Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH resend 2/2] userns: control capabilities of some user namespaces

From: Christian Brauner
Date: Mon Nov 06 2017 - 17:42:18 EST


On Mon, Nov 06, 2017 at 04:14:18PM -0600, Serge Hallyn wrote:
> Quoting Daniel Micay (danielmicay@xxxxxxxxx):
> > Substantial added attack surface will never go away as a problem. There
> > aren't a finite number of vulnerabilities to be found.
>
> There's varying levels of usefulness and quality. There is code which I
> want to be able to use in a container, and code which I can't ever see a
> reason for using there. The latter, especially if it's also in a
> staging driver, would be nice to have a toggle to disable.
>
> You're not advocating dropping the added attack surface, only adding a
> way of dealing with an 0day after the fact. Privilege raising 0days can
> exist anywhere, not just in code which only root in a user namespace can
> exercise. So from that point of view, ksplice seems a more complete
> solution. Why not just actually fix the bad code block when we know
> about it?
>
> Finally, it has been well argued that you can gain many new caps from
> having only a few others. Given that, how could you ever be sure that,
> if an 0day is found which allows root in a user ns to abuse
> CAP_NET_ADMIN against the host, just keeping CAP_NET_ADMIN from them
> would suffice? It seems to me that the existing control in
> /proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_userns_clone might be the better duct tape
> in that case.

I agree that /proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_userns_clone is the most reasonable
thing to do. This patch introduces a layer of complexity to fine-tune user
namespace creation that - in the relevant security critical scenario - should
simply be turned of entirely.

Is /proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_userns_clone upstreamed or is this still only
carried downstream?