[PATCH 3.10 086/139] net: Set sk_prot_creator when cloning sockets to the right proto

From: Willy Tarreau
Date: Wed Nov 01 2017 - 17:53:36 EST


From: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@xxxxxxxxx>

commit 9d538fa60bad4f7b23193c89e843797a1cf71ef3 upstream.

sk->sk_prot and sk->sk_prot_creator can differ when the app uses
IPV6_ADDRFORM (transforming an IPv6-socket to an IPv4-one).
Which is why sk_prot_creator is there to make sure that sk_prot_free()
does the kmem_cache_free() on the right kmem_cache slab.

Now, if such a socket gets transformed back to a listening socket (using
connect() with AF_UNSPEC) we will allocate an IPv4 tcp_sock through
sk_clone_lock() when a new connection comes in. But sk_prot_creator will
still point to the IPv6 kmem_cache (as everything got copied in
sk_clone_lock()). When freeing, we will thus put this
memory back into the IPv6 kmem_cache although it was allocated in the
IPv4 cache. I have seen memory corruption happening because of this.

With slub-debugging and MEMCG_KMEM enabled this gives the warning
"cache_from_obj: Wrong slab cache. TCPv6 but object is from TCP"

A C-program to trigger this:

void main(void)
{
int fd = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP);
int new_fd, newest_fd, client_fd;
struct sockaddr_in6 bind_addr;
struct sockaddr_in bind_addr4, client_addr1, client_addr2;
struct sockaddr unsp;
int val;

memset(&bind_addr, 0, sizeof(bind_addr));
bind_addr.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
bind_addr.sin6_port = ntohs(42424);

memset(&client_addr1, 0, sizeof(client_addr1));
client_addr1.sin_family = AF_INET;
client_addr1.sin_port = ntohs(42424);
client_addr1.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");

memset(&client_addr2, 0, sizeof(client_addr2));
client_addr2.sin_family = AF_INET;
client_addr2.sin_port = ntohs(42421);
client_addr2.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");

memset(&unsp, 0, sizeof(unsp));
unsp.sa_family = AF_UNSPEC;

bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&bind_addr, sizeof(bind_addr));

listen(fd, 5);

client_fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP);
connect(client_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&client_addr1, sizeof(client_addr1));
new_fd = accept(fd, NULL, NULL);
close(fd);

val = AF_INET;
setsockopt(new_fd, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_ADDRFORM, &val, sizeof(val));

connect(new_fd, &unsp, sizeof(unsp));

memset(&bind_addr4, 0, sizeof(bind_addr4));
bind_addr4.sin_family = AF_INET;
bind_addr4.sin_port = ntohs(42421);
bind(new_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&bind_addr4, sizeof(bind_addr4));

listen(new_fd, 5);

client_fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP);
connect(client_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&client_addr2, sizeof(client_addr2));

newest_fd = accept(new_fd, NULL, NULL);
close(new_fd);

close(client_fd);
close(new_fd);
}

As far as I can see, this bug has been there since the beginning of the
git-days.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@xxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@xxxxxx>
---
net/core/sock.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c
index 96e1259..104784e 100644
--- a/net/core/sock.c
+++ b/net/core/sock.c
@@ -1470,6 +1470,8 @@ struct sock *sk_clone_lock(const struct sock *sk, const gfp_t priority)

sock_copy(newsk, sk);

+ newsk->sk_prot_creator = sk->sk_prot;
+
/* SANITY */
get_net(sock_net(newsk));
sk_node_init(&newsk->sk_node);
--
2.8.0.rc2.1.gbe9624a