Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/6] security/keys: use constant time memory comparison for macs

[James Morris]

On Sat, 10 Jun 2017, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:

> Otherwise, we enable a MAC forgery via timing attack.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@xxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: David Safford <safford@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: keyrings@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx


Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@xxxxxxxxxx>


-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>