd880(0000) GS:ffff8801dae00000(0000) 
> knlGS:0000000000000000
> CS:Â 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> CR2: 0000000000ede000 CR3: 00000001adaac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
> DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
> DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
>
>
> ---
> This bug is generated by a bot. It may contain errors.
> See https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ for more information about syzbot.
> syzbot engineers can be reached at syzkaller@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>
> syzbot will keep track of this bug report. See:
> https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#bug-status-tracking for how to communicate with 
> syzbot.
> syzbot can test patches for this bug, for details see:
> https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#testing-patches
> --
> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-btrfs" in
> the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html