[PATCH v4 05/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using

From: Jason A. Donenfeld
Date: Tue Jun 06 2017 - 13:50:37 EST


Otherwise, we might be seeding the RNG using bad randomness, which is
dangerous. The one use of this function from within the kernel -- not
from userspace -- is being removed (keys/big_key), so that call site
isn't relevant in assessing this.

Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@xxxxxxxxx>
---
crypto/rng.c | 6 ++++--
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/rng.c b/crypto/rng.c
index f46dac5288b9..e042437e64b4 100644
--- a/crypto/rng.c
+++ b/crypto/rng.c
@@ -48,12 +48,14 @@ int crypto_rng_reset(struct crypto_rng *tfm, const u8 *seed, unsigned int slen)
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;

- get_random_bytes(buf, slen);
+ err = get_random_bytes_wait(buf, slen);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
seed = buf;
}

err = crypto_rng_alg(tfm)->seed(tfm, seed, slen);
-
+out:
kzfree(buf);
return err;
}
--
2.13.0